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THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

HYDE PARK CITY
Plaintiff/ Appellee,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

vs

Priority No. 2

JERALD RIO DAVIS
Defendant /Appellant.

Case No.20080055-CA

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
1.

Defendant/Appellant was charged in the Justice Court for Hyde Park City

before a Justice court judge sitting in that court with some legal training but which
justice was neither a law school graduate nor a member of any state or federal bar. The
Defendant/Appellant, prior to trial in the Justice Court, filed Motions to Dismiss (See
Appendix A) thereby challenging the constitutionality and sufficiency of the city
ordinances under which Defendant/Appellant was charged and sentenced as well as the
legislative enactments enabling the creation and operation of the Justice court system.
2.

The Defendant/Appellant suffered an adverse ruling by the sitting Justice

and was thereafter tried, convicted and sentenced by said Justice Court Judge (See
Appendix B). Defendant/Appellant appealed the conviction and Sentence to the First
District court for Cache County (See Appendix C) and particularly specifying therein that

1

an illegal sentence had been imposed in light of Utah Law in addition to the other matters
addressed in the Motions presented at the Justice Court level.
3.

The case was heard denovo in the District Court for Cache County and

Defendant/Appellant suffered adverse rulings on all motions to dismiss filed therewith
(See Appendix D), each filed anew in connection with the denovo proceeding
(practically identical to those filed in the Justice Court). Each Motion addressed
Constitutional issues and in fact challenged the constitutionality of one or more statutes
or ordinances.
4.

Defendant/Appellant was convicted by the District Court after a Bench

Trial on the 19th day of September, 2007 and at that time Judgment and Sentence were
orally imposed by the Trial Court. (See Transcript as Appendix E). The Minutes,
Sentence, Judgment, Commitment and Notice was signed and filed by the Court on the
28th day of September, 2007 (See Appendix F). A Notice of Appeal was filed by the
Defendant/Appellant on the 15 th day of October, 2007 (See Appendix G). This Appeal is
taken from a criminal judgment pursuant to the provisions of Rule 26 of the Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure and Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l, (1953 as Amended).
Jurisdiction of this Court is established pursuant to provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(e), (1953 as Amended).
5.

The clerk of the Trial Court refrained from transmitting the file to the Court

of Appeals, which Appeal Defendant had filed on 15 October 2007, even after the

2

Designation of Record was filed on November 30, 2007 (See Appendix H). On the 16 th
day of January, 2008 the file was belatedly transmitted to the Utah Court of Appeals after
two evidentiary hearings addressing a disputed contempt citation had transpired. The
Trial Court, at each hearing, had granted Defendant/Appellant additional time to
complete an ordered cleanup; the last review on the ordered clean up was scheduled for
the 1st day of July, 2008 and was heard on that date, no further hearings are now
scheduled.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
6.

The Standard of Review on Appeal concerning the challenge to the Trial

Court's interpretation as to the constitutionality of the questioned ordinance, the legality
of the sentence, and the constitutionality of the Statutes creating Justice courts is as to the
correctness of the trial courts ruling without deference to the trial Judges findings.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I.

Are the Plaintiff/Appellee City's nuisance ordinances repugnant to
and in conflict with the laws of the State of Utah and not in accord
with the doctrine announced in ALLGOOD v. LARSON (Supra).

II

Are the nuisance Ordinances of Plaintiff/ Appellee and the various
Statutes of the State of Utah addressing nuisance constitutional or
should said statutes be declared void-for-vagueness because the
statutes do not adequately define what is a nuisance nor do they
provide adequate guidelines for the enforcement of said statutes.

III.

Is the penalty ordinance No. 10-359 of the Plaintiff/ Appellee
enforceable on its face as imposed upon Defendant/ Appellant?

IV.

The Statutory scheme for Justice Courts interferes with Judicial
3

independence by providing monetary incentives to convict criminal
defendants and by authorizing the administrative arm of municipal
government to hire and fire judges and to control court operations.
V.

Did the Trial Court both at the Justice Court level and at the District
level abuse their respective discretions and exceed the Maximum
sentence as allowed by State Law thereby denying Due Process as
guaranteed by the Utah Constitution and by the United States
Constitution.

VI. Did the District Court rule by its ruling appropriately dispose of the
issues as to constitutionality of a statute or ordinance when it denied
the Defendant/Appellant's motion to dismiss and the motion to quash
the justice court conviction.
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES FOR APPEAL
7.

The issues presented in the de novo prosecution were adequately preserved

at the Justice Court level and subsequently in the District Court by Motion to Dismiss
supported by a Memorandum of Points and Authorities dated 12th April, 2007 filed
addressing the violation of the Defendant's right to due process of law, equal protection
under the laws and right to uniform operation of the law, in that the Statute UCA 10-8-60
defining what constitutes a Nuisance is relegated to each city and town and violates the
Doctrine of Separation of powers as mandated by Article VIII Section 4 of the Utah
Constitution and other constitutional provisions and that the very existence of the Justice
Court constitutes a violation of Article VIII Section 4 of the Utah Constitution and
thereby may not presume jurisdiction to decide criminal cases or controversies and by
Objection to the Order entered on Motion to Dismiss And To Quash Conviction as filed
on the 21 st August, 2007 (See Appendix J) and on the Objection to Oral Verdict,
4

Judgement and Sentence filed on the 9 October, 2007 (See Appendix K).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
CASES CITED AND LEARNED WORKS AND OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED
United States Constitution, 14 th Amendment
Utah Constitution Article I, Section 1
Utah Constitution Article I, Section 24
Utah Constitution Article V, Section 1
Utah Constitution Article VIII, Section 1
Utah Constitution Article VIII Section 4
Utah Constitution Article XI Section 5
Tennessee Constitution Article II, Section 2
Tennessee Constitution Article IV, Section 4
Tennessee Constitution Article VI, Section 1
Utah Code Annotated § 10-3-703
Utah Code Annotated § 10-8-6
Utah Code Annotated § 10-8-60
Utah Code Annotated § 10-8-84
Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-103 (1)
Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-104
Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-301
Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-801(1)
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Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-801 (2)
Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-803
Utah Code Annotated § 77-18a-l (1953 as Amended)
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(e)
Utah Code Annotated § 78-3-4(8)
Utah Code Annotated § 78-3-13.4
Utah Code Annotated § 78-3-14.5 (2)
Utah Code Annotated § 78-5-101
Utah Code Annotated § 78-5-101.5
Utah Code Annotated § 78-5-104(1)
Utah Code Annotated § 78-5-108
Utah Code Annotated § 78-5-110
Utah Code Annotated § 78-5-111
Utah Code Annotated § 78-5-116 (1)
Utah Code Annotated § 78-5-132 (1)
Utah Code Annotated § 78-5-134 (2)
Utah Code Annotated § 78-5-134 (5)
Utah Code Annotated § 78-5-134 (5)(d)
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Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 26
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Winters v. New York 333 U.S. 507, 515, 92 L.Ed 840, 68 S.Ct. 665 (1948)
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Sam Newton, Justice Court Appeal: The Good, the Bad, and the Unintended, 18 Utah
Bar J. No. 1 at 25 (January/February 2005)
Blacks Law Dictionary 7th Edition, West Group 1999
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
8.

This action was originally filed in the Justice Court of Hyde Park City and

was, after proceedings in that court, appealed to the District Court for Cache County.
This Appeal is taken from a final Judgment and Sentence entered in the First District
Court for Cache County, State of Utah on the 19 day of September, 2007 and signed by
the District Judge on the 28 day of September, 2007 convicting Defendant of a purported
violation of Hyde Park City Ordinance 10-332 thereby adjudging Defendant guilty of 1
Count of Maintaining a Nuisance, an infraction.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
9.

Ira B. (Friday) Davis, the father of Defendant Jerald Rio Davis was a long

time resident of Hyde Park City, owning lands located at 187 East 200 North in that
city consisting of 1.07 acres upon which stood a home and shop which housed the
business which was licensed pursuant to the laws of said municipality and operated as Ira
B. Davis Body and Fender, apparently a de facto Proprietorship.

9

10.

During the lifetime of Ira B. Davis, the minutes of the Hyde Park City

Council (examined from 1970 to present), no discussion concerning said lands is noted
other than one instance regarding placement of a "Trailer House" which had been moved
onto the property, there was a brief discussion but no formal action was taken at that time
and no further discussion regarding this topic or of any other issue was addressed until
the end of 1979. (A mobile home is still situated on the property and is rented to tenants
which tenants change from time to time.)
11.

Hyde Park City purported to enact Chapter 10-300 through 10-343 which

agglomeration of ordinances is hereinafter referred to as the "nuisance ordinance." This
ordinance appears to have been enacted on the 10 th day of January, 1979 and is said to
have been revised or amended on the 1st day of February, 1979.
12.

The "nuisance ordinance", as adopted by the Plaintiff City, differs

significantly from the nuisance statutes which have been and are presently enacted by the
Utah Legislature during all relevant times including the time coextensive with this
litigation and at the time of the alleged violation.
13.

On August 11, 1998 a letter from Mayor Mark E. Daines to Ira Davis

advised that the City had received complaints about the "appearance of your property"
(See Appendix L).
14.

In a letter dated November 9, 1998 from Mayor Mark E. Daines, it is

observed that,
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"...We have noticed the removal of some vehicles and very much appreciate
your willingness to comply with the ordinance and at the same time not
jeopardize your repair business/'
15.

Ira Davis died on May 18, 2001 and his estate ultimately passed to his son,

Rio Davis, the Defendant/Appellant who, having previously been employed in the
business by his father, continued to operate the business under license issued upon
application of Rio Davis (See Appendix M). No significant alterations to the general
condition of the subject lands have been made since the demise of Ira Davis except as
noted hereinbelow.
16.

After taking possession of the property at 187 East 200 North, Hyde Park,

Utah, Defendant/Appellant commenced a clean up, discarding and/or destroying items
considered not to be relevant to the continued operation of the business, and has indeed
removed a considerable amount of personal property from the East side of the tract,
which portion was then fenced and now serves as an enclosure for horses, apparently a
permitted use under applicable zoning ordinances. Personal property remains stored in
the open area behind the shop which houses the Davis repair business as it is now
operated. Likewise, a barn on the premises is employed as housing for animals as well as
for storage of machinery and auto parts.
17.

On March 21, 2003 Defendant/Appellant received a letter from Reed A.

Elder, purporting to represent Hyde Park City (See Appendix N). The letter discusses a
visit and alluded to goals which were to be accomplished by Defendant/Appellant in
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order to bring the property into compliance with the existing City ordinances as follows:
11

1. Removal of or storage in an onsite garage, ...all non-licensed vehicles and

boats.
2. All miscellaneous materials that you [emphasis mine] have no useful purpose
for and all debris must be removed from the property. This includes, but is not limited to
automotive motor parts, brick and masonry materials, lumber or other wood items, metal
barrels and all other items of furniture, machinery and building materials.
3. All material and machinery which you [emphasis mine] want to keep and store
on the property must be stored inside a closed structure or within an additional fenced
area inside the property which creates a visual barrier to the other properties surrounding
your property. The materials to be used and the location of placement of such a fence
would need to be approved by the City.
4. The property on which there is presently a trailer home located (northeast
corner) must be separated from the balance of your property to establish its own lot and
utilities. This will need to follow existing ordinances which the City will help you with.
5. This all must be accomplished within 120 days of this letter or the City may
have to take actions to have the work done, which will result in a charge to you for the
cost."
The letter goes on to request a signature from Defendant/Appellant which signature was
never provided.
18.

On or about the 3 rd day of November, 2005 Defendant/Appellant was

charged with the crime of "Maintaining a Nuisance" in violation of Hyde Park Revised
Ordinance No. 10-332 with regard to the tract located at 187 East 200 North, Hyde Park,
Utah and litigation ensued. (See Appendix P).
19.

After denial of written Motions challenging the constitutionality of the

court and of the ordinance a trial was had on the 28 th day of June, 2006 in the Hyde Park
City Court, whereupon the Defendant was found Guilty and was Sentenced on the 1 st day
of November, 2006 as follows: "Defendant is fined $50.00 (fifty dollars) each day after
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11/30/06 not in compliance with ordinance." (See paragraph 2 above.)
20.

The Judgment of Conviction and sentence entered by the Justice court was

Appealed to the First District Court in Cache County. After renewed Motions asserting
constitutional grounds were filed and denied by the District court a trial was had on the
19th day of September, 2007 whereupon the Defendant was adjudged Guilty of an
infraction and was Sentenced on the 28 th day of September, 2007 as specified
hereinabove. The sentence required that Defendant pay a $50.00 fine and clean up the
property to the satisfaction of city officials under pain of contempt.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
21.

The Defendant/ Appellant is charged with violation of Hyde Park City

Revised Ordinance 10-332 "Maintaining a Nuisance". The statute, as written, is
repugnant to and in conflict with the laws of the State of Utah and not in accord with the
doctrine announced in Allgood v. Larson 545 P.2d 530, 531 (Utah 1976)( See Appendix
Q) and as such the nuisance statutes of both Hyde Park City/Appellee and the State of
Utah are unconstitutional and should be declared void-for-vagueness because they do not
adequately define what is a nuisance nor do they provide adequate guidelines for
enforcement and each Ordinance should be struck down as unenforceable on its face and
as it has been applied to this particular Defendant.
22.

The Defendant/ Appellant contends that Part 10-331 of the Plaintiff/

Appellant's nuisance ordinance and U.C.A. § 76-10-801(1) defining nuisance and
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U.C.A. § 76-10-803 defining a public nuisance are unconstitutionally vague in violation
of Article I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
23.

Ordinances, such as the Plaintiff/Appellee has adopted here, are

regulated by the State laws and by the courts, the city cannot impose a greater sentence
than that provided by state law. See Allgood v. Larson (supra). It is to be noted that 108-84, by its express terms, limits the grant of power to municipalities to pass ordinances,
to those "not repugnant to law." It should be further noted that the penalty provisions in
the city ordinance exceeds the mandates of 10-8-60 by pre-classifying the offense as a
Class C Misdemeanor which defeats the "fine only" grant under the limitation on the
grant of power regarding nuisance charges bestowed on the city by that statute.
24.

The Utah legislature's scheme for establishing and operating justice courts

violates the separation of powers doctrine's prohibition proscribing acts of one branch
of government which interfere with performance of core functions by another branch.
Judges must be free to exercise exclusive power to decide cases independently and
without influence exerted by the executive and legislative branches. Under Utah's
statutory scheme, municipal governments have been afforded broad authority to control
and direct justice courts, including the power to whimsically appoint and dismiss judges.
In addition, municipalities may and are directed to control justice court budgets,
personnel, and resources. Because Utah law requires that municipalities must fund their
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own justice courts, local governments will tend to establish local courts only if the courts
are able to fund their own operations. In practice, some justice courts have become so
profitable that they serve as a significant source of revenue upon which the
municipalities they serve rely when planning their annual budgets. This legislative
scheme presents enormous, if subtle, incentives for justice court judges to generate
revenue by convicting and fining criminal defendants. These incentives and others
interfere with the core judicial function of independently and fairly adjudicating criminal
cases in violation of the separation of powers doctrine.
25.

The sentence imposed by the Justice Court as well as by the District Court

was clearly at odds with the powers extended to cities and towns (and importantly to the
District Court as well) and was surely "repugnant to law." Allgood vs. Larsen (decided)
see also State vs. Hemmert (supra) in the Supreme Court of the State of Utah No. 15725
(an unpublished opinion) Crockett, Hall and Ellet concurring.) If the singular and
unlawful sentence imposed by the Justice Court and, to some extent, perpetuated by the
District Court had it not found its basis in an unconstitutional ordinance, this Defendant
would have been deprived of any power to seek an effective review of the draconian
pronouncements that plagued this case as found its way through the lower Courts.
26.

Defendant/Appellee filed a Motion and Memorandum of Points and

Authorities In Support of a Motion To Dismiss in the District Court on or about the 12 th
day of April, 2007. A Motion to Quash the Justice Court conviction was also filed. Said
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Motions specifically addressed constitutional issues as related to the validity of
Plaintiff/Appellant's ordinances and the validity of certain statutes of State of Utah
regarding nuisance as well as the constitutionality of the sentences imposed.
27.

The District Court did no adequately address its basis for denying

Defendant/Appellant's Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Quash and in fact relied on a
presumption as if it were an item of evidence which tended to negate evidence in
argument presented by Defendant/Appellant.
ARGUMENT
I.
Are the Plaintiff/Appellee City's nuisance ordinances repugnant to
and in conflict with the laws of the State of Utah and not in accord with the
doctrine announced in ALLGOOD v. LARSON (Supra).
28.

The powers conferred on cities and towns within Utah, such as

Plaintiff/Appellee town are regulated by Title 10 of the Utah Code, U.C.A. § 10-8-60
significantly provides that:
" They [cities and town] may declare what shall be a nuisance, and abate
the same, and impose fines upon persons who may create, continue or
suffer nuisances to exist."
This section does not seem to address criminal sanctions and certainly limits the cities
power to that of imposing fines. Defendant/Appellant suggests that fines can be of either
a civil or criminal nature. Blacks Law Dictionary, 7th Edition West Group 1999 defines a
fine as, "a pecuniary criminal punishment or civil penalty payable to the public treasury."
29.

While this section seems to give considerable flexibility to the city/town to
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fashion its own standards of criminality, this section (even if it authorizes criminal
sanctions) must be considered in light of other provisions of law and in connection with
the "Allgood Doctrine" interestingly, Utah Code Annotated 10-8-60 does not seem to
allow the city to by their ordinances, to impose imprisonment as a punishment.
30.

As a limitation imposed on the Grant found in the above cited statute,

U.C.A. § 10-8-84 provides that cities and town such as Plaintiff/Appellee may:
" (1) ... pass all ordinances and rules, and make all regulations, not
repugnant to law, necessary for carrying into effect or discharging all
powers and duties conferred by this chapter and as are necessary and
proper to provide for the safety and preserve the health, and promote
the prosperity, improve the morals, peace and good order, comfort, and
convenience of the city and its inhabitants , and for the protection of
property in the city."

"(2)... may enforce obedience to ordinances with fines or penalties in
accordance with Section 10-3-703."
This provision provides an interesting paradox because it may, by use of the term
"penalties" allow imprisonment for maintaining a nuisance despite the limitation found in
10-8-60 (supra) Utah Code Annotated Section 10-3-703 provides:
" (1) The governing body of each municipality may impose a minimum criminal
penalty for the violation of any municipal ordinance by a fine not to exceed the
maximum class B misdemeanor fine under Section 76-3-301 or by a term of
imprisonment up to six months, or by both the fine and term of imprisonment.
(2)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(b), the governing body may prescribe
a minimum civil penalty for the violation of any municipal ordinance by a fine not
to exceed the maximum class B misdemeanor fine under Section 76-3-301."
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The city by limiting the fine to fifty dollars/day seems to be at odds with the minimum
mandatory requirement found in 10-3-703.
31.

The Utah Supreme Court in ALLGOOD v. LARSON ( Supra) , held that

the provisions of Article XI, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution are "not only a delegation
of power by the people to a municipality, but is also a limitation" of such powers. The
"constitutional provision, in conferring police power upon municipalities, limits the grant
to an area "not in conflict with the general law." The Allgood Court placed a construction
on the provision found in UCA 10-8-84 "not repugnant to law" as being coextensive
with the mandate emphasized above.
32.

In determining whether an ordinance is in conflict with general laws, the

test is whether the questioned ordinance permits or licenses that which the statute forbids
and prohibits, and likewise whether that same ordinance might eschew conduct permitted
by the "General Law." RICHFIELD CITY v. WALKER, 790 P.2d 87, 90-91 (Utah
App. 1990) citing SALT LAKE CITY v. KUSSE, 97 Utah 113, 93 P.2d 671 (1938).(See
Appendix R) Based on this test it is apparent that the Plaintiff/ Appellee's nuisance
ordinances are in conflict with the "general laws" of the State of Utah as the elements of
each cannot be reconciled one with the other.
Part 10-331 of the Plaintiff/ Appellee's nuisance ordinance defines a nuisance as
follows:
"For the purpose of this part the term "nuisance" is defined
"to mean any condition of use or premises or of building
exteriors which are deleterious or injurious, noxious or
unsightly which includes, but is not limited to keeping or
depositing on, or scattering over the premises any of the following:
18

A. Lumber, junk, trash, or debris.
B. Abandoned, discarded, or unused objects or equipment
such as furniture, stoves, refrigerators, freezers, cans or
containers."1
Where in the Utah Nuisance Statutes do prohibitions such as these appear?
33.

All prohibitions in the Utah Code eschew Msuch terms as "noxious" or

"unsightly" and invoke the requirement that any proscribed condition must be dangerous
to "human life or health" or create an "impure or unwholesome" condition. [Defendant
suggests that the latter standard "impure or unwholesome" is unenforceable (infra)].
34.

The Utah Supreme Court has held that the test as to whether the use of the

property constitutes a "nuisance" is the reasonableness of the use complained of in the
particular locality and in the manner and under the circumstances of the case. CANNON
v. NEUBERGER, 1 Utah 2d 396, 268 P.2d 425 (See Appendix S); DAHL v. UTAH OIL
REFINING CO.x 71 Utah 1, 262 P.269. (See Appendix T) The question is not whether a
reasonable person in the Plaintiff/ Appellee's or Defendant/ Appellant's position would
regard the condition as unreasonable, but whether reasonable persons generally, looking
at the whole situation impartially and objectively, would consider it unreasonable.

1

In the Information and in the Amended Information it is provided that,
NuisanceM is also defined to mean: (2) unsheltered storage or old, unused, stripped and
junked machinery, implements, equipment or personal property of any kind which is no
longer safely usable for the purposes for which it was manufactured, for a period of 30
days or more". This is inconsistent with the existing Plaintiff/Appellant Ordinance as
acknowledged by a Fax submitted by a city employee, Diane, who acknowledges that the
ordinance has not been modified since 1978. The verbiage herein is also inconsistent
with Utah Code 76-10-801, defining "Nuisance".
f,
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Should Defendant/Appellant's use offend the "Danger to human health" standard, the
inquiry must nevertheless shift to the reasonableness of the use in the location. (Perhaps
this is the basis of the three or more persons requirement which basis is problematic in
that the standard is suspect, invidious and arbitrary).
35.

The Courts have uniformly held that the use of property analogous to

Defendant/ Appellant's use of the subject property or even for such purposes as public
garages or for the business of wrecking automobiles and salvaging parts are not
nuisances per se. HATCH v. HATCH CO., 3 Utah 2d 295, 283 P.2d 217 (Utah 1955)
citing GEORGE v. GOODVICH, 288 Pa. 48, 135 A. 719, 50 A.L.R. 107 (See Appendix
U); PARKERSBURG BUILDERS MATERIAL CO. v. BARRACK, 118 W.Va. 608,
191 S.E. 368, 110 A.L.R. 1461.(See Appendix V)
Utah Code Annotated, § 76-10-801, (1973 as Amended) defines "nuisance" as
follows:
"(1) A nuisance is any item, thing, manner, condition whatsoever that is
dangerous to human life or health or renders soil, air, water, or food impure
or unwholesome."
No such limitation appears in the Plaintiff/Appellee's Ordinance The Utah State statute
above goes on to provide:
"(2) Any person, whether as owner, agent, or occupant who creates, aids in
creating, or contributes to a nuisance, or who supports, continues or retains
a nuisance, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor."
36.

The Utah Court of Appeals in TURNBAUGH v. ANDERSON, 793 P.2d
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939 (Utah App. 1990) (See Appendix W) held that Section 76-10-801 encompasses two
types of nuisance developed under the common law: public and private nuisance. See
e.g., HELMKAMP v. CLARK READY MIX CO., 214 N.W.2d 126, 129 (Iowa 1974)
(See Appendix X) (state statutory enumerations do not modify the common-law doctrine
of nuisance); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts 821A (1979) (See Appendix Y).
The definition of nuisance in Section 76-10-801 includes acts or conditions that are
commonly classed as public or private nuisances.
37.

A public nuisance is defined under the provisions of U.C.A. § 76-10-803,

(1992 Amendment) as follows:
"(1) A public nuisance is a crime against the order and economy
of the state and consists in unlawfully doing any act or omitting
to perform any duty, which act or omission:
(a) annoys, injures, or endangers the comfort, repose, health,
or safety of three or more persons;2
(b) offends public decency3:
(c) unlawfully interferes with, obstructs, or tends to obstruct,
or renders dangerous for passage, any lake, stream, canal, or
basin, or any public park, square, street, or highway;
(d) is a nuisance as defined in Section 78-38-9;,(for application
of which section Plaintiffs do not contend) or
(e) in any way renders three or more persons insecure in life
2

Which three (3) people? (See Solar Salt) (infra)

3

As is noted on page 8, Defendant contends that (a) and (b) are unenforceable as
vague and imprecise.
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or the use of property.
(2) An act which affects three or more persons in any of the ways
specified in this section is still a nuisance regardless of the extent of
annoyance or damage inflicted on individuals is unequal.ff
38.

The Utah Supreme Court had defined a public nuisance as affecting "an

interest common to the general public, rather than peculiar to one individual, or several,"
SOLAR SALT CO. vs. SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSP. CO., 555 P.2d 286, 289
(Utah 1976) (quoting W. Prosser, Law of Torts 606). c/76-10-803 SUPRA.
(See Appendix Z)
39.

It is more than clear that the nuisance ordinances of the Plaintiff City are

repugnant to and in conflict with the general laws of the State of Utah in violation of the
doctrine of ALLGOOD v. LARSON, supra. The Plaintiff City's nuisance ordinances
forbid what the "general laws" of the State of Utah permit.
40.

The Plaintiff/ Appellee's nuisance ordinances should therefore be declared

null and void as being violative of Article XI, § 5 of the Utah Constitution and parallel
provisions of the Constitution of the United States.
II.

Are the nuisance Ordinances of Plaintiff/ Appellee and the various
Statutes of the State of Utah addressing nuisance constitutional or
should said statutes be declared void-for-vagueness because the
statutes do not adequately define what is a nuisance nor do they
provide adequate guidelines for the enforcement of said statutes.

41.

There should be no question that the nature of even civil proceedings may

be, to some extent, quasi- criminal in character. SIMS v. TAX COMMISSION, 841 P.2d
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6 (Utah 1992). (See Appendix AA) U.C.A. § 76-10-801(2), (1973 as Amended)
provides as follows:
"(2) Any person, whether as owner, agent, or occupant who creates,
aids in creating, or contributes to a nuisance, or who supports,
continues, or retains a nuisance, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor."
42.

The Defendant/ Appellant contends that Part 10-331 of the Plaintiff/

Appellant's nuisance ordinance and U.C.A. § 76-10-801(1) defining nuisance and
U.C.A. § 76-10-803 defining a public nuisance are unconstitutionally vague in violation
of Article I, § 7 of the Utah and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
43.

The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a statute or ordinance define

an offense with sufficient definiteness that "ordinary people" can understand what
conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement. KOLENDER v. LAWSON, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 75 L.Ed.2d
903, 909, 103 S.Ct. 1855 (1983).(See Appendix BB) More important than actual notice
is the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law
enforcement. KOLENDER, quoting SMITH v. GOGUEN, 415 U.S. 566, 574, 39
L.Ed.2d 605, 94 S.Ct. 1242 (1974). It is a basic principle of due process that an
enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibition is not clearly defined. GRAYNED v.
CITY OF ROCKFORD, 408 U.S. 104, 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 92 S.Ct. 2294 (1972). (See
Appendix CC).
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44.

A constitutional vagueness challenge can proceed either as a facial

challenge or upon its application, based upon the facts of the case. GREENWOOD v.
CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, 817 P.2d 816 (Utah 1991).(See Appendix DD) A
facial challenge is permitted when a statute or ordinance has no practical application in
any case or the law reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct.
HOFFMAN ESTATES v. FLIPSIDE, HOFFMAN ESTATES, INC., 455 U.S. 489, 494,
71 L.Ed.2d 362, 102 S.Ct. 1186 (1982). (See Appendix EE) Where a statute or ordinance
imposes criminal penalties, the standard of certainty is higher. WINTERS v. NEW
YORK, 333 U.S. 507, 515, 92 L.Ed. 840, 68 S.Ct. 665 (1948).(See Appendix FF) This
concern has led the United States Supreme Court to invalidate a criminal statute on its
face even when it could conceivably have had some valid application. COLAUTTI v.
FRANKLIN, 439 U.S. 379, 394-401, 58 L.Ed.2d 596, 99 S.Ct. 675 (1979)4 .(See
Appendix GG).
45.

The challenged ordinances and statutes in the instant case reaches a

substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct.
Article I, § 1 of the Utah Constitution provides as follows:
"All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their
lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship
4

Utah cases such as Logan City v. Huber 786 P.2d 1372 (Ut App. 1990)
(See Appendix HH) and Provo City v. Whatcott 200 UT, (Ut. App 1986)
would seem to rely on this holding. (See Appendix JJ) For ordinances and
statutes which sweep too broadly.
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according to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably,
protest against wrongs, and petition for redress or grievances; to
communicate freely their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the
abuse of that right."
46.

As a preliminary matter, the Plaintiff/ Appellee must establish and prove in

connection with an appropriate ordinance that Defendant/ Appellant's use of the subject
property is a public nuisance as defined under § 76-10-803 and such use has a
detrimental effect on public comfort, repose, health or safety, or which offends public
decency.
47.

The Utah Supreme Court has held that municipal ordinances which are

similar to U.C.A. § 76-10-801 and § 76-10-803, even when only the civil remedy is
pursued, are unconstitutionally vague. The Court in JONES v. LOGAN CITY CORP.,
19 Utah 2d 169, 428 P.2d 160 (1967) (See Appendix KK) observed as follows:
"While the statute above mentioned grants to cities the power to declare
what shall be a nuisance, the ordinance before us does not in fact define
what a nuisance is. Ordinance No. 120 above referred to, which grants to
the Board of Condemnation the right to determine whether any building
constitutes a menace to public health or public safety, does not provide
standards on which the board can base its findings as to what is or what is
not a menace to public health or public safety. It would appear that the
ordinance imposes upon the Board of Condemnation quasi-judicial
functions without standards or guidelines to govern the Board in its
determination.ff
48.

U.C.A. § 76-10-801 and § 76-10-803 do not provide sufficient standards or

guidelines upon which the Court can base its findings as to what is or what is not
detrimental to public comfort, repose, health or safety and what is or what is not a public
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nuisance or even what public comfort or repose are.
49.

The United States Supreme Court observed in KOLENDER v. LAWSON,

(supra, n. 7) "societies concern for minimal guidelines finds it roots as far back as the
decision in UNITED STATES v. REESE, 92 U.S. 214,221, 25 L.Ed. 563 (1876)" (See
Appendix LL)
"It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large
enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step
inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at
large. This would, to some extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative
department of government."
50.

U.C.A. § 76-10-801 and § 76-10-803 are unconstitutionally vague on their

face because the statues encourage arbitrary enforcement by failing to describe with
sufficiency what conduct is proscribed by the statutes and also because those statutes
reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. It is also evident that
the statutes are unconstitutionally vague in the application of their provisions to the facts
of this case. Assuming that the Plaintiff/ Appellee's nuisance ordinances are applicable
in this case, those questioned ordinances are likewise unconstitutionally vague.
51.

Part 10-331 of Plaintiff/ Appellee's nuisance ordinance is susceptible of

many different meanings and consequently is unconstitutionally vague. For example, the
ordinance prohibits lumber from being deposited or scattered on any premises. This
ordinance could incidently preclude a commercial lumber yard from maintaining stock
on the premises and/or selling lumber. The ordinance might also prohibit the
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construction of buildings from lumber. Junk, as defined in the ordinance, is also
susceptible of many different meanings as opposed to a common definition such as might
be found in a dictionary.5
52.

The questioned ordinance is susceptible of many different meanings and

encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement and should therefore be declared
unconstitutionally vague.
III. Is the penalty ordinance No. 10-359 of the Plaintiff/ Appellee
enforceable on its face as imposed upon Defendant/ Appellant?
53.

Plaintiff/Appellee's Ordinance No. 10-359 PENALTY FOR FAILURE TO

COMPLY is as follows:
"A. Any owner, occupant or person having an interest in the property subject to
this chapter who shall fail to comply with the notice or order given pursuant
to this chapter shall be guilty of a class C misdemeanor for each offense and
further sum of $50.00 for each and every day such failure to comply continues
beyond the date fixed for compliance.
B. Compliance by any owner, occupant or person to whom a notice has been
given as provided in this chapter shall not be admissible in any criminal
proceeding brought pursuant to this section."
54.

For purposes of this argument, we shall dwell only on part A. With regard

to that portion which reads, "...further sum of $50.00 for each and every day such failure
to comply continues beyond the date fixed for compliance."

5

Old iron, glass, paper, or other waste that may be used again in some form (2):
secondhand, worn, or discarded articles (3): clutter lb b : something of poor quality :
trash c: something of little meaning, worth, or significance. (Webster's Dictionary)
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55.

The Utah legislature in 1973 created classes of offenses and in 76-

1-103 (1), the following language appears:
"The provisions of this code shall govern the construction of, the
punishment for,...any offense defined in this code.... any offense defined
outside this code ..." 76-1-104 provides that the code shall be
constructed in accordance with these general purposes; and
Subsection (3), dealing with penalties, states; c Prescribe
penalties which are proportionate to the seriousness of offenses..."
The language was cited in Allgood vs. Larsen (supra).
56.

Ordinances, such as the Plaintiff/Appellee has adopted here, are

regulated by the State laws and by the courts, the city cannot impose a greater sentence
than that provided by state law. See Algood v. Larson (supra). It is to be noted that 108-84, by its express terms, limits the grant of power to municipalities to pass ordinances,
to those "not repugnant to law." It should be further noted that the penalty provisions in
the city ordinance exceeds the mandates of 10-8-60 by pre-classifying the offense as a
Class C Misdemeanor which defeats the fine only limitation imposed by 10-8-84..
57.

If the ordinance penalty conflicts with that of the "general law" of the state

addressing the same subject, the ordinance penalty is void. The penalty prescribed by the
city ordinance cannot exceed that set by the state law. [Allgood v. Larson(supra)]
58.

The test as to whether an ordinance is repugnant to or in conflict with state

law is not necessarily as to whether it deals with the same subject matter in a different
manner by providing a different penalty, but it is whether the ordinance permits or
licenses something which the state statute forbids or prohibits, or vice versa. See Algood
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v. Larson quoting Salt Lake city v. Kusse, supra; and see, e.g. City of Columbus v. Molt,
36 Ohio St. 2d 94, 304 N.E.2d 245 (supra).
59.

Any violation of the Plaintiff/ Appellee's Nuisance Ordinance shall be

designated as a single crime, a misdemeanor.6 The Ordinance exceeds the statutory
limits by providing that a fine of $50.00 shall be assessed "...for each and every day such
failure to comply continues beyond the date fixed for compliance." There can only be
one violation and as such there can be only one fine assessed. If the penalty is valid, it
can only find application to the point that $50.00 represents the maximum which may be
assessed and then, only once. See State of Utah v. Hemmert, No 15725 1978. (supra)
(Unpublished opinion) (See Appendix MM).
IV.
The Statutory scheme for Justice Courts interferes with Judicial
independence by providing monetary incentives to convict criminal defendants and
by authorizing the administrative arm of municipal government to hire and fire
judges and to control court operations.
60.

The Utah legislature's scheme for establishing and operating justice courts

violates the separation of powers doctrine's prohibition proscribing acts of one branch
of government which interfere with performance of core functions by another branch.
Judges must be free to exercise exclusive power to decide cases independently and
without influence exerted by the executive and legislative branches. Under Utah's
statutory scheme, municipal governments have been afforded broad authority to control

6

In this case, the crime was charged as an infraction, presumably to avoid the
necessity of impaneling a Jury as demanded by the Defendant.
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and direct justice courts, including the power to whimsically appoint and dismiss judges.
In addition, municipalities may and are directed to control justice court budgets,
personnel, and resources. Because Utah law requires that municipalities must fund their
own justice courts, local governments will tend to establish local courts only if the courts
are able to fund their own operations. In practice, some justice courts have become so
profitable that they serve as a significant source of revenue upon which the
municipalities they serve rely when planning their annual budgets. This legislative
scheme presents enormous, if subtle, incentives for justice court judges to generate
revenue by convicting and fining criminal defendants. These incentives, in turn, interfere
with the core judicial function of independently and fairly adjudicating criminal cases in
violation of the separation of powers doctrine.
A. The Utah Constitution Grants Judges the Exclusive Power to Impartially
Decide Criminal Cases, Independent of any Compulsion Wielded by Executive
and/or Legislative Branches.
61.

Under the Utah Constitution's separation of powers clause, one branch of

government may not interfere with the core function of another branch. Although this
doctrine does not require complete independence between any or all of the three
branches, it does require that each branch respect the inherent roles of the other two
branches. The main function of the judicial branch, as an undeniable fact, is to
impartially interpret the law and fairly decide cases and controversies.
62.

The separation of powers doctrine serves as the very foundation of the
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American concept of liberty. Article V, section one of the Utah Constitution defines this
doctrine as follows:
"The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into
three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial;
and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one
of these departments shall exercise functions appertaining to either of the
others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted.
Utah Const. Art. V, § 1."
63.

As the Utah Court has observed, the separation of the three branches is

essential to preserve liberty and individual rights:
"Montesquieu's writings warn us that there can be no liberty if the powers of the
three branches of government do not remain separate. Madison recognized the
principle as more sacred than any other in a free constitution, and that no one
branch should possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the
others in the administration of its powers. Justice Marshall adhered to the
principle in Marbury vs. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed, 60.... (See
Appendix NN). The fundament of the doctrine remained unassailable when the
United States Supreme Court through Justice Frankfurter reminded the President
that his action of seizing the nation's steel mills to prevent a national catastrophe
threatened to be an "accretion of dangerous power" which comes from the
"unchecked disregard" of the checks and balances that doctrine was created to
provide. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. Vs. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 594 (1952)
(See Appendix PP). Whether implied, as in our federal constitution and in those
of fourteen states, or whether expressly stated, as in our own state's constitution,
the doctrine of separation of powers is the control gate harnessing the reservoir of
powers of a government which functions at the will of the people. Timpanogos
Planning & Water Management Agency vs. Central Utah Water Conservancy
Dist. 690 P.2d 562, 564-565 (Utah 1984)."
64.

Notwithstanding the imperative of the above quoted language, the modern

separation of powers doctrine does not require absolute independence between the
branches. "[Although the threefold division of powers is the basis for the American
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Constitution, there are many cases in which the duties of one department are, to a certain
extent, devolved upon and shared by the other." In re Young, 1999 UT 6, *f 13, 976 P.2d
581 (quoting Tite vs. State Tax Commission, 57, P.2d 734, 737 (Utah 1963)) (See
Exhibit QQ). One branch only violates the separation of powers doctrine when it
exercises the power that is "exclusive to one department..." Id. at ^fl4. Utah Courts have
characterized exclusive powers as those which are "primary," "core," or "essential," to
one branch. Id. (quoting Salt Lake City vs. Ohms. 881 P.2d 844, 849 (Utah 1994)
(Appendix RR); Timpanogas % (Supra) at 567; State vs. Gallion. 572 P.2d 683, 688 (Utah
1977)) (Appendix SS). Stated differently, exclusive means "inherent in the very concept
of one of the three branches of a constitutional government." Id. at f 26.
65.

The judicial branch's " primary function" includes the duty to fairly and

independently "hear and determine controversies between adverse parties and questions
in litigation." Timpanogos Planning and Water Management Agency v. Central Utah
Water Conservancy Dist., 690 P.2d at 569, 571 (Utah 1984) (quoting Citizens Club vs.
Welling, 27 P.3d 23, 26 (Utah 1933)) (See Exhibit TT). Judges have the exclusive
power "to interpret and adjudicate with dispassionate impartiality questions of law
between adverse parties..." Id. it follows that the separation of powers doctrine bars
executive or legislative actions that threaten "the fundamental integrity of the judicial
branch..." Ohms, (supra) (quoting In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 642 (Utah
1988)). "It is essential in all courts that the judges who are appointed to administer the
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law should be permitted to administer it under the protection of the law, independently
and freely, without favor and without fear." In re Hammermaster 985 P.2d 924, 936
(Wash. 1999) (quoting Bradley vs Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 349 n. 16 (1871) (See Appendix
UU).
B. Utah's Legislative Scheme Governing Justice Courts Creates Substantial
Economic Incentives for Municipalities to Use Justice Courts to Generate Revenue
for Their General Fund.
66.

The statutes governing justice courts violate principles of Constitutional

dimension in that justice courts are revenue-driven entities that, by definition, cannot
independently and impartially adjudicate disputes. Under Utah's legislative scheme,
state funded district courts have jurisdiction over misdemeanor offenses unless a local
municipality acts to fund its own justice court. Because municipalities retain half of the
revenue created by justice courts, municipalities, as a practical matter, will only create
such courts when the elective system can generate sufficient revenue to fund a profitable
operation. This revenue-producing scheme creates enormous incentives for municipal
governments and consequently justice court judges to overlook fundamental
constitutional principles in order to achieve and maximize that profit.
67.

In Utah's courts system, local municipalities may, at their option, elect to

enforce class B and C misdemeanors either through the state district courts or by creating
their own justice courts. Article VIII, section 1 of the Utah Constitution authorizes the
legislature to create "courts not of record..." The legislature has done so in chapter five
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of Title 78 of the Utah Code. That chapter authorizes municipalities to create and fund
justice courts with "jurisdiction over class B and C misdemeanors, violation of
ordinances, and infractions committed within their territorial jurisdiction, except those
offenses over which the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction." Utah Code Ann. § 785-104(1) (2002); see also Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-101, 78-5-101.5 (2002) (providing for
the creation of justice courts). In the absence of a justice court, state funded district
courts have jurisdiction over these criminal offenses. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(8)
(Supp.2004)7.
68.

Despite this legislative authority to create justice courts, as a practical

matter, local governments only do so when justice courts exhibit the apparent ability to
generate sufficient revenue to pay for their own expenses. By statute, the states must
fund the district courts to enforce class B and C misdemeanors, local ordinances, and
infractions. Utah Code Ann. §78-3-13.4 (2002). Under this model, the state receives half
of all fines and forfeitures while the prosecuting agency, usually meaning the county,
receive the other half. Id. § 78-3-14.5 (2) (Supp. 2004). Local municipalities receive no
portion of this revenue because they provide no funding to the district courts.
69.

When municipalities purport to create justice courts to supplant the state

funded court operations, Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-110 (Supp. 2004), 78-5-111 (2002);

7

The Justice Court, by some mechanism, retains the entire fee generated by Plea
in Abeyance Agreements.
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they must, as a preliminary requirement and in order to receive favorable action on an
application to create a justice court, demonstrate a "need" for a local court, including
demonstration of the ability to fund the proposed court. Id § 78-5-101.5 (2002). As
previously noted, in a justice-court system, municipalities retain half of all fines and
forfeitures; the other half goes to the state. Id. § 78-5-116 (1) (Supp. 2004).
70.

Given these fiscal realities, municipalities only create justice courts when

doing so makes economic sense. Because the state has a statutory obligation to enforce
class B and C misdemeanors, local ordinances, and infractions without charge visited on
local governments, municipalities would have no incentive to establish local justice
courts unless such courts generate adequate revenue to retire the operational cost.. A
recent study of justice courts in Salt Lake County established that all justice courts,
"produce revenues in excess of expenditures in varying degrees." Institute for Law and
Policy Planning, Salt Lake County Criminal Justice Assessment 6.11 (2004) (hereinafter
referred to as "County Justice Court Assessment") (See Appendix VV).
71.

Many justice courts show a profit and thereby generate revenue for cities.

The previously referenced County Justice Court Assessment discloses that justice court
"[j]udges and administrators freely admit that they believe the justice courts are a source
of significant revenue for their cities." Id. In fact, municipalities "view the [justice]
courts as a prime source worthy of protection and expansion." Id.
72.

Municipalities have further capitalized on the justice court system by
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refusing to reimburse the host county for incarcerating justice court offenders. Id. at 3.9.
Although some county sheriffs bill municipalities for housing offenders, most cities
maintain that they already contribute to the County's general fond, and that such
contributions should provide compensation for operating the jail. Id. at 3.10 . As a
result, in Salt Lake County, "municipalities generated nearly $17 million dollars in court
fees [gross revenue] during 2000, yet paid nothing towards the approximately $7 million
in jail billings".
73.

In addition to confinement at no cost to the involved city , municipalities

are the recipient of additional services from counties. "Justice Courts have unfettered
access to the larger system through the jail, the county probation department, the legal
defender, etc. with little or no financial obligation. Id. at 3.9. For these very reasons,
justice courts have, not surprisingly, proliferated in recent years. Id. at 6.5. In Cache
County, courts have even been established in minor villages such as Trenton &
Clarkston.
C. The Legislative Scheme Coupled With Municipalities' Lack of Financial
Accountability For Incarcerated Offenders Undermines Justice Court
Independence and Creates Unconstitutional Pecuniary Incentives to do Other Than
Justice as well as to Dispense with Fairness and impartiality.
74.

The legislature's funding mechanism coupled with the political realty that

municipalities use justice courts to generate revenue for the general fund directly
undermine justice court judges' independence. Justice court judges must produce
sufficient revenue to maintain the very existence of their courts, and thereby incentive
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exists to meet a municipalities' revenue projections. The County Justice Court
Assessment study substantiates this proposition of "the fear that cities will become
dependent on the money generated through enforcement, thus increasing the likelihood
that police and judges will be overly aggressive as a way to meet financial expectations
and demands." Id. at 3.8.
75.

The conclusion quoted above directly conflicts with certain official

assumptions that monetary demands on justice court judges are "unlikely" and
"speculative." Indeed, the revenue-generating impetus for establishing justice courts is
obvious. As the editorial staff of the Salt Lake Tribune observed, "the justification for
creating justice courts explicitly includes being a revenue source for the wider city
government..." Editorial, Justice Peeks, Salt Lake Tribune, July 20, 2005. The County
Justice Court Assessment concluded that "the importance of revenue generation to
municipalities is apparent from the fact that municipal judges are directly responsible to
the executive branch, unlike county judges who must stand for retention by the
electorate." County Justice Court Assessment at 6.5.
76.

The separation of powers doctrine bars judges from being subject to

financial blandishments when deciding cases. Statutes "granting a pecuniary interest" to
judges are clearly unconstitutional. Blankenship vs. Minton Chevrolet, Inc., 266 S.E.2d
902, 903 (W.V. 1979) (See Appendix WW). The Utah Courts have similarly held that
judges must have "no favors to grant, no patronage to dispose of, and no friends to
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reward." Timpanogo, 690 P.2d at 568 (quoting In re O'Sullivan, 158 P.2d 306, 309
(Mont. 1945). In the Timpanogos case, the Supreme Court held that the legislature
violated the separation of powers doctrine when it empowered district court judges to
appoint board members of a water conservancy district. Id. at 570. Citing the possibility
that the same judges who appointed board members might later review board decisions,
this Court concluded that the district court judges might "feel constrained in passing
upon board action." Id. at 570.
77.

Financial incentives need not be explicit in order to violate the separation

of powers doctrine. In defining governmental branch powers, the Utah Court observed
that there is a natural tendency of all persons, even judges, to unconsciously protect their
interest:
Due to the manner in which our system was created and has developed, the
judiciary has the awesome prerogative and responsibility of judging the
scope of powers of the executive, legislative, and of its own. For this
reason it is essential that the judiciary be especially circumspect in maintaining
an awareness of the natural propensity of human nature: that when anyone
has the power to decide wherein his own interests are involved, there is danger
of consciously or subconsciously leaning toward the protection, and perhaps
the magnification, of his own self-interest. Jones, 550 P.2d at 210 (footnote
omitted) (See Appendix XX).
Knowing that justice courts will only survive if they produce adequate revenue, a justice
court judge might well have an incentive to convict and fine persons without due regard
to their core function to fairly adjudicate cases. Timpanogos, 660 P.2d at 571..
78.

Municipalities' refusal to reimburse jails for costs associated with
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confinement compounds justice court judges' incentives to generate revenue. This
stance allows justice court judges to use county jails "with little restriction and complete
financial impunity." County Justice Court Assessment at 3.9. A direct consequence of
un-reimbursed jail services is the common practice injustice courts of ordering criminal
defendants to "pay or serve" their sentences. Id. 6.5. This device allows justice court
judges to threaten to and/or to incarcerate offenders who fail to pay fines in a timely
manner. Id.. The absence of any financial obligation to municipalities for jail services
has resulted injustice court judges employing incarceration to excess in order to collect
revenue. Id. at 3.9.
79.

The "pay or serve" practice is particularly offensive because it tends to

foment an unwarranted deprivation of a persons liberty. In defining separation of powers
violations, the Utah Court has held that it will tolerate shared powers "when it is
essential to the discharge of a primary function, when it is not an assumption of the
whole power of another department, and when the exercise of the other power does not
jeopardize individual liberty." Timpanogos, 690 P.2d at 567 (quoting C. Sand,
Sutherland Statutory Construction § 3.06). The absence of any financial obligation
resulting from the incarceration of offenders who fail to pay fines, Defendant/Appellant
suggests, violates this test.
D. Municipalities' Statutory Control Over Justice Courts Further Frustrates
the Fair Adjudication of Criminal Cases.
80.

Even if financial incentives did not interfere with judicial independence,
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Utah's legislative scheme governing justice courts also violates separation of powers
principles because it foments exertion of inordinate control over administration of
justice courts., Municipalities have statutory authority to hire and fire judges, to fund
court operations, and to supervise court personnel. These powers, coupled with the use
of justice courts as sources of general revenue, create a legislative scheme that invades
the core function of the judicial branch to fairly and independently deciding cases.
81.

Of greatest concern, the legislature has authorized the executive, without

meaningful guidelines, to hire and fire justice courts judges. Utah Code Annotated
section 78-5-134 (2)(2002) designates the municipal leader, whether a mayor, council
chair, or city manager, generically called the "appointing authority," to "appoint "justice
court judges. The entity's legislative body must then confirm the appointment by a
majority vote. Id § 78-5-134(2). Justice Court judges serve four-year terms. Id. § 78-5132 (1). Upon completion of the term, Utah law mandates that justice court judges "shall
be reappointed absent a showing of good cause." Id. § 78-5-134(5). In determining
whether "good cause" exists, municipalities "shall consider" (1) whether the state Judicial
Council has certified the judge; and, (2) "any other factors considered relevant by the
appointing authority." Id. § 78-5-134(5)(d). (Emphasis mine)
82.

Although this scheme purports to model the appointment of justice court

judges after the traditional appointment process for Federal judges, it allows for
expansive executive and legislative influence over judges. Because appointing
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authorities may "consider any other factor'1 in deciding whether to reappoint a judge,
justice court judges essentially serve at the whim of the executive. Id. § 78-5-134(5)(d).
Given this broad discretion as to whether to reappoint, the economic realities
surrounding justice courts and the pressure to generate revenue might directly influence
how judges handle cases. At its most extreme, such influence is manifested if a judge
fails to meet a municipality's revenue projections8 whereupon the appointing authority
might employ the grant of power as a means of expressing frustration or displeasure. In
a plausible scenario, the justice court judge might indeed, sense pressure, whether
"consciously or subconsciously" to maximize collections and, thus, preserve his or her
"own self-interest." Jones, 550 p.2d at 210. Pressure to collect revenue might not
necessarily be overt, unspoken or unrealized expectations of "favors," "patronage," or
"reward" but might well be enough to violate separation of powers principles.
Timpanogos, 690 P.2d at 568 (quoting In re O'Sullivan, 158 P.2d at 309).
83.

At the very least, the appointment and reappointment process tend to create

an appearance of impropriety. Canon 2 of the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct charges
judges to avoid even "the appearance of impropriety" to ensure "public confidence" in
the judiciary. The County Justice Court Assessment pointed to such an appearance of
patronage when it concluded that justice court judges are "directly responsible to the
executive branch" for their very existence. County Justice Court Assessment at 6.5.

8

Surely a significant "factor"
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Although the assessment did not observe anything "sinister or improper" the stated
concern was that the "appointive power of the mayors presents an interesting if not
conflicted situation in that the Executive branch literally creates the judicial branch via
appointment.ff Id. at 6.10. The editorial staff of the Salt Lake Tribune eliminated any
doubt about the appearance of impropriety when it recently observed that "because the
justification for creating justice courts explicitly includes being a revenue source for the
wider city government, judicial impartiality is seriously compromised." Editorial, Justice
Peeks, Slat Lake Tribune, July 20, 2005.
84.

Given the sheer numbers of persons who appear before justice courts,

appearance of impartiality is essential to maintenance of public confidence in those
courts. The Utah State court website points out that in fiscal year 2004 justice courts
presided of over 450,000 traffic cases. In addition, the justice courts disposed of an
additional 85,000 misdemeanor cases during that same year. By comparison, the district
courts disposed of only about 100,000 misdemeanors during fiscal year 2004. See
http://www.utcourts.gov/stats/FY04/dist/fy2004_9.htm. A person, citizen or otherwise,
is most likely to experience the Utah justice system through justice courts. These
numbers present a compelling case to ensure "public confidence" in the justice courts.
Hammermaster, 985 P.2d at 936.
85.

Moreover, an appearance of impropriety undermines the independence of

justice courts because public perception affects judicial decision-making. Utah Courts
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have held that appearances erode public confidence and alter judges' decisions
discussing the point as follows:
"A judge cannot engage in political debate or make public defense of his acts.
When his action is judicial he may always rely upon the support of the define
record upon which his action is based...But when he participates in the action
of the executive or legislative departments of government he is without those
supports. He exposes himself to attack and indeed invites it, which because
of his peculiar situation inevitable impairs his value as a judge and the appropriate
influence of his office." Timponogos, 690 P.2d at 572 (quoting a letter from
former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Harlan Fiske Stone to Franklin D.
Roosevelt, July 20, 1942, in Mason, Extra-Judicial Work for Judges:
The Views of Chief Justice Stone, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 203-204 (1953).
86.

In addition to the appointment process, the legislature has granted

municipalities control over justice court personnel and resources. Utah law entrusts
municipalities with funding physical facilities, hiring and supervising court staff, and
administering personnel policies. Utah Code Annotated § 78-5-108 (Supp. 2004), 78-5110 (Supp. 2004), 78-5-111 (2002). Utah law thereby empowers local executives to
control every aspect of justice court operations and to determine, and thereby fix, each
budgetary item. The executive branch also appoints the administrative staff who serve
"at will' or are hired via the merit system as any other city employees" in the executive
department. County Justice Court Assessment at 6.10.
87.

These extensive powers emphasize the appearance of impropriety and tend

to reinforce the actual conflicts discussed above. Executive control over justice courts'
budgets, staff, and resources presents "the perception (if not the reality) of dominance
that elected officials exercise over the judiciary they created." Id. Executive action
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violates the separation of powers doctrine "when there is an attempt by one branch to
dominate another in that other's proper sphere of influence." Young, 1999 UT 6, f23,
976 P.2d 581. Because the legislative scheme allows local executives to "effectively
control " the justice courts, that scheme unconstitutionally invades the province of the
judiciary. Id.9
E. No Valid Reasons Support Or Justify Municipalities' Revenue-Motivated
Control Over Justice Courts.
88.

Although one might present several unpersuasive rebuttals to the

suggestion that municipalities are revenue-driven to creation of justice courts; none of
those arguments change the legislative landscape that fosters executive and legislative
interference with justice courts based on budgetary considerations. Neither judicial
oversight, nor case law, nor the theoretical advantages and efficiencies presented by use
of the justice court system sanitizes the separation of powers obstacles presented by
Utah's legislative scheme. Such argument as has been presented in proceedings to date
fail to resolve the main question presented by this motion which question requires an
answer as to whether the legislative scheme governing justice courts jeopardizes the
"dispassionate" adjudication of criminal cases. Timponogos, 690 P.2d at 571. Although
one might reason that no particular Defendant can provide a showing that revenue
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Most attorneys who have significant experience with criminal defense can tell
horror stories of jury trials held on folding chairs in a bay of the local fire departments or
amongst the garden tools in the justice court Judge's garage (so much for public
confidence).
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concerns actually motivated any particular justice court judges' decisions the discussion
above demonstrates the superficiality of such an argument given the reality that justice
courts are essentially revenue-driven. See County Justice Court Assessment at 3.9, 3.9,
6.11.10 Additionally, proper application of the separation of powers doctrine does not
require such a showing in that the Utah Supreme Courts opinion in Timponogos
establishes that no actual bias need occur when one branch is provided authority to
influence another's core function. In that case, the Utah Court struck down district court
judges' authority to appoint water conservancy board members even though the parties
neither alleged nor proved actual favoritism. Timponogos, 690, P.2d at 570-72. This
appointment system violated the separation of powers doctrine on the reasoning that
judges might "feel constrained" and "would avoid confrontations" while adjudicating
disputes involving water boards. Id. at 570-71.
89.

Any position taken to the effect that no other jurisdictions have struck

down similar justice court systems based on separation of powers considerations is
manifestly without foundation. State by and through the Town of South Carthage vs.
Barrett, 840 S.W.2d 895 (Tenn. 1992) (See Appendix YY), the Tennessee Supreme
Court held that a legislatively-established justice court system violated separation of
powers principles without a showing of any actual harm to any defendant. The
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There is some tacit recognition of the "revenue driven' nature of the courts
origination and operation by the promulgation of a bail schedule.
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Tennessee Constitution contains provisions similar to Utah's as they require the
separation of the three branches and as they allow for the legislature to create justice
courts. Id at 897 (citing Tenn. Const. Art. II, § 2, Art. VI, § 1). Like Utah, the
Tennessee legislature empowered municipalities to appoint justice courts judges to
"serve at the pleasure" of the mayor and local legislative leaders. Id at 896.
90.

The Tennessee Supreme Court held that this system violated the mandate

of the separation of powers doctrine because of the potential for city leaders to influence
justice court judges "to increase city revenue...and to impose harsher sentences" on DUI
offenders. Id. at 897 (quoting Summers vs. Thompson, 764 S.W.2d 182, 183 (Tenn.
1988)) (See Appendix ZZ). Although that court relied on a prior decision in which city
leaders had actually attempted to influence a justice court judge, no similar allegations
arose with respect to the case under review. Carthage, 840 S.W.2d at 897 . The court
held without necessity of reference to the previous case that the mere potential for
influence violated justice court judges' ability to fairly adjudicate cases:
The instant scenario demonstrates the danger posed to an independent judiciary
and to the impartial administration of justice through the exercise of arbitrary
power by a separate branch of government motivated by policy and political
concerns inimical to an independent system of justice. Judicial independence by
all respected political thought indispensably is essential to the effective operation
of constitutional government. Id. at 899.
91.

To ensure a judiciary independent from the political caprice and whims of

other government branches, the Tennessee Supreme Court required justice court judges
to be elected rather than to be appointed and supervised by local municipalities. Id. The
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Tennessee Constitution employs popular elections to preserve judicial independence
from the other branches of government. Id. at 896 (citing Tenn. Const. Art. IV, § 4).
Although Utah does not rely on popular elections, the "danger" attendant to influence of
justice court judges as enunciated in Carthage would seem to apply equally under
Utah's justice court system.
92.

Similarly, in Calligy vs. Mayor and Council of the City of Hoboken, 665

A.2d 408, 409 (N.J. Super. 1995) (See Appendix AAA), a taxpayer claimed that an
ordinance placing a municipal court in a city's department of administration violated
separation of powers principles. That opinion invalidated the justice court because the
"authority conferred by the ordinance is inconsistent with both the fact and appearance of
judicial independence required by law." Id. at 412. The Court reached this conclusion
despite the absence of any allegation that city officials had ever interfered with the
court. Id. at 411. Instead, the court held that placing the justice court in the executive
branch was "inconsistent with that court's independence." Id.
93.

This instant case in analogous. Although Defendant/Appellant does not

and cannot allege that the justice court judge is actually influenced by the fact that he is
beholden to the City's leaders11 under Utah's legislative scheme, the fact remains that
local executive officials "literally create[] the judicial branch via appointment." County

1

* Other than the inferences that might be drawn from Judicial adherence to the
singular and unlawful fine schedule imposed by the legislative act of the Hyde Park City
council.
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Justice Court Assessment at 6.10. Thus, justice court judges are "directly responsible to
the executive branch..." County justice Court Assessment at 6.5. This situation allows
municipalities to "dominate" justice courts in violation of the separation of powers
doctrine. Young, 1999 UT 6, t 23, 976 P.2d 581.
94.

Even more to the point, in the State of Washington that State's experience

points to the very dangers that the reality of revenue-generating justice courts suggest
might happen in Utah. In In re Hammermaster, 985 P.2d 924 (Wash. 1999), the
Washington Supreme Court sanctioned a justice court for violating numerous ethical
duties and abusing his authority. The court reprimanded the judge for threatening to
incarcerate offenders up to a "life" term for failing to pay court-ordered fines. Id. at 93536. In doing so, the court held that "[a] judge's primary function is the administration of
justice, not the collection of fines." Id. at 936.
95.

One justice fully concurred in the court's judgment and provided specific

examples of justice court judges who were motivated by financial considerations in
adjudicating criminal cases and observed:
Our opinion today conveys a very strong message to the judiciary and local
governments in Washington that the Supreme Court will not tolerate short
cuts in due process. While many municipalities have established municipal
courts because they want to administer justice locally, it is also true many
jurisdictions establish municipal court for purely avaricious reasons- as
revenue agencies to be operated if they "make money" and be dispensed
with if they become inconvenient to administer or generate insufficient
revenues. Some local jurisdictions have even attempted to control
performance of duties by municipal court judges through devices such as
performance audits, the provision of substandard court facilities, or nonjudicial
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control of court personnel. Occasionally, in some jurisdictions, when the
judge has been too independent and has refused to generate sufficient revenue
for the municipality, the city's legislative or executive authorities have forced
the ouster of the judge. Id. at 249 (Talmadge, J. Concurring)(cites omitted).
96.

Arguments that "section 8 judges" exercise "meaningful oversight" of

justice courts are advanced with misplaced confidence. There is no dispute but that other
courts, the Judicial Conduct Commission and the state Judicial Council oversee justice
courts. The fact that supervision is available fails to address the multitude of problems
inherent in Utah's justice court system. Even given the supervision available, the
legislative scheme does, nonetheless, provide justice courts with strong incentives to
generate revenue contrary to the impartial administration of justice. Any such argument
similarly fails to address a municipalities' power and influence with respect to
appointment and reappointment of judges, to push for increased collections, and to
manipulate budgets, personnel, and resources whether it be explicitly or implicitly. In
any event, actual municipal pressure need not invite the Utah court's attention or violate
the Canons of Judicial Conduct in order to influence justice court judges' decisionmaking. As detailed above, this Court has recognized that subtle pressures can be as
effective to subvert the system as can overt influence. Timponogos, 690 P.2d at 571;
Jones, 550 P.2d at 210.
97.

Any argument that the Utah legislature has authorized justice courts for

over 100 years without problem does no more than beg the point. Aside from the
obvious response that the law as well as jurisprudence evolves over time, Utah's present
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legislative scheme directly defeats the purposes behind establishing local courts. "Justice
Courts 'are designed, in the interest of both the defendant and the state, to provide
speedier and less costly adjudications than may be possible in criminal courts of general
jurisdiction.'" Bernat vs. Allphin, 2005 UT 1, If 32.106 P.3d 707 (quoting Colten vs.
Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 114 (1972)) (See Appendix BBB). But, the separation of
powers doctrine bars government from sacrificing "liberty" for the sake of efficiency.
Timponogos, 690 P.2d at 567. In Timponogos, denial of the power to appoint water
conservancy board members because such a "centralization and consolidation of power
would seem to us tantamount to loss of democracy in the name of efficiency, an
untenable proposition under our system of jurisprudence." Id. at 571. points up the basic
flaw in any such argument.
98.

Like judges' power to appoint officers whom appear before those same

judges, municipal control and influence over justice court judges who may generate
revenue to that municipality undermines "essential" constitutional liberties. Id. at 567.
Indeed, the framers of the federal constitution founded the justice system on judicial
independence in criminal matters. Hammermaster, 985 P.2d at 935-36. An independent
judiciary, free from fiscal constraints, "is an essential tool in guarding the constitution
and the rights of individuals." Id. at 936.
99.

Finally, any contention that the right to appeal to the district court and

request a trial de novo "sanitizes " any problems with justice courts is without basis in
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theory or as practiced. Any such argument grossly underrates the impact justice courts
have on criminal defendants. Even though justice courts handle only class B and C
misdemeanors, local ordinance violations and infractions, with intermediate punishment
authority, conviction of even the least of these crimes can devastate lives. Incarceration
visits destruction on the most routine daily activities and deprives persons of the
fundamental right to liberty. As the United States Supreme Court has observed, even
"[pjenalties such as probation or a fine may engender 'a significant infringement of
personal freedom,' but they cannot approximate in severity the loss of liberty that a
prison term entails." Blanton vs. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 542 (1989)
(quoting Frank vs. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 151 (1969)) (See Appendix CCC).
Beyond the possibility of a jail sentence, fine, or probation, numerous collateral
consequences disrupt the lives of persons who are convicted injustice courts. These
disruptions include the loss of employment, driving privileges, government benefits, and
even student loans. Sam Newton, Justice Court Appeal: The Good, the Bad, and the
Unintended, 18 Utah Bar J. No. 1 at 25 (January/February 2005) (See Appendix DDD).
100.

The appellate process as contemplated by the legislature and as it is

employed with respect to Justice court cases is flawed. By statutory mandate, an
ordinance imperfection is dealt with differently than an imperfect constitutional ruling
by a judge, albeit the appointment of that Justice Court Judge might have been for all the
wrong reasons. The fact of this legislative distinction violates the right of a Defendant to
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due process and equal protection under the law, particularly in view of the fact that a
singular protection is thereby extended to a flawed system.12
V.
Did the Trial Court both at the Justice Court level and at the District
level abuse their respective discretions and exceed the Maximum sentence as
allowed by State Law thereby denying Due Process as guaranteed by the Utah
Constitution and by the United States Constitution.
101.

The Court sentenced the Defendant orally from the bench on the 19th day of

September, 2007 as follows:
"The Court finds you guilty of the offense....It will be the order of the
Court that the Defendant pay a fine in the amount of $50 for maintaining
that nuisance. The Court will place the Defendant on probation and will
review this matter on the 26th of November at 10:00 a.m. At that point in
time I'll expect Mr. Grunig in his capacity to come back and report to the
Court, and the Defendant is to be present at that time as well with his
counsel, and represent to me that the property has been cleaned up
satisfactory to the norms of society. If not, the Defendant will be placed in
contempt and then the Court will impose a jail sentence at that point in
time." (See Transcript No. 1 pg. 46 and 47)
This sentence was clearly at odds with the powers extended to cities and towns
(and more importantly to the District Court) and was surely "repugnant to law." Allgood
vs. Larsen (supra) see also State vs. Hemmert (supra) in the Supreme Court of the State
of Utah No. 15725 (an unpublished opinion) Crockett Hall and Ellet concurring. If the
singular and unlawful sentence imposed by the Justice Court and perpetuates by the
District Court had not found its basis in an unconstitutional ordinance, this Defendant
would have been deprived of any power to seek an effective review of this draconian
12

The Defendant/Appellant is particularly grateful for the assistance provided in
connection with the text and argument used in connection with presentation of this issue.
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pronouncement.
VI.
Did the District Court rule by its ruling appropriately dispose of the
issues as to constitutionality of a statute or ordinance when it denied the
Defendant/Appellant's motion to dismiss and the motion to quash the justice court
conviction.
102. Defendant/Appellee filed a Motion and Memorandum of Points and
Authorities In Support of Motion To Dismiss in the District Court on or about the 12 th
day of April, 2007. A Motion to Quash the Justice Court conviction was also filed. Said
Motions specifically addressed constitutional issues as related to the validity of
Plaintiff/Appellant's ordinances and the validity of certain statutes of State of Utah
regarding nuisance.
2.

The District Judge in a Hearing held on the 30 th day of July, 2007

ruled on the issues in said Motion To Dismiss in the Court's Minutes regarding that
Ruling recites:
"The Court denies both of defendant's motions." (See Appendix EEE)
The actual transcript of that hearing is found in Transcript #1, Page 3 and reads as
follows:
f

Tn regards to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the Court finds that the
Defendant has not overcome the long-standing presumptions regarding
constitutionality. The court finds that Plaintiffs ordinance is not
unconstitutionally vague and therefore defendant's motion is denied. "
103.

The Plaintiff/Appellee was charged with preparing the Order On Motion to

Dismiss And To Quash Conviction and the proposed order recited as follows:
"Based upon the pleadings and other arguments made in this matter, the
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Court finds that Defendant has failed to overcome the burden necessary to
show that the Hyde Park City nuisance ordinance is unconstitutional; that
the Hyde Park City nuisance ordinance is in conflict with state statutes; and
that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague or over broad."
The Defendant/Appellant filed timely objections to the Oral Order of the Court and to the
Judgement of conviction (Appendix FFF).
CONCLUSION
In keeping with prior points regarding sensitivity to the revenue potential inherent
in operation of Justice Courts one need only look at the sentencing process employed in
this case. In the Justice Court the mandate of municipalities legislative arm insured a
steady flow to city coffers at the rate of fifty dollars per day, not just from the date of
conviction but from the date of Notice. When appealed to the District Court an even less
subtle approach was employed in order to circumvent the above unconstitutionality by
invoking the tool of civil contempt, a punishment without end so to speak, all without the
safeguards afforded by the right to appeal provided by a system created without
deference to the concept of separation of powers.
The general purpose of all laws and regulations, is that of allowing an owner the
highest possible degree of freedom of use of his property so long as it is not an
infringement upon recognition of similar rights of others or inconsistent with the general
welfare while not infringing upon the safety and health of others. Notwithstanding those
laudable goals, a well ordered State must insure that the functions inherent injustice and
punishment he insulated from local prejudices or proclivities that might erupt in certain
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areas within the general sovereignty.
Utah's legislative scheme governing justice courts invades the judges' core
function to "adjudicate with dispassionate impartiality." Instead of administering justice,
justice courts risk being relegated to "collection agencies" for "government officials
intent on revenue" generation. The separation of powers doctrine demands "[jjudicial
independence...without intrusion from or intruding upon the other branches of
government."
Upon the reasoning supporting the above conclusions this court should reverse the
ruling of the District Court for want of jurisdiction and thereby invalidate" Utah's
legislative scheme creating and maintaining justice courts.
Alternatively, should this Court conclude that the Justice Court have jurisdiction
to try criminal cases the conviction of Defendant should be reversed in that the ordinance
of Hyde Park City is flawed in that the elements of that ordinance, if proved, forbids
conduct which a state statute protects and metes out punishment which the Utah
Constitution and the acts of the State legislature forbid.
Respectfully Submitted,

/flW./ Lauritzen
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Foregoing document(s),
BRIEF OF APPELLANT, was delivered on the following in the manner indicated
on the 16th day of July, 2008. [ ] U.S. mail [X] Hand delivery [ ] Fax

Jonathan Jenkins
108 North Main
Logan, UT 84321
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Addendum
(none required)
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APPENDIX A
Motions to Dismiss

A. W. Lauritzen(1906)
Attorney at Law
610 North Main
P.O.Box 171
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (801) 753-3391

L.1

IN THE JUSTICE COURT FOR HYDE PARK CITY
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH

HYDE PARK CITY,
Plaintiff,

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
PLAINTIFF'S INFORMATION

vs.
RIO DAVIS
Defendant.

Case No. HP05-05
Judge David C. Marx
Oral Arguments Requested

COMES NOW the Defendant's and hereby respectfully moves this Honorable Court for
an Order to Dismiss the Plaintiffs Complaint.
The prosecution must be dismissed on the following reasoning and grounds:
1. The nuisance ordinance of the Plaintiffs City has not been properly enacted,
published, posted or adopted in accordance with the statutes and laws of the State of Utah.
2. The Plaintiff City's nuisance ordinances are repugnant to and in conllici with the
ueneral laws of the State of Utah.
3. The Plaintiffs City's nuisance ordinances and tl
are unconstitutionally vague both facially and as applied
Dated thisxH— day ol February. 2006.

statutes of (he State ofUtah

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of a Foregoing documents, DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S INFORMATION and MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS was served on the following in the
manner indicated on the 2nd day of March, 2006.V] U.S. mail [ ] Hand delivery [ ] Fax

mua- zd^Kdd
Scott Wyatt
113 East Center
Hyde Park, Utah 84318

A. W. Lauritzen(1906)
Attorney at Law
610 North Main
P.O.Box 171
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (801) 753-3391
IN THE JUSTICE COURT FOR HYDE PARK CITY
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH

HYDE PARK CITY.
Plaintiff.

MOTION TO DISMISS
PENDING ACTION

vs.
Oral Arguments Requested
RIO DAVIS
Defendant.

Case No. HP05-05
Judge: David C. Marx

COMES NOW Rio Davis and moves this court to Dismiss the action pending on the
grounds previously argued and upon the further ground that the trial/appeal piocess an
promulgated b\ the Utah Legislature and as practiced in the Justice Court and m the District
Court are ilawed and deny this Defendant due process of law follows:
1.

The Statute UCA 10-8-60 in prescribing that determination of c\ idence employed

regarding what constitutes a Nuisance be relegated to each city and town constitutes violation of
Defendant's right to due process and violated the Doctrine of Separation of powers as mandated
by Article VIII Section 4 of the Utah Constitution and as construed by authorities.
2.

This court by its very existence and as governed pursuant to State Law constitutes

a violation of Article VIII Section 4 of the Utah Constitution and thereby possesses no
jurisdiction to decide cases or controversies.
J.

A Memorandum of Points and Authorities are provided herewith

Wherefore this action should be dismissed.
Dated this the <fW day of October, 2006.
/

A.W. La'uittzdn

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

\
\

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
i
Foregoing document(s),MOTION TO DISMISS PENDING ACTION, was
served on the following in the manner indicated on the y*(£&- day
of October, 2006. \/\

Scott Wyatt
lo<& w. M a m
lo<$CL.y\} LK.T

U.S. mail [ ] Hand delivery [ ] Fax.

A. W. Lauritzen(1906)
Attorney at Law P.O. Box 171
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (435) 753-3391
IN THE JUSTICE COURT IN AND FOR HYDE PARK CITY
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH

HYDE PARK CITY,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS AND QUASH
CONVICTION

vs.
JERALD RIO DAVIS,
Defendant,
Case No. HP05-0503

FACTS
1.

Relying on a Hyde Park Ordinance, y / p - ~33P-

, said ordinance

widely divergent from State Statute both as to punishment and elements proof of which is
required to support a conviction Defendant stands convicted of the town ordinance and now
awaits sentencing before a town justice who is as to this case, not legally trained.
ISSUES
POINT I.

The Statutory scheme for Justice Courts interferes with Judicial

independence by providing monetary incentives to convict criminal defendant's and
authorizing municipal government to hire and fire judges and to control court operations.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ARGUMENT
THE STATUTORY SCHEME PROMULGATED FOR THE PURPOSE OF CREATING
AND REGULATING JUSTICE COURTS INTERFERES WITH JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE BY PROVIDING MONETARY INCENTIVES TO CONVICT
AND/OR SANCTION CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS AND BY AUTHORIZING
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS TO HIRE AND FIRE JUDGES AND BY GRANTING
CONTROL OF COURT OPERATIONS.
3. The Utah legislature's scheme for establishing and operating justice courts violates the
separation of powers doctrine's prohibition proscribing acts of one branch of government which
interfere with performance of core functions by another branch. Judges must be free to exercise
exclusive power to decide cases independently and without influence exerted by the executive
and legislative branches. Under Utah's statutory scheme, municipal governments have obtained
broad authority to control and direct justice courts, including the power to whimsically appoint
and dismiss judges. In addition, municipalities may and are directed to control justice court
budgets, personnel, and resources. Because Utah law requires that municipalities must fund their
own justice courts, local governments will tend to establish local courts only if the courts are
able to fund their own operations. In practice, some justice courts have become so profitable that
they serve as a significant source of revenue upon which the municipalities they serve rely when
planning their annual budgets. This legislative scheme presents enormous, if subtle, incentives
for justice court judges to generate revenue by convicting and fining criminal defendants. These
incentives, in turn, interfere with the core judicial function of independently and fairly
2

adjudicating criminal cases in violation of the separation of powers doctrine.
A. The Utah Constitution Grants Judges the Exclusive Power to Impartially Decide
Criminal Cases, Independent of any Compulsion Wielded by Executive and Legislative
Branches.
4. Under the Utah Constitution's separation of powers clause, one branch of government
may not interfere with the core function of another branch. Although this doctrine does not
require complete independence among the three branches, it does require each branch to respect
the inherent roles of the other two branches. The main function of the judicial branch, as an
undeniable fact, is to impartially interpret the law and fairly decide cases and controversies.
5. The separation of powers doctrine serves as the very foundation for the American
concept of liberty. Article V, section one of the Utah Constitution defines this doctrine as
follows:
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into
three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial;
and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one
of these departments shall exercise functions appertaining to either of the
others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted.
Utah Const. Art. V, § 1.
6. As the Utah Court has observed, the separation of the three branches is essential to
preserve liberty and individual rights:

Montesquieu's writings warn us that there can be no liberty if the powers of the three
branches of government do not remain separate. Madison recognized the principle as
more sacred than any other in a free constitution, and that no one branch should possess,
directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the others in the administration of its
powers. Justice Marshall adhered to the principle in Marbury vs. Madison, 5 U.S. 137,
1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed, 60....The fundament of the doctrine remained unassailable when
the United States Supreme Court through Justice Frankfurter reminded the President that
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his action of seizing the nation's steel mills to prevent a national catastrophe threatened to
be an "accretion of dangerous power" which comes from the "unchecked disregard" of
the checks and balances that doctrine was created to provide. Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. Vs. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 594 (1952). Whether implied, as in our federal
constitution and in those of fourteen states, or whether expressly stated, as in our own
state's constitution, the doctrine of separation of powers is the control gate harnessing
the reservoir of powers of a government which functions at the will of the people.
Timpanogos Planning & Water Management Agency vs. Central Utah Water
Conservancy Dist. 690 P.2d 562, 564-565 (Utah 1984).
7. Notwithstanding the imperative of the above quoted language, the modern separation
of powers doctrine does not require absolute independence between the branches. "[Although
the threefold division of powers is the basis for the American Constitution, there are many cases
in which the duties of one department are to a certain extent devolved upon and shared by the
other." In re Young, 1999 UT 6, ^[13, 976 P.2d 581 (quoting Tite vs. State Tax Commission,
57, P.2d 734, 737 (Utah 1963)). One branch only violates the separation of powers doctrine
when it exercises the power that is "exclusive to one department..." Id. at ^}14. Utah Courts have
characterized exclusive powers as those which are "primary," "core," or "essential," to one
branch. Id. (quoting Salt Lake City vs. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 849 (Utah 1994); Timpanogas,
690 P.2d at 567; State vs. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683, 688 (Utah 1977)). Stated differently,
exclusive means "inherent in the very concept of one of the three branches of a constitutional
government." Id. at % 26.
8. The judicial branch's " primary function" includes the duty to fairly and independently
"hear and determine controversies between adverse parties and questions in litigation."
Timpanogos, 690 P.2d at 569, 571 (quoting Citizens Club vs. Welling, 27 P.3d 23, 26 (Utah
1933)). Judges have the exclusive power "to interpret and adjudicate with dispassionate
impartiality questions of law between adverse parties..." Id. it follows that the separation of
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powers doctrine bars executive or legislative actions that threaten "the fundamental integrity fo
the judicial branch..." Ohms, 881 P.2d at 849 (quoting In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d
633, 642 (Utah 1988)). "It is essential in all courts that the judges who are appointed to
administer the law should be permitted to administer it under the protection of the law
independently and freely, without favor and without fear." In re Hammermaster 985 P.2d 924,
936 (Wash. 1999) (quoting Bradley vs Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 349 n. 16 (1871)).
B. Utah's Legislative Scheme Governing Justice Courts Creates Substantial Economic
Incentives for Municipalities to Use Justice Courts to Generate Revenue for Their General
Fund.
9. The statutes governing justice courts violate principles of Constitutional dimension in
that justice courts are revenue-driven entities that, by definition, cannot independently and
impartially adjudicate disputes. Under Utah's legislative scheme, state funded district courts
have jurisdiction over misdemeanor offenses unless a local municipality acts to fund its own
justice court. Because municipalities retain half of the revenue created by justice courts,
municipalities, as a practical matter, will only create such courts when the elective system can
generate sufficient revenue to fund a profitable operation. Consequently, this revenue-producing
scheme creates enormous incentives for municipal governments and justice court judges to
overlook fundamental constitutional principles in order to achieve and maximize that profit.
10. In Utah's courts system, local municipalities may, at their option, elect to enforce
class B and C misdemeanors either through the state district courts or by creating their own
justice courts. Article VIII, section one of the Utah Constitution authorizes the legislature to
create "courts not of record..." The legislature has done so in chapter five of Title 78 of the Utah
5

Code. 1 hat chapter authorizes municipalities to create and fund justice courts with "jurisdiction
over class B and C misdemeanors, violation of ordinances, and infractions committed with their
territorial jurisdiction, except those offenses over which the juvenile court has exclusive
jurisdiction." Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-104(1) (2002); see also Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-5-101,
78-5-101.5 (2002) (providing for the creation of justice courts). In the absence of a justice
court, state funded district courts have jurisdiction over these criminal offenses. Utah Code
Ann. § 78-3-4(8) (Supp. 2004).
11. Despite this legislative authority to create justice courts, as a practical matter, local
governments only do so when justice courts can generate sufficient revenue to pay for their own
expenses. By statute, the states must fund the district courts to enforce class B and C
misdemeanors, local ordinances, and infractions. Utah Code Ann. §78-3-13.4 (2002). Under
this model, the state receives half of all fines and forfeitures while the prosecuting agency,
usually meaning the county, receive the other half. Id. § 78-3-14.5 (2) (Supp. 2004). Local
municipalities receive no portion of this revenue because they provide no funding to the district
courts.
12. When municipalities purport to create justice courts, to supplant the state fund court
operations, Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-110 (Supp. 2004), 78-5-111 (2002); they must, as a
preliminary requirement and in order to receive favorable action on an application to create a
justice court, demonstrate a "need" for a local court, including demonstration of the ability to
fund the proposed court. Id § 78-5-101.5 (2002). As previously noted, in a justice-court
system, municipalities retain half of all fines and forfeitures; the other half goes to the state.
Id. § 78-5-116 (1) (Supp. 2004).
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13. Given these fiscal realities, municipalities only create justice courts when doing so
makes economic sense. Because the state has a statutory obligation to enforce class B and C
misdemeanors, local ordinances, and infractions without charge visited on local governments,
municipalities would have no incentive to establish local justice courts unless such courts
generate adequate revenue to retire the operational cost.. A recent study of justice courts in Salt
Lake County established that all justice courts, "produce revenues in excess of expenditures in
varying degrees." Institute for Law and Policy Planning, Salt Lake County Criminal Justice
Assessment 6.11 (2004) (hereinafter referred to as "County Justice Court
Assessment")(relevant portions are attached hereto ).
14. Many justice courts show a profit and thereby generate revenue for cities. The
previously referenced County Justice Court Assessment discloses that justice court "[j]udges and
administrators freely admit that they believe the justice courts are a source of significant revenue
for their cities." Id. In fact, municipalities "view the [justice] courts as a prime source worthy of
protection and expansion." Id.
15. Municipalities have further capitalized on the justice court system by refusing to
reimburse the host county for incarcerating justice court offenders. Id. at 3.9. Although some
county sheriffs bill municipalities for housing offenders, most cities maintain that they already
contribute to the County's general fund, and that such contributions should provide
compensation for operating the jail. Id. at 3.10. As a result, in Salt Lake County "municipalities
generated nearly $17 million dollars in court fees [gross revenue] during 2000, yet paid nothing
towards the approximately $7 million in jail billings". Id.
16. In addition to confinement at no cost to the involved city , municipalities are the
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recipient of additional services from counties. "Justice Courts have unfettered access to the
larger system through the jail, the county probation department, the legal defender, and so forth
with little or no financial obligation. Id. at 3.9. For these very reasons, justice courts have,
unsurprisingly, proliferated in recent years. Id. at 6.5. Courts have even been established in
minor villages such as Trenton & Clarkston.
C. The Legislative Scheme Coupled With Municipalities' Lack of Financial Accountability
For Incarcerated Offenders Undermines Justice Court Independence and Creates
Unconstitutional Pecuniary Incentives do Other Than Justice to Dispense with Fairness
and impartiality.
17. The legislature's funding mechanism coupled with the political realty that
municipalities use justice courts to generate revenue for the general fund directly undermine
justice court judges' independence. Justice court judges must produce sufficient revenue to
maintain the very existence of their courts, and thereby incentive exists to meet a municipalities'
revenue projections. The County Justice Court Assessment study substantiates this proposition
of "the fear that cities will become dependent on the money generated through enforcement, thus
increasing the likelihood that police and judges will be overly aggressive as a way to meet
financial expectations and demands." Id. at 3.8.
18. The conclusion quoted above directly conflicts with certain official assumptions that
monetary demands on justice court judges are "unlikely" and "speculative." Indeed, the revenuegenerating impetus for establishing justice courts is obvious. As the editorial staff of the Salt
Lake Tribune recently observed, "the justification for creating justice courts explicitly includes
being a revenue source for the wider city government..." Editorial, Justice Peeks, Salt Lake
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Tribune, July 20, 2005. The County Justice Court Assessment concluded that "the importance
of revenue generation to municipalities is apparent from the fact that municipal judges are
directly responsible to the executive branch, unlike county judges who must stand for retention
by the electorate." County Justice Court Assessment at 6.5
19. The separation of powers doctrine bars judges from being subject to financial
blandishments when deciding cases. Statutes "granting a pecuniary interest" to judges are clearly
unconstitutional. Blankenship vs. Minton Chevrolet Inc., 266 S.E.2d 902, 903 (W.V. 1979).
The Utah Courts have similarly held that judges must have "no favors to grant, no patronage to
dispose of, and no friends to reward." Timpanogo, 690 P.2d at 568 (quoting In re O'Sullivan,
158 P.2d 306, 309 (Mont. 1945). In the Timpanogos case, the Supreme Court held that the
legislature violated the separation of powers doctrine when it empowered district court judges to
appoint board members of a water conservancy district. Id. at 570. Because the same judges
who appointed board members would later review board decisions, this Court concluded that the
district court judges might "feel constrained in passing upon board action." Id. at 570.
20. Financial incentives need not be explicit in order to violate the separation of powers
doctrine. In defining governmental branch powers, the Utah Court observed that there is a
natural tendency of all persons, even judges, to unconsciously protect their interest:
Due to the manner in which our system was created and has developed, the
judiciary has the awesome prerogative and responsibility of judging the
scope of powers of the executive, legislative, and of its own. For this
reason it is essential that the judiciary be especially circumspect in maintaining
an awareness fo the natural propensity fo human nature: that when anyone
has the power to decide wherein his own interests are involved, there is danger
of consciously or subconsciously leaning toward the protection, and perhaps
the magnification, of his own self-interest. Jones, 550 P.2d at 210 (footnote omitted).
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Knowing that justice counts will only survive if they produce adequate revenue, a justice court
judge might well have an incentive to convict and fine persons without due regard to their core
function to fairly adjudicate cases. Timpanogos, 660 P.2d at 571.
21. Municipalities' refusal to reimburse jails compounds justice court judges' incentives
to generate revenue. This stance allows justice court judges to use county jails "with little
restriction and complete financial impunity." County Justice Court Assessment at 3.9, A
direct consequence of un-reimbursed jail services is the common practice injustice courts of
ordering criminal defendants to "pay or serve" their sentences. Id. 6.5. This device allows
justice court judges to threaten to and/or to incarcerate offenders who fail to pay fines in a timely
manner. Id.. The absence of any financial obligation to municipalities for jail services has
resulted injustice court judges employing incarceration to excess in collecting revenue.
Id. at 3.9.
22. The "pay or serve" practice is especially offensive because it tends to foment an
unwarranted deprivation of a persons liberty. In defining separation of powers violations, the
Utah Court has held that it will tolerate shared powers "when it is essential to the discharge of a
primary function, when it is not an assumption of the whole power of another department, and
when the exercise of the other power does not jeopardize individual liberty." Timpanogos, 690
P.2d at 567 (quoting C. Sand, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 3.06). The absence of
any financial obligation resulting from the incarceration of offenders who fail to pay fines,
Defendant suggests, violates this test.
D. Municipalities' Statutory Control Over Justice Courts Further Frustrates the Fair
Adjudication of Criminal Cases.
10

23. Even if this financial incentive did not interfere with judicial independence, Utah's
legislative scheme governing justice courts also violates separation of powers principles
because it foments exertion of inordinate control over administration of justice courts.
Municipalities have statutory authority to hire and fire judges, to fund court operations, and to
supervise court personnel. These powers, coupled with the use of justice courts as revenue
boosters create a legislative scheme that invades the core function of the judicial branch to fairly
and independently deciding cases.
24. Of greatest concern, the legislature has authorized the executive, without meaningful
guidelines, to hire and fire justice courts judges. Utah Code Annotated section 78-5-134(),
(2)(2002) designates the municipal leader, whether a mayor, council chair, or city manager,
generically called the "appointing authority," to "appoint "justice court judges. The entity's
legislative body must then confirm the appointment by a majority vote. Id § 78-5-134(2).
Justice Court judges serve four-year terms. Id. § 78-5-132 (1). Upon completion of the term,
Utah law mandates that justice court judges "shall be reappointed absent a showing of good
cause." Id. § 78-5-134(5). Iin determining whether "good cause" exists, municipalities "shall
consider" (1) whether the state Judicial Council has certified the judge; and, (2) "any other
factors considered relevant by the appointing authority." Id. § 78-5-134(5)(d). (Emphasis mine)
25. Although this scheme purports to model the appointment of justice court judges after
the traditional appointment process of Federal judges, it allows for expansive executive and
legislative influence over judges. Because appointing authorities may "consider any other
factor" in deciding whether to reappoint a judge, justice court judges essentially serve at the
whim of the executive. Id. § 78-5-134(5)(d). Given this broad discretion as to whether to
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reappoint, the economic ?ealities surrounding justice courts and the pressure to generate revenue
directly influence how judges handle cases. At its most extreme, such influence is manifested if
a judge fails to meet a municipality's revenue projections1 and the appointing authority uses the
grant of power as a means of expressing displeasure. In a plausible scenario, the justice court
judge might indeed, sense pressure, whether "consciously or subconsciously" to maximize
collections and, thus, preserve his or her "own self-interest." Jones, 550 p.2d at 210. Pressure
to collect revenue might not necessarily be overt, unspoken or unrealized expectations of
"favors," "patronage," or "reward" might well be enough to violate separation of powers
principles. Timpanogos, 690 P.2d at 568 (quoting In re O'Sullivan, 158 P.2d at 309).
26. At the very least, the appointment and reappointment process tend to create an
appearance of impropriety. Canon 2 of the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct charges judges to
avoid even "the appearance of impropriety" to ensure "public confidence" in the judiciary. The
County Justice Court Assessment pointed to such an appearance of patronage when it concluded
that justice court judges are "directly responsible to the executive branch" for their very
existence. County Justice Court Assessment at 6.5. Although the assessment did not observe
anything "sinister or improper" the stated concern was that the "appointive power of ihe mayors
presents an interesting if not conflicting situation in that the Executive branch literally creates the
judicial branch via appointment." Id. at 6.10. The editorial staff of the Salt Lake Tribune
eliminated any doubt about the appearance of impropriety when it recently observed that
"because the justification for creating justice courts explicitly includes being a revenue source for
the wider city government, judicial impartiality is seriously compromised." Editorial, Justice

'Surely a significant "factor"
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Peeks, Slat Lake Tribune, July 20,2005.
27. Given the sheer numbers of persons who appear before justice courts, appearance of
impartiality is essential to maintain public confidence in those courts. The Utah State court
website points out that in fiscal year 2004 justice courts presided of over 450,000 traffic cases.
See http://www.utcourts.gov/stats/FY04/justice/fy2004_statewide.htm. In addition, the
justice courts disposed of an additional 85,000 misdemeanor cases during the same year. By
comparison, the district courts disposed of only about 100,000 misdemeanors during fiscal year
2004. See http://www.utcourts.gov/stats/FY04/dist/fy2004 9.htm. A person, citizen or
otherwise, is most likely to experience the Utah justice system through justice courts. These
numbers present a compelling case to ensure "public confldence,, in the justice courts.
Hammermaster, 985 P.2d at 936.
28. Moreover, an appearance of impropriety undermines the independence of justice
courts because public perception affects judicial decision-making. Utah Courts have held that
appearances erode public confidence and alter judges' decisions discussing the point as follows:
"A judge cannot engage in political debate or make public defense of his acts.
When his action is judicial he may always rely upon the support of the define
record upon which his action is based...But when he participates in the action
of the executive or legislative departments of government he is without those
supports. He exposes himself to attack and indeed invites it, which because
of his peculiar situation inevitable impairs his value as a judge and the appropriate
influence of his office." Timponogos, 690 P.2d at 572 (quoting a letter from
former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Harlan Fiske Stone to Franklin D.
Roosevelt, July 20, 1942, in Mason, Extra-Judicial Work for Judges:
The Views of Chief Justice Stone, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 203-204 (1953)).
29. In addition to the appointment process, the legislature has granted municipalities
control over justice court personnel and resources. Utah law entrusts municipalities with funding
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physical facilities, hiring %nd supervising court staff, and administering personnel policies. Utah
Code Annotated §§ 78-5-108 (Supp. 2004), 78-5-110 (Supp. 2004), 78-5-111 (2002). Utah
law thereby empowers local executives to control every aspect of justice court operations and to
determine and thereby fix, each budgetary item. The executive branch also appoints the
administrative staff who serve "at wilV or are hired via the merit system as any other city
employees" in the executive department. County Justice Court Assessment at 6.10.
30. These extensive powers emphasize the appearance of impropriety and tend to
reinforce the actual conflicts discussed above. Executive control over justice courts' budgets,
staff, and resources presents "the perception (if not the reality) of dominance that elected officials
exercise over 1he judiciary they created." Id. Executive action violates the separation of powers
doctrine "when there is an attempt by one branch to dominate another in that other's proper
sphere of influence." Young, 1999 UT 6, ^[23, 976 P.2d 581. Because the legislative scheme
allows local executives to "effectively control " the justice courts, that scheme unconstitutionally
invades the province of the judiciary. Id.
E. No Valid Reasons Support Or Justify Municipalities' Revenue-Motivated Control Over
Justice Courts.
31. Although one might present several unpersuasive rebuttals to the suggestion that
municipalities are revenue-driven to creation of justice courts; none of those arguments change
the legislative landscape that fosters executive and legislative interference with justice courts
based on budgetary considerations. Neither judicial oversight, case law, nor the theoretical
advantages present through the justice court system sanitizes the separation of powers obstacles
presented by Utah's legislative scheme. Such argument as has been presented in proceedings to
14

date fail to resolve the main question presented by this motion: whether the legislative scheme
governing justice courts jeopardizes the "dispassionate" adjudication of criminal cases.
Timponogos, 690 P.2d at 571. Although one might reason that no particular Defendant can
provide a showing that revenue concerns actually motivated any particular justice court judges'
decisions the discussion above demonstrates the superficiality of such an argument given the
reality that justice courts are essentially revenue-driven. See County Justice Court Assessment
at 3.9,3.9, 6.11.2 Additionally, proper application of the separation of powers doctrine does not
require such a showing in that the Utah Supreme Courts opinion in Timponogos establishes that
no actual bias need occur when one branch is provided authority to influence another's core
function. In that case, the Utah Court struck down district court judges' authority to appoint
water conservancy board members even though the parties neither alleged nor proved actual
favoritism. Timponogos, 690, P.2d at 570-72. This appointment system violated the
separation of powers doctrine on the reasoning that judges might "feel constrained" and "would
avoid confrontations" in adjudicating disputes involving water boards. Id. at 570-71.
32. Any position taken to the effect that no other jurisdictions have struck down similar
justice court systems based on separation of powers considerations is manifestly without
foundation. . State vs. Town of South Carthage, 840 S.W.2d 895 (Tenn. 1992), the
Tennessee Supreme Court held that a legislatively-established justice court system violated
separation of powers principles without a showing of any actual harm to the defendant. The
Tennessee Constitution contains provisions similar to Utah's as they require the separation of

2

There is some tacit recognition of the "revenue driven' nature of the courts origination
and operation by the promulgation of a bail schedule.
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the three branches and as^they allow for the legislature ot create justice courts. Id at 897 (citing
Tenn. Const. Art. II, § 2, Art. VI, § 1). Like Utah, the Tennessee legislature empowered
municipalities to appoint justice courts judges to "serve at the pleasure" of the mayor and local
legislative leaders. Id at 896.
33. The Tennessee Supreme Court held that this system violated the mandate of the
separation of powers doctrine because of the potential for city leaders to influence justice court
judges "to increase city revenue...and to impose harsher sentences" on DUI offenders. Id. at 897
(quoting Summers vs. Thompson., 764 S.W.2d 182, 183 (Tenn. 1988)). Although that court
relied on a prior decision in which city leaders had actually attempted to influence a justice court
judge, no similar allegations arose with respect to the case under review. Carthage, 840
S.W.2d at 897. The court held without necessity of reference to the previous case that the
mere potential for influence violated justice court judges' ability to fairly adjudicate cases:
The instant scenario demonstrates the danger posed to an independent judiciary
and to the impartial administration of justice through the exercise of arbitrary power
by a separate branch of government motivated by policy and political concerns
inimical to an independent system of justice. Judicial independence by all respected
political thought indispensably is essential to the effective operation of constitutional
government. Id. at 899.
34. To ensure an judiciary independent from the political caprice and whims of other
government branches, the Tennessee Supreme Court required justice court judges to be elected
rather than to be appointed and supervised by local municipalities. Id. The Tennessee
Constitution employs popular elections to preserve judicial independence from the other
branches of government. Id. at 896 (citing Tenn. Const. Art. IV, § 4). Although Utah does
not rely on popular elections, the "danger" attendant to influence of justice court judges as
16

enunciated in Carthage &ould seem to apply equally under Utah's justice court system.
35. Similarly, in Calligy vs. Mayor and Council fo the City of Hoboken, 665 A.2d
408, 409 (N.J. Super. 1995), a taxpayer claimed that an ordinance placing a municipal court in a
city's department of administration violated separation of powers principles. That opinion
invalidated the justice court because the "authority conferred by the ordinance is inconsistent
with both the fact and appearance of judicial independence required by law." Id. at 412. The
Court reached this conclusion despite the absence of any allegation that city officials had ever
interfered with the court. Id. at 411. Instead, the court held that placing the justice court in the
executive branch was "inconsistent with that court's independence." Id.
36. This instant case in analogous. Although Defendant does not and cannot allege that
the justice court judge is actually influenced by the fact that he is beholden to the City's leaders
under Utah's legislative scheme, the fact remains that local executive officials "literally create[]
the judicial branch via appointment." County Justice Court Assessment at 6.10. Thus, justice
court judges are "directly responsible to the executive branch..." County justice Court
Assessment at 6.5. This situation allows municipalities to "dominate" justice courts in violation
of the separation of powers doctrine. Young, 1999 UT 6, f 23, 976 P.2d 581.
37. Even more to the point, in the State of Washington that states experience points to
the very dangers that the reality of revenue-generating justice courts suggest might happen in
Utah. In In re Hammermaster, 985 P.2d 924 (Wash. 1999), the Washington Supreme Court
sanctioned a justice court for violating numerous ethical duties and abusing his authority. The
court reprimanded the judge for threatening to incarcerate offenders up to a "life" term for failing
to pay court-ordered fines. Id. at 935-36. In doing so, the court held that "[a] judge's primary
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function is the administration of justice, not the collection of fines." Id. at 936.
38. One justice fully concurred in the court's judgment and provided specific examples
of justice court judges who were motivated by financial considerations in adjudicating criminal
cases and observed:
Our opinion today conveys a very strong message to the judiciary and local
governments in Washington that the Supreme Court will not tolerate short
cuts in due process. While many municipalities have established municipal
courts because they want to administer justice locally, it is also true many
jurisdictions establish municipal court for purely avaricious reasons-as
revenue agencies to be operated if they "make money" and be dispensed
with if they become inconvenient to administer or generate insufficient
revenues. Some local jurisdictions have even attempted to control
performance of duties by municipal court judges through devices such as
performance audits, the provision of substandard court facilities, or nonjudicial
control of court personnel. Occasionally, in some jurisdictions, when the
judge has been too independent and has refuse dot generate sufficient revenue
for the municipality, the city's legislative or executive authorities have forced
the ouster of the judge. Id. at 249 (Talmadge, J. Concurring)(cites omitted).
39. Arguments that "section 8 judges" exercise "meaningful ovesight" of justice courts.
Are advanced with misplaced confidence. There is no dispute that other courts, the Judicial
Conduct Commission and the state Judicial Council oversee justice courts. The fact that
supervision is available fails to address the multitude of problems inherent in Utah's justice court
system. Even given the supervision available, the legislative scheme does, nonetheless, provide
justice courts with strong incentives to generate revenue contrary to the impartial administration
of justice. Any such argument similarly fails to address a municipalities' power and influence
with respect to appointment and reappointment of judges, to push for increased collections, and
to manipulate budgets, personnel, and resources whether it be explicitly or implicitly. In any
event, actual municipal pressure need not invite the Utah court's attention or violate the Canons
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of Judicial Conduct in orSer to influence justice court judges' decision-making. As detailed
above, this Court has recognized that subtle pressures can be as effective, to subvert the system
as can overt influence. Timponogos, 690 P.2d at 571; Jones, 550 P.2d at 210.
40. Any argument that the Utah legislature has authorized justice courts for over 100
years without problem does no more than beg the point. Aside from the obvious response that
the law as well as jurisprudence evolves over time, Utah's present legislative scheme directly
defeats the purposes behind establishing local courts. "Justice Courts 'are designed, in the
interest of both the defendant and the state, to provide speedier and less costly adjudications than
may be possible in criminal courts of general jurisdiction.'" Bernat vs. Allphin, 2005 UT 1, %
32.106 P.3d 707 (quoting Colten vs. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 114 (1972)). But, the separation
of powers doctrine bars government from sacrificing "liberty" for the sake of efficiency.
Timponogos, 690 P.2d at 567. In Timponogos, denial of the power to appoint water
conservancy board members because such a "centralization and consolidation of power would
seem to us tantamount to loss of democracy in the name of efficiency, an untenable proposition
under our system of jurisprudence." Id. at 571. points up the basic flaw in such an argument.
41. Like judges' power to appoint officers whom appear before those same judges,
municipal control and influence over justice court judges to generate revenue undermines
"essential" constitutional liberties. Id. at 567. Indeed, the framers of the federal constitution
founded the justice system on judicial independence in criminal matters. Hammermaster, 985
P.2d at 935-36. An independent judiciary, free from fiscal constraints, "is an essential tool in
guarding the constitution and the rights of individuals." Id. at 936.
42. Finally, any contention that the right to appeal to the district court and request a trial
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de novo "sanitizes " any problems with justice courts is without basis in theory or as practiced.
Any such argument grossly underrates the impact justice courts have on criminal defendants.
Even though justice courts only handle class B and C misdemeanors, local ordinance violations,
with intermediate punishment schedules, and infractions, conviction of these crimes can
devastate lives. Incarceration visits destruction on the most routine daily activities and deprives
persons of the fundamental right to liberty. As the United States Supreme Court has observed,
even "[penalties such as probation or a fine may engender ca significant infringement of
personal freedom,' but they cannot approximate in severity the loss of liberty that a prison term
entails." Blanton vs. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 542 (1989) (quoting Frank vs.
United States, 395 U.S. 147,151 (1969)). Beyond the possibility of a jail sentence, fine, or
probation, numerous collateral consequences disrupt the lives of persons who are convicted in
justice courts. These disruptions include the loss of employment, driving privileges, government
benefits, and even student loans. Sam Newton, Justice Court Appeal: The Good, the Bad,
and the Unintended, 18 Utah Bar J. No. 1 at 25 (January/February 2005).
43. The appellate process as contemplated by the legislature and as it is employed with
respect to Justice court cases is flawed. By statutory mandate, an ordinance imperfection is dealt
with differently than an imperfect constitutional ruling by a judge, albeit his appointment might
be for all the wrong reasons. The fact of this legislative distinction violates the right of a
Defendant to due process and equal protection under the law.
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CONCLUSION
In summary, Utah's legislative scheme governing justice courts invades the judges' core
function to "adjudicate with dispassionate impartiality." Timponogos, 690 P.2d at 571. Instead
of administering justice, justice courts risk being relegated to "collection agencies" for
"government officials intent on revenue" generation. Hammermaster, 985 P.2d at 943
(Talmage, J. Concurring). The separation of powers doctrine demands "[jjudicial
independence...without intrusion from or intruding upon the other branches of government." Id.
at 936 (majority opinion).
Upon the reasoning supporting the above conclusions this Defendant requests this Court
Dismiss this pending action for want of jurisdiction and thereby invalidate^ Utah's legislative
scheme for creating and maintaining justice courts.
Respectfully submitted thisjD day off )Cff,. , 2006
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APPENDIX B
Sentence & Judgement

Hyde FarK Municipal j u s u c e v^uui i
Cache County, State of Utah
113 East Center Street, Hyde Park City, Utah 84318

(435)563-6923

JUDGMENT

rATE OF UTAH/ Hyde Park
Plaintiff,

As Modified at Sentence Review
DOB: 11-11-58

raid Rio Davis

Case: HP05-0503

Defendant
efendant either having been adjudged or entered a plea of GUILTY/NO CONTEST to the charge of:
Dunt No. 1 Maintaining a Nuisance
Hyde Park Ordinance 10-332

Infraction

Misdemeanor, and no legal reason having been shown why judgment should not be pronounced, and Defendant being present with or
iving waived Counsel. It is the judgment and sentence of the Court (
Judgment and sentence is modified) as follows:
ount No. 1 Defendant is fined $
and sentenced to
_ days in the Cache County Jail; and
* days in the Cache County
il and $
are suspended upon satisfactory completion of
months probation to:
Formal Court probation requiring
Wednesday of each month between 2:00 & 5:00 p.m. beginning
; OR
ifendant to appear personally before the Court on the
Informal Court probation to submit a written report to the Court prior to the first Wednesday of each month. Terms of probation are as
Hows:
per month beginning
a. Payment of total fine(s) $
or
hours community service as follows: $_
and by the same day of each month thereafter until paid in full. $20 late fee for all delinquent payments.
b. No violation of federal, state, or local law. Keep Court informed of current address and phone number at all times. Submit to search of
person, premises, or property and seizure of any evidence without a search warrant, any time of day or night, upon reasonable suspicion as
ascertained by probation officer or police officer to verify compliance with probation terms.
c. $
restitution to
. Restitution is to be paid before Court fines.
d. Do not possess or consume any alcoholic beverages, and do not frequent any place where alcohol is the main item on the menu; in
particular: liquor stores, bars, and parties. Submit to urinalysis and/or blood tests at request of alcohol counselor, police officer, or Court.
e. Contact
Bear River Alcohol and Drug OR
Court approved agency
by
for evaluation and complete recommended treatment, pay directly to provider the cost for treatment and sign a release of information to the
Court.
f. Provide all new receipts for proof of payment of all counseling upon each appearance before the Court. No credit given without receipts.
g. No association with anyone wanted by the law or performing illegal activity,
h. Maintain full time employment or educational program.
i. Contact Private Probation Services Incorporated by
to arrange for supervised probation. OR
Participate in the PPSI
House Arrest Program and pay the costs of the same,
j . Complete and pay for:
SA course
Victim Impact Panel course
Values course
high school diploma/GBD
certificate by
_.
Written report about
.by.
Attend
Alcoholics Anonymous (AA)
other Court pre-approved rehabilitation group
Narcotics Anonymous (NA) or
within
days
every week and provide proof of attendance to Court at time of probation appearance on the
times
next required appearance or each month, whichever is applicable. Must complete a written summary on each meeting attended.
m. Contact assigned agency for community service hours on or before
and schedule
work
hours
days which are
to be completed by
.
n. Pay restitution for any jail time required^)
serve
at the
State
approved
rate.
^VJ \\J .JS^l
TV/ t*t
U 1 V then^current
UIVUsVUllVlll w
jlllll. U
J J J J U J V L U 1CIIV/.

C- fVpfi/v/
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UE-TM op&ntJf\*>cJb.,

nd other conditions set forth by the Court.
rount No. 2

Defendant is fined $

o be imprisoned for
>robation.
rount No. 3

:

less the following suspend »d $
TOTAL TO BE PAID
and
days to be suspended on payment of fine and successful completion of

days in the Cache County Jail with

Defendant is fined $

o be imprisoned for
)robation.

$_
less the following suspended $_
TOTAL TO BE PAID
$
and
days to be suspended on payment of fine and successful completion o[

* days in the Cache County Jail with

Defendant may appeal this judgment within thirty (30) days to Cache

/

Date of Judgment f\jU/^C^
"opy delivered/mailed to Defendant on

)isflrict Court by/nptifying this Court's clerk.

/ - I 8LQ

C
7

by

f V\'

T^.

, Judge

APPENDIX C
Notice of Appeal

A. W. Lauritzen( 190ft)
Attorney at Law/ Attorney for Defendant
P.O.Box 171
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (435) 753-3391

IN THE JUSTICE COURT IN AND FOR HYDE PARK CITY
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH

HYDE PARK CITY
Plaintiff.
NOTICE OF APPEAL
vs
JERALD RIO DAVIS
Defendant

Case No. HP05-0503
Judge: David C. Marx

You will please take notice that the Defendant appeals the decision oi ihc Hyde Park City
Justice Court for Cache County. State of Utah, made and entered on the Is1 d.n oi November.
2006 to the District Court for Cache County. State of Utah; said decision amounting to a
Judgment of conviction and sentence in the above entitled action.
"->

„L

Dated the^v^ dav of November, 2006.

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL
COUNTY OF CACHE

STATE OF UTAH
A.W. Lauritzen being first duly sworn does depose and say that I hereby certify that there
are valid grounds for the taking of appeal in the above entitled matter and that the appeal is not
taken for the hindrance or delay ro to obstruct justice.

w>/?

M.

Notary Public

Seal:

I

**&r

DENNIS N CLARK
Notary Public

I
|

State of Utah

|

My Commission Expires Feb. 8, 2007 L
505 N. 400W, Logan, UT 84321
I
v n r *><\> *v v v v f www » » » * V P <FV

?

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hcrebv certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing.
APPEAL, postage prepaid, to the following listed below on the

Scott Wyatt, Esq.
108 North Main
Logan, UT 84321

J

X(

)TICE OF

day of November. 2006.

APPENDIX D
Motions to Dismiss

A._W.Lauritzen(1906$
Attorney at Law
610 North Main
P.O.Box 171
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (801)753-3391
rN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH

HYDE PARK CITY,

[
I

MOTION TO DISMISS
PENDING ACTION

vs.

|

Oral Arguments Requested

RIO DAVIS
Defendant.

j
I

Case No. 071100143
Judge: Judkins

Plaintiff

COMES NOW Rio Davis and moves this court to Dismiss the action pending on the
grounds previously argued in Justice Court upon rhc ground that the trial and appeal process as
promulgated by the Utah Legislature and as practiced in the Justice Court ana in. the District
Court are flawed and deny this Defendant due process of law follows:
1.

The Statute UCA 10-8-60 in prescribing the nature and quality of evidence

employed regarding what constitutes a Nuisance be relegated to each city and town constitutes a
violation of Defendant's right 10 due process and violates the Doctrine of Separation ol powers as
mandated by Article VIII Section 4 of the Utah Constitution and as construed by authorities such
as Burns v. Boyden 133 P3d. 370 (Utah 2006).
2.

The Justice Court by its very existence and as governed pursuant to State Law,

constitutes a violation of Article VIII Section 4 of the Utah Constitution and thereby may assert
no jurisdiction to decide criminal cases ov controversies.

3.

A Men^prandum of Points and Authorities is provided herewith.

Wherefore this action should be dismissed.
Dated this the I'^-xtey of April, 2007.

CERTIFICATE ui v MAILING
I herebv certit'v that a true and correct copy of'he iinvyoinii document! s).NT 'ION TO
DISMISS PENDING ACTION, was served on the followirm in the manner indicated on the
\<"
^_

day of April, 2007. $ U.S. mail [ ] Hand delivery [ ] Fax.

HttlAMk
Scott Wyatt
108 North Main. #200
Louan, Utah 84321

A. W. Lauritzen(1906)
Attorney at Law/ Attorney for Defendant
P.O. Box 171
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (435) 753-3391

IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT IN
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH
HYDE PARK CITY
Plaintiff,

)
)
)

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS

vs
])
])

JERALD RIO DAVIS
Defendant

Case No.071003
Judge: Judkins
Oral Arguments Requested

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Ira B. (Friday) Davis, the father of Defendant Jerald Rio Davis was a long time

resident of Hyde Park City, owning lands located at 187 East 200 North consisting of 1.07 acres
upon which stood a home and shop which housed the business licensed and operated as Ira B.
Davis Body and Fender.
2.

During the lifetime of Ira B. Davis the minutes of the Hyde Park City Counsel

(examined during the period of 1970 onward) no discussion concerning said lands is noted
except that respecting a Trailer House which was moved onto the property, there was a brief
discussion but no action was taken at that time and no further discussion regarding this topic or
any other was addressed until the end of 1979.
3.

For the purposes of this argument and for no other purpose, it is conceded by the
1

Defendant that Hyde Park City has purported to have enacted Chapter 10-300 through" 10-343
which, from time to time, will be referred to as the "nuisance ordinance." This ordinance appears
to have been enacted on the 10th day of January, 1979 and is said to have been revised on the 1st
day of February, 1979.
4.

The nuisance ordinance, as adopted by the Plaintiff City, differs significantly from

the nuisance statutes which have been and are in effect in Utah during the time coextensive with
this litigation.
5.

On August 11, 1998 a letter from Mayor Mark E. Daines to Ira Davis advised that

the City has received complaints about the "appearance of your property."
6.

In a letter dated November 9, 1998 from Mayor Mark E. Daines, observes that,
"... We have noticed the removal of some vehicles and very much appreciate
your willingness to comply with the ordinance and at the same time not
jeopardize your repair business."

7.

Ira Davis died on May 18, 2001 and his estate ultimately passed to Rio Davis who

continued to operate the business under a license issued by the executive branch of the Municipal
Government.
8.

After taking possession of the property at 187 East 200 North, Rio Davis

commenced a clean up, discarding items considered not to be relevant to continued operation,
and has indeed removed a considerable amount of property from the East side of the tract which
portion has now been fenced and is occupied by horses. Now operated, Personal property
remains behind the shop which houses the Davis repair business as it is now situated.
9.

On March 21, 2003 Defendant received a letter from Reed A. Elder, purporting

to represent Hyde Park City. The letter discusses a visit in which suggested goals were to be
2

accomplished by Defendant to bring the property into compliance with the existing City
ordinances as follows:
1. Removal of or storage in an onsite garage, " ...all non-licensed vehicles and boats"
2. "All miscellaneous materials that you [emphasis mine] have no useful purpose for and
all debris must be removed from the property. This includes, but is not limited to automotive
motor parts, brick and masonry materials, lumber or other wood items, metal barrels and all other
items of furniture, machinery and building materials."
3. "All material and machinery which you want to keep and store on the property must be
stored inside a closed structure or within an additional fenced area inside the property which
creates a visual barrier to the other properties surrounding your property. The materials to be
used and the location of placement of such a fence would need to be approved by the City."
4. "The property on which there is presently a trailer home located (northeast corner)
must be separated from the balance of your property to establish its own lot and utilities. This
will need to follow existing ordinances which the City will help you with."
5. "This all must be accomplished within 120 days of this letter or the City may have to
take actions to have the work done, which will result in a charge to your for the cost."
The letter requests a signature from Defendant which was never accomplished.
10.

Defendant was charged with the crime of Maintaining a Nuisance in violation of

Hyde Park Revised Ordinances of 10-332 with regard to the property at 187 East 200 North,
Hyde Park, Utah alleging the occurrence on or about the 3rd day of November, 2005.
11.

Defendant was tried and convicted of an in infraction by a non- lawyer Judge and

sentenced to pay a fine of $50.00/ day from the date of sentencing to a date to be thereafter
determined by the Executive Department of the Municipal Government; this appeal follows.
ISSUES
I.

Whether or not the Plaintiff City's nuisance ordinances are repugnant to and

in conflict with the laws of the State of Utah and not in accord with the doctrine announced
in ALLGOOD v. LARSON (infra).
II.

Whether or not the nuisance statutes of Hyde Park City and the State of
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Utah are constitutional or whether said statutes should be declared void-for-vagueness
because the statutes do not adequately define what is a nuisance nor do they provide
adequate guidelines for the enforcement of said statutes.
III.

Whether or not the penalty ordinance No. 10-359 of the Plaintiff City is

enforceable on its face as imposed upon Defendant.
DISCUSSION
I.

The nuisance ordinances of the Plaintiff City are repugnant to and in conflict

with the laws of the State of Utah and in violation of the doctrine of ALLGOOD v.
LARSON(supra).
12.

The powers of cities and towns such as Plaintiff town are regulated by Title 10 of

the Utah Code, U.C.A. § 10-8-60 which provides that:
cities and town may declare what shall be a nuisance and abate the same and
impose fines upon persons who may create, continue or suffer nuisances to exist.
13.

While this section seems to give considerable flexibility to the city to fashion its

own standards of criminality, this section must be considered in light of other provisions of law
and the "Allgood Doctrine." c/Logan City v. Thatcher
14.

P2d

(19_UT).

As a limitation imposed on the Grant found in the above cited statute,

U.C.A. § 10-8-84 provides that cities and town such as Plaintiff may:
pass all ordinances and rules, and make all regulations, not repugnant to law,
necessary for carrying into effect or discharging all powers and duties conferred
by this chapter and as are necessary and proper to provide for the safety and
preserve, the health, and promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace and
good order, comfort, and convenience of the city and its inhabitants , and for the
protection of property in the city and may enforce obedience to ordinances with
fines or penalties as they may deem proper, but the punishment in any event shall
be by fine not to exceed the maximum class B misdemeanor fine under Section
4

76-3-301 or by imprisonment not to exceed six months or both fine and
imprisonment.

15.

The Utah Supreme Court in ALLGOOD v. LARSON, 545 P.2d 530, 531 (Utah

1976) held that the provisions of Article XI, § 5 of the Utah Constitution are "not only a
delegation of power by the people to a municipality, but is also a limitation" of such powers. The
"constitutional provision, in conferring police power upon municipalities, limits the grant to an
area "not in conflict with the general law,"" The Allgood Court placed a construction on the
provision found in 10-8-84 "not repugnant to law" as being coextensive with the mandate
emphasized above.
16.

In determining whether an ordinance is in conflict with general laws, the test is

whether the questioned ordinance permits or licenses that which the statute forbids and prohibits,
and likewise whether that same ordinance might eschew conduct permitted by the "General
Law." RICHFIELD CITY v. WALKER 790 P.2d 87, 90-91 (Utah App. 1990) citing SALT
LAKE CITY v. KUSSE, 97 Utah 113, 93 P.2d 671 (1938). Based on this test it is apparent that
the Plaintiff City's nuisance ordinances are in conflict with the general laws of the State of Utah
as the elements of each cannot be reconciled in several respects.
Part 10-331 of the Plaintiff City's nuisance ordinance defines a nuisance as follows:
For the purpose of this part the term "nuisance" is defined "to mean any condition
of use or premises or of building exteriors which are deleterious or injurious,
noxious or unsightly which includes, but is not limited to keeping or dispositing
on, or scattering over the premises any of the following:
A. Lumber, junk, trash, or debris.
B. Abandoned, discarded, or unused objects or equipment such as furniture,

5.

stoves, refrigerators, freezers, cans or containers.
17.

Where in the Utah Nuisance Statutes do prohibitions such as these appear? All

prohibitions in the Utah Code eschew "such terms as "noxious" or "unsightly" and invoke the
requirement that any proscribed condition must be dangerous to "human life or health" or create
an "impure or unwholesome" condition. [Defendant proposes that the latter standard "impure or
unwholesome" is unenforceable (infra)].
18.

The Utah Supreme Court has held that the test of whether the use of the property

constitutes a nuisance is the reasonableness of the use complained of in the particular locality an
in the manner and under the circumstances of the case. CANNON v. NEUBERGER, 1 Utah 2d
396, 268 P.2d 425; DAHL v. UTAH OIL REFINING CO.. 71 Utah 1, 262 P.269. The question
is not whether a reasonable person in the Plaintiffs or Defendant's position would regard the
condition as unreasonable, but whether reasonable persons generally, looking at the whole
situation impartially and objectively, would consider it unreasonable; thus should Defendant's
use offend the "Danger to human health" standard, the inquiry must nevertheless shift to the
reasonableness of the use in the location. (Perhaps this is the basis of the three or more persons
requirement which basis is problematic as to whether the standard is suspect, invidious and
arbitrary).
19.

The Courts have uniformly held that the use of property analogous to Defendants'

use of the subject property or even for such purposes as public garages or for the business of
wrecking automobiles and salvaging parts are not nuisances per se. HATCH v. HATCH CO., 3
Utah 2d 295, 283 P.2d 217 (Utah 1955) citing GEORGE v. GOODVICK 288 Pa. 48, 135 A.
719, 50A.L.R. 107; PARKERSBURG BUILDERS MATERIAL CO. v. BARRACK 118 W.Va.
6

608,191 S.E. 368, I I O A L . R . 1461.
Utah Code Annotated, § 76-10-801, (1973 Amendment) defines "nuisance" as follows:
(1) A nuisance is any item, thing, manner, condition whatsoever that is dangerous
to human life or health or renders soil, air, water, or food impure or unwholesome.
No such limitation appears in the Hyde Park Ordinance and the State statute goes on to provide:
(2) Any person, whether as owner, agent, or occupant who creates, aids in
creating, or contributes to a nuisance, or who supports, continues or retains a
nuisance, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
20.

The Utah Court of Appeals in TURNBAUGH v. ANDERSON, 793 P.2d 939

(Utah App. 1990) held that Section 76-10-801 encompasses two types of nuisance developed
under the common law: public and private nuisance. See e.g., HELMKAMP v. CLARK
READY MIX CO., 214 N.W.2d 126, 129 (Iowa 1974) (state statutory enumerations do not
modify the common-law doctrine of nuisance); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts 821A
(1979). The definition of nuisance in Section 76-10-801 includes acts or conditions that are
commonly classed as public or private nuisances.
21.

A public nuisance is defined under the provisions of U.C.A. § 76-10-803, (1992

Amendment) as follows:
(1) A public nuisance is a crime against the order and economy of the state and
consists in unlawfully doing any act or omitting to perform any duty, which act or
omission:
(a) annoys, injures, or endangers the comfort, repose, health, or safety of three or
more persons;1

1

Which three (3) people. (See Solars Salt)

(b) offends public decency2:
(c) unlawfully interferes with, obstructs, or tends to obstruct, or renders dangerous
for passage, any lake, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park, square, street, or
highway;
(d) is a nuisance as defined in Section 78-38-9;,(for application of which section
Plaintiffs do not contend) or
(e) in any way renders three or more persons insecure in life or the use of
property.
(2) An act which affects three or more persons in any of the ways specified in this
section is still a nuisance regardless of the extent of annoyance or damage
inflicted on individuals is unequal.
22.

The Utah Supreme Court had defined a public nuisance as affecting "an interest

common to the general public, rather than peculiar to one individual, or several." SOLAR SALT
CO. vs. SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSP. CO., 555 P.2d 286, 289 (Utah 1976) (quoting W.
Prosser, Law of Torts 606). cf!6-10-803 SUPRA.
23.

It is more than clear that the nuisance ordinances of the Plaintiff City are

repugnant to and in conflict with the general laws of the State of Utah in violation of the doctrine
of ALLGOOD v. LARSON, supra. The Plaintiff City's nuisance ordinances forbid what the
general laws of the State of Utah permit.
24.

The Plaintiff City's nuisance ordinances should therefore be declared null and void

as being violative of Article XI, § 5 of the Utah Constitution and parallel provisions of the
Constitution of the United States.
II.

The Plaintiff City's nuisance ordinances and the nuisance statutes are

As is noted on page 8, Defendant contends that (a) and (b) are unenforceable as
vague and imprecise.

8

unconstitutionally vaguk
2^

There should he no question that (hr naliire of even civil proceedings are quasi-

criminal in character. SIMS v. TAX COMMISSION, 841 P 2d 6 (Utah 1992).
U.C.A. § 76-10-801(2), (1973 Amendment) provide

•<

(2) Any person, whether as owner, agent, or occupant who creates, aids in
creating, or contributes to a nuisance, or who supports, continues, or retains a
nuisance, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
26.

I he Defendants con U.IK I (hat I'uri Hi- < '»1 ml (In Plaintiff City's nuisance ordinance

a^ 1 U.C.A. § 76-10-801(1) defining nuisance and U.C.A. § 76-10-803 defining a public nuisance
are unconstitutionally vague in violation of Article I, £ 7 of the 1 'tali l piisiitui"»n nnd the
Fourteen!,! i \:t nendment to the I h u'ted States Constitution.
27.

The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a statute or ordinance deink. ;i« =

offense with sufficient definiteness lliat urdm;trv people i an understand what conduct is
prohil

r

anii in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.

KOLENDER v. LAWSON, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 75 L.Ed.2d 903, 909. In-'J Si I 1855(1983).
More important than at tiuil notice r. I he requirement that a legislature establish minimal
guidelines to govern law enforcement. KOLENDER, quoting SMITH v. GOGUEN, 415 U.S.
566, 574, 39 L.Ed.2d 605, 94 S.Ct 1 -"4/ ( 1«» M ) '1 r .i basic pnnciple of due process that an
enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibition is not clearly defined. GRAYNED v. CITY OF
ROCKFORD, 408 U.S. 104, 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 92 S.Ct. 2294 (1972).
28.

A const,

* agueness challenge can proceed either as a facial challenge or

upon its application, based upon the facts of the case. GREENWOOD v. CITY OF NORTH
SALT LAKE, 817 P.2d 816 (I Jtah

'

i

.lenge is perm -. ,: when a statute or

9

ordinance has no practical application in any case or the law reaches a substantial amount of
constitutionally protected conduct. HOFFMAN ESTATES v. FLIPSIDE, HOFFMAN
ESTATES, INC., 455 U.S. 489, 494, 71 L.Ed.2d 362, 102 S.Ct. 1186 (1982). Where a statute or
ordinance imposes criminal penalties, the standard of certainty is higher. WINTERS v. NEW
YORK, 333 U.S. 507, 515, 92 L.Ed. 840, 68 S.Ct. 665 (1948). This concern has led the United
States Supreme Court to invalidate a criminal statute on its face even when it could conceivably
have had some valid application. COLAUTTI v. FRANKLIN, 439 U.S. 379, 394-401, 58
L.Ed.2d 596, 99 S.Ct. 675 (1979)3.
29.

The challenged ordinances and statutes in the instant case reaches a substantial

amount of constitutionally protected conduct.
Article I, § 1 of the Utah Constitution provides as follows:
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their lives and
liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship according to the
dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and
petition for redress or grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts and
opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right.
30.

The Plaintiff City must establish and prove in this case that Defendants' use of the

subject property is a public nuisance as defined under § 76-10-803 and such use has a detrimental
effect on public comfort, repose, health or safety, or which offends public decency.
31.

The Utah Supreme Court has held that municipal ordinances which are similar to

U.C.A. § 76-10-801 and § 76-10-803 even when only the civil remedy is pursued, to be
unconstitutionally vague. The Court in JONES v. LOGAN CITY CORP., 19 Utah 2d 169, 428

3

Utah cases such as Logan City v. Huber 786 P.2d 1372 (Ut App. 1990) and Provo City v.
Whatcott 200 UT, (Ut. App 1986) discuss ordinances and statutes which sweep too broadly.

10

P.2d 160 (1967) observed as follows:
While the statute above mentioned grants to cities the power to declare what shall
be a nuisance, the ordinance before us does not in fact define what a nuisance is.
Ordinance No. 120 above referred to, which grants to the Board of Condemnation
the right to determine whether any building constitutes a menace to public health
or public safety, does not provide standards on which the board can base its
findings as to what is or what is not a menace to public health or public safety. It
would appear that the ordinance imposes upon the Board of Condemnation quasijudicial functions without standards or guidelines to govern the Board in its
determination.
32.

U.C.A. § 76-10-801 and § 76 10 803 do not provide sufficient ^u^. <• .»!

giiiilcliiii ', iipoii nliim In iht ( 'unit can base its findings as to what is or what is not detrimental to
public comfort, repose, health or safety and what is or what is not a public nuisance or even what
public comfort or repose are.
33.

The United States Supreme Court stated in KOLENDER v. LAWSON, supra, n.

7: societies concern for minimal guidelines finds it roots as far back as the decisioiI in UNITED
STATES v. REESE, 92 U.S. 214, 221, 25 L.Ed. 563 (1876):
It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to
catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who
could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large. This would, to some
extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative department of government.
34.

U.C.A. § 76-10-801 and § 76-10-803 are unconstitutionally vague on their face

because the statues encourage arbitrary enforcenini! by failing fo dcsaibe with sufficiency what
conduct is proscribed by the statutes and also those statutes reach a substantial amount of
constitutionally protected conduct. Furthermore, the statutes are unconstitutionally vague in the
application of the statutes to the facts of this case. Assuming, the Plaintiff City's nuisance
ordinances are applicable in this case, the ordinances are also unconstitutionally vague.

35.

Part 10-3^1 of Plaintiff City's nuisance ordinance is susceptible of many different

meanings and consequently is unconstitutionally vague. For example, the ordinance prohibits
lumber from being deposited or scattered on any premises. This ordinance could preclude a
commercial lumber yard from maintaining stock on the premises and selling lumber. The
ordinance could also prohibit the construction of buildings from lumber. Junk as defined in the
ordinance is also susceptible of many different meanings as defined in Webster's Dictionary.

36.

The ordinance is susceptible of many different meanings and encourages arbitrary

and discriminatory enforcement and should therefore be declared unconstitutionally vague.
III.

Whether or not the penalty ordinance No. 10-359 of the Plaintiff City, as

written is enforceable upon Defendant.
37.

Hyde Park City Ordinance No. 10-359 PENALTY FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY

is as follows:
A. Any owner, occupant or person having an interest in the property subject to
this chapter who shall fail to comply with the notice or order given pursuant
to this chapter shall be guilty of a class C misdemeanor for each offense and
further sum of $50.00 for each and every day such failure to comply continues
beyond the date fixed for compliance.
B. Compliance by any owner, occupant or person to whom a notice has been
given as provided in this chapter shall not be admissible in any criminal
proceeding brought pursuant to this section.
38.

For purposes of this argument, we shall dwell only on part A. With regard to that

portion which reads, "...further sum of $50.00 for each and every day such failure to comply
continues beyond the date fixed for compliance."
39.

The legislature created on July 1, 1973 classes of offenses and stated in 76-1-103
(1) the following as found in Algood v. Larson (supra):

12

"The provisions of this code shall govern the construction of, the punishment
for,...any offense defined in this code.... any offense defined outside this
code ..." 76-1-104 provides that the code shall be constructed in accordance
with these general purposes; and Subsection (3), dealing with penalties,
states; ' Prescribe penalties which are proportionate to the seriousness of
offenses..."
40.

The cities which adopt ordinances, such as the Plaintiff City has accomplished

here, are regulated b y the State laws and by the courts, the city cannot impose a greater sentence
than that provided b y state law. See Algood v. Larson (supra), T' is :o be noted that 10-8-84, by
its express terms, Hi i lits tl ie gi ant of powei tc i i n it licipalities to pass orcin lai ices, to tl lose """i IC t
repugnant to law."
4

If the ordinance penalty conflicts with that of the general law of the state covering

the same subject, the ordinance penalty is void. The penalty prescribed by the city ordinance
cannot exceed that set b y the state law. [Allgood v. Larson(supra)]
42.

The test as to whether an i •• !--

• r"-•;.:

'

\ ute law is

not whether it deals with the same subject matter in a different manner by pioviding a different
penalty, but it is whether the ordinance permits or licenses something which the state statute
forbids or prohibits, or vice versa. See Algood v. Larson quoting Salt Lake city v. Kusse, supra;
and see, e.g. city of Columbus v. Molt, 36 Ohio St. 2d 94, 304 N.E.2d 245.
43.

AJX>

violation of tl ie Plaii Hi!: f Cit; • 's Nuisance Ordii lance si lall be designated as a

single crime, a misdemeanor. The Ordinance exceeds the statutory limits by providing that a fine
of $50.00 shall be assessed "...for each and every day such failure to comply continues beyond
the date fixed for compliance." There can only be one violation and as such there can be only
one fine assessed. If the penalty is valid, the probable application is only to the point that $50.00
13

APPENDIX E
Transcript

otally decimated by that aort of situation.
ou thought about that.

I don't think

That truck back there may be

omething that you have a future use for, but right now you
on't have a use for it.
The court is going to order that the -- well, I guess,
r.. Lauritzen, your client has the right to come back in not
ess than two nor more than 45 days unless you want to waive
hat time frame and proceed with sentencing today?
MR. LAURITZEN;
THE

I'11 waive it.

Very well.

It will be the order of the

Durt that the defendant pay a fine in the amount of $50 for
aintaining that nuisance.

The court-will place the

Bfendant on probation and will review this matter on the
5th of November at 10:00.

At that point in time I'll expect

:. Grunig in his capacity to come back and report to the
)urt, and the defendant is to be present at that time as
B11 with his counsel, and represent to me that the property
is been cleaned up satisfactory to the norms of society.

If

)t, the defendant will be placed in contempt and then the
)urt will impose a jail sentence at that point in time.

Mr.

ivis, I think you understand the court's position.
It will be ordered that the exhibits be returned to Mr.
'nkins.

We'll be in recess.

(Trial concluded.)
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APPENDIX F
Minutes, Sentence, Judgment, Commitment and Notice

First Judicial District, State of Utah, Coi

ache
FEB

STATE OF UTAH

0 8 2003

Jl 'I«" .MrlN 1' & COMMITMENT
Plaintiff,
Case No.

vs.

n^tJL £it^

Plaintiff's

$M*4^
Defendant

7>1 /1 f) PI

^

AttornevtO^L£lM4

Defendant's Attorned

Defendant (having been adjudgedfteiiteied tt^ka-of) (GUILTY 7 NO CONTEST) to the charge of
Count No. 1

y y s f r t t

C,

4( llLSMltiLA

^

a Class.

/"/

Misdemeanor

Count No. 2

a Class.

Misdemeanor

Count No. 3

a Class .

Misdemeanor

And Defendant having agreed to proceed with sentencing and no other legal reason having been shown why judgment should not be
pronounced, and Defendant being presented (with) (having waived) Counsel, it is the judgment and sentence of the Court as follows:
1

Count No. 1

Defendant is fined $

plus surcharge of
less the following suspended

$

TOTAL TO BE PAID
and to be imprisoned for
Count No. 2

days in the County Jail with
Defendant is fined $

$ S

days to be suspended on payment of fine/probation
plus surcharge of

less the following suspended

$

I O'l A I TO BE PAID
and to be imprisoned for
!

Count No. 3

days in the County Jail with
Defendant is fined $

%

days to be suspended on payment of fine/probation
plus surcharge of

less the following suspended

$

TOTAL TO BE PAID
and to be imprisoned for

O

days in the Countv Jail with

$

davs to be suspended on payment of fine/probation

_hrs by_
_days. Community Service.
REPORT TO JAIL.
_to serve.
FINE DUE by_
. beginning.
Fine to be paid in installments of $
per.
Probation with
Q PPS
• AP&P
5(T Court
• No association with known criminals, drug dealers or drug users.
[~1 Complete alcohol counseling, pay fees, file Completion notice, • Possess/consume no alcohol or be where it is served/sold.
f~1 Receive credit of
towards cost of counseling. Q Keep Court Informed Of Current Address.
|~] Submit to search and seizure and random testing upon request of law enforcement.
Q Violate no laws.
Q Obtain UA.
• Obtain and maintain full-time employment or schooling.
• Obtain GED .

/Uivikio-^ fcir^
Defendant may appeal this judgnu-

Dated

T(W<T7

d7 <?ir0'
i of Appeals In Salt Lake City, Utah.

Clerk

#&

APPENDIX G
Notice of Appeal

10A.W. Lauritzen (1906)*
15 East 600 North #1
P.O.Box 171
Logan, UT 84321
435-753-3391
rN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
NOTICE OF APPEAL
vs.

JERALD RIO DAVIS,
Defendant.

Case No. 071100143 MO
Judge Clint S. Judkins

You will please take notice that the Defendant appeals the Judgment of Conviction and
sentence entered in the First District Court for Cache County, State of Utah, on the 28th of
September, 2007 to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah; said Entry amounting to a final
judgment of conviction and sentence in the above entitled action.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, NOTICE OF

n-rtt

October

APPEAL, postage prepaid, to the following listed below on theW'^day of-SSffrombcr, 2007.

Wifm (i\kdm>M%r±
Jonathan E. Jenkins, Esq.
108 North Main
Logan, UT 84321

2

"t - a v>

EXHIBIT J"

Xf

A.W. Lauritzen(1906)
Attorney at Law/Attorney for Defendant
135 North Main Ste. # 104
P.O. Box 171
Logan, UT 84321
435-753-3391
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH

AMENDED
NOTICE OF APPEAL

HYDE PARK CITY
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 071100143 MO
Judge Clint S. Judkins

JERALD RIO DAVIS,
Defendant.

You will please take notice thai pi n si lant to ai i Order of the District Court, made on
January 16, 2008 (see Exhibit A), the Defendant files herewith an Amended Notice of Appeal
taken from the Judgment of Conviction and Sentence entered in the First District Court for Cache
County, State oi Utah, on the 28th of September, 2007; said Entry amounting to a final judgment
of conviction and sentence in the above entitled action.
This notice is being submitted specifically designating the constitutional issues from
which Defendant hereby appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals as follows:
1. Whether the Ordinance of the Plaintiff City herein # 10-332 et seq. is
Unconstitutionally vague and violative of the protections afforded by the Due Process Clause of
the U.S. Constitution as well as the guarantees of equal protection of the laws.
2.Whether the Ordinances of the Plaintiffs are repugnant to and in i ecu if li ::l will i the
laws of the State of Utah and do not thereby afford Defendant due process and/or equal
1

laws of the State of Utah and do not thereby afford Defendant due process and/or equal
protection of the laws in violation of constitutional mandates.
3. Whether the creation and regulation of Justice Courts interferes with Judicial
independence and thereby violates the separation of powers concept of the Utah Constitution by
providing monetary incentives to convict and/or sanction criminal Defendants and by authorizing
the administrative branch of municipal governments to hire and fire judges and affording
inordinate municipal control of court operations.
4. Whether the Sentences as imposed by the Justice Court and by the District court were
lawful under State Law and did thereby afford Defendant due process of law.
This Appeal is taken to the Appellate Courts of the State of Utah pursuant to Applicable
Law.
DATED this H

day of March, 2008.

2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby i >! !

tiled a true and correct copy of the foregoing, AMENDED

NOTICE OF APPEAL, postage prepaid, to the following listed bclo
March, 2008.

Jonathan E. Jenkins, Esq.
108 North Main
Logan, UT 84321

3

the j^jnday of

APPENDIX H
Designation of Record on Appeal

>,N ! ! I C T ; . ( „ V

A.W. Lauritzen (1906;
Attorney at Law
15 East 600 North #1
P.O. Box 171
Logan, UT 84321
Phone: 435-753-3391
Fax:435-753-8331

_ f
- -' •' • • /
07ft'OV/ /,
!

^ r-i)5

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

DESIGNATION OF RECORD
ON APPEAL

vs.
JERALD RIO DAVIS,
Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 071100143 MO
Judge Judkins

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:
COMES NOW the Defendant/Appellant, Jerald Rio Davis, and submits this Designation
of Record on Appeal, and requests that the following items be submitted as part cTf!" Record
with respect to this Appeal.
1.

Any and all transcripts of Hearings and Court proceedings appertaining to the

above entitled matter be supplied to Defendant/Appellant to aid in this Appeal insofar as they are
now in the possession of the Clerk of the Trial Court..
2.

The entire contents of the file as it now exists in the records of

the First District Court.
3.

All Exhibits that may have been offered and/or admitted in

the course of proceedings had at the trial level.

Jl

4.

.\

Transcript of the proceedings and Oral pronouncement of Sentence had on the

19th day of September, 2007.
WHEREFORE, the Defendant/Appellant respectfully requires that these matters be
contained within the Record of thisyVppeal and transmitted as required by law.
Dated t h e 5 _ day of

A

H\^M&^f^2Q01.

A. W. Lauritzen, Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, DESIGN \ ' '! "
OF RECORD ON APPEAL, postage prepaid, to m,

Ciwimh/f

, 2007.

Jonathan E. Jenkins, Esq.
108 North Main
Logan, UT 84321

3

. ..i-. i.stcd below on the J t S i a y of

' cP,

A. W. Lauritzen (1906)
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 171
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (435) 753-3391

" ' : ' • • : "•.'•••

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH

HYDE PARK CITY,
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS
AND TO QUASH CONVICTION

Plaintiff,
vs.
JERALD RIO DAVIS

Case No. 071100143
Judge: Clint S. Judkins

Defendant.

COMES NOW A.W. LAURITZEN, Attorney for the Defendant, with this his
Objection to Plaintiffs Order on Motion to Dismiss and to Quash Conviction and alleges:
1.

Defendant objects to the Court's Order in that the penalty prescribed by the

ordinances exceeds the legislative grant; the sentence imposed by the convicting Court is
thereto as immaterial. The ordinance, in its entirety, should be declared void in view of the
express holding in Algood v. Larson 545 P.2d 530 (Utah 1976).
DATED this J \ "day of August, 2007.

1

o

y

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I heiebv n."iiif\ iii.ii I faxed and mailed a true and correct copy of die foregoing,
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS AND TO QUASH
CONVICTION, Postage prepaid, to the following listed below * ^••.••\1,-

;

2007.

2z S4 iCJonathan Jenkins, Esq.
108 North Main
Logan, UT 84321

2

./<s.

1 August,

APPENDIX J
Objection to the Order on Motion to Dismiss and to Quash Conviction

APPENDIX K
Objection to Oral Verdict, Judgment and Sentence

A.W. Lauritzen (1906)
15 East 600 North #1
P.O.Box 171
Logan, UT 84321
435-753-3391
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

OBJECTION TO ORAL VERDICT,
JUDGEMENT AND SENTENCE

JERALD RIO DAVIS,
Defendant.

Case No. 071100143 MO
Judge Clint S. Judkins

COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through is Attorney of record, with this his
Objection to the ruling from the bench, Judgment and Sentence as entered on the 19th day of
September, 2007 in that the Judge's Order imposed the maximum sentence and in that, the
Defendant was convicted of an infraction with the ordinance prescribing the maximum fine of
Fifty Dollars ($50.00). No jail time may be imposed upon conviction of the infraction under
either municipal or state law and in that Defendant has suffered the maximum penalty, no
probation or further sanction may be imposed should the fine be paid as required by the Court in
its written Judgement.
—in*

Dated the g^ay~of October, 2007.

. Lauritzen

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, OBJECTION TO
ORAL VERDICT, JUDGEMENT AND SENTENCE, postage prepaid, to the following listed
below on the M-flay of Slpg?8&er, 2007.

IfYl-PaKaj^
Jonathan E. Jenkins, Esq.
108 North Main
Logan, UT 84321

2
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APPENDIX L
Letter from Mark E. Daines

113 East Hyde Park Lane, P.O. Box 489
Hyde Park, Utah 84318
563-6507

November 9, 1998

Mr. Ira B. Davis
187 East 200 North
Hyde Park, Utah 84318
Dear Ira:
I will try to respond to your written request for information concerning the business at your home.
It has taken some time to locate and research the old ordinances and Council minutes.
A. Regarding the date of your first business license, we will accept your date of late 50's or early
60fs. We have no records dating back that far for business licenses, and can find no record in the
Council minutes.
B. We have reviewed the earliest zoning ordinances that we can locate of the City and are
enclosing a copy of the portion that relates to you and your business. Your business has always
been a non-conforming use in a residential zone. It was grandfathered in and today would not be
allowed. Even in the earliest ordinances there is provision that such a non-conforming use may
NOT be expanded. This, of course, is a serious concern for the City. It appears that you have
added many, many vehicles and other materials to your property.
C. The original right that you have is a non-conforming use in a residential zone, grandfathered in
by the existence of your business prior to zoning regulations in the City.
D. Enclosed is a copy of the minutes of September 8, 1998 as requested.
We hope to work amicably with you to allow you to keep your repair business, but to remove all
articles added onto your property which did not exist at the time you got your business license in
the late 50's or early 60fs.
We have noticed the removal of some vehicles and very much appreciate your willingness to
comply with the ordinance and at the same time not jeopardize your repair business.
Sincerely,

Mark E. Daines
Mayor
MED/jyh

/ \^
\i

APPENDIX M
Business License

APPENDIX N
Letter from Reed A. Elder

March 21, 2003
Rio Davis
808 East Canyon Rd.
Hyde Park, UT 84318
Re: Property clean up at 187 East 200 North
Dear Rio:
This letter is a follow-up on my visit with you on Thursday the 20th of March 2003, where we discussed
the clean-up of your property at 187 East 200 North in Hyde Park City. The following is a list of items
we agreed needed to be done to bring your property into compliance with City ordinances:
1. All non-licensed vehicles and boats must be removed from the property or stored in a garage on
site.
2. All miscellaneous materials that you have no useful purpose for and all debris must be removed
from the property. This includes, but is not limited to automotive motor parts, brick and masonry
materials, lumber or other wood items, metal barrels and all other items of furniture, machinery and
building materials.
3. All material and machinery which you want to keep and store on the property must be stored
inside a closed structure or within an additional fenced area inside the property which creates a visual
barrier to the other properties surrounding your property. The materials to be used and the location of
placement of such a fence would need to be approved by the City.
4. The property on which there is presently a trailer home located (northeast corner) must be
separated from the balance of your property to establish its own lot and utilities. This will need to follow
existing ordinances which the City will help you with.
5. This all must be accomplished within 120 days of this letter or the City may have to take
actions to have the work done, which will result in a charge to you for the cost.
Rio, we are very interested in helping you accomplish this task. Let us work together to get this done.
Please sign the enclosed letters as your agreement to perform. Return one in the self-addressed stamped
envelope and keep the other as your copy.
Sincerely,
Rio Davis

Reed A. Elder
Hyde Park City
cc: David Kooyman, Mayor
Hyde Park City Council

APPENDIX P
Information

Scott L Wyatt # 5829
HYDE PARK CITY ATTORNEY
108 North Main
Logan, Utah 84321
(435) 753-4000
IN THE JUSTICE COURT IN AND FOR HYDE PARK CITY
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH

HYDE PARK CITY,
INFORMATION
Plaintiff,
v.
JERALD RIO DAVIS,
808 Canyon Road
Hyde Park, Utah 84318
DOB 11/11/58

Case No. HP05- CSC-^>
Judge: David C. Marx

Defendant.

The City of Hyde Park, upon information and belief, charges the above-named defendant
with the commission of the following crime:
COUNT 1:
IN VIOLATION OF:
CLASSIFICATION:
LOCATION:
ON OR ABOUT:

Maintaining a Nuisance
Revised Ordinances of Hyde Park §10-332
A Class "B" Misdemeanor
187 East 200 North, Hyde Park, Utah
November 3, 2005

The acts of the defendant constituting the crime are: That the defendant, owning, leasing,
occupying or having charge of the premises located at 187 East 200 North. Hyde Park,
Utah, did maintain or keep any nuisance thereon. "Nuisance" is defined to mean: (1) any
condition of use of premises or of building exteriors which are deleterious or injurious,
noxious or unsightly which includes, but not limited to keeping or depositing on, or
scattering over the premises any of the following: (a) Lumber, junk, trash, or debris; or
(b) abandoned, discarded or unused objects or equipment such as furniture, stoves,
refrigerators, freezers, cans or containers. "Nuisance" is also defined to mean: (2)
unsheltered storage or old, unused, stripped and junked machinery, implements,
equipment or personal property of any kind which is no longer safely usable for the

purposes for which i^was manufactured, for a period of 30 days or more
This information is based on evidence obtained from the following witness: R. Karren,
M. Grunig.
DATED November 3, 2005

Scott t W y a t t
Hyde Park City Attorney

Scott L Wyatt # 5829
HYDE PARK CITY ATTORNEY
108 North Main
Logan, Utah 84321
(435) 753-4000
IN THE JUSTICE COURT IN AND FOR HYDE PARK CITY
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH

HYDE PARK CITY,

AMENDED
INFORMATION

Plaintiff,
v.
CHRISTINE H. DAVIS,
808 Canyon Road
Hyde Park, Utah 84318
DOB 11/11/58

Case No. HP05-0504
Judge: David C. Marx

Defendant.

The City of Hyde Park, upon information and belief, charges the above-named defendant
with the commission of the following offense:
COUNT 1:
IN VIOLATION OF:
CLASSIFICATION:
LOCATION:
ON OR ABOUT:

Maintaining a Nuisance
Revised Ordinances of Hyde Park §10-332
An Infraction
808 East Canyon Road, Hyde Park, Utah
November 3, 2005

The acts of the defendant constituting the offense are: That the defendant, owning,
leasing, occupying or having charge of the premises located at 808 East Canyon Road,
Hyde Park. Utah, did maintain or keep any nuisance thereon. "Nuisance" is defined to
mean: (1) any condition of use of premises or of building exteriors which are deleterious
or injurious, noxious or unsightly which includes, but not limited to keeping or depositing
on, or scattering over the premises any of the following: (a) Lumber, junk, trash, or
debris; or (b) abandoned, discarded or unused objects or equipment such as furniture,
stoves, refrigerators, freezers, cans or containers. "Nuisance" is also defined to mean: (2)
unsheltered storage or old, unused, stripped and junked machinery, implements,
equipment or personal property of any kind which is no longer safely usable for the

purposes for which it was manufactured, for a period of 30 days or more
This information is based on evidence obtained from the following witness: R. Karren,
M. Grunig.
DATED March 23, 2006

A
Scott L Wyatt
Hyde Park City Attorney

APPENDIX Q
Allgood vs. Larson 545 P.2d 530, 531 (Utah 1976)
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01/12/76 VIVIAN ALLGOOD v. DELMAR LARSON
[1]

SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

[2]

No. 14094

[3]

1976.UT.4 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 545 P.2d 530

[4]

January 12, 1976

[5]

VIVIAN ALLGOOD, PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT,
v.
DELMAR LARSON, SHERIFF OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, AND SALT
LAKE CITY, UTAH, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS

[6]

Roger F. Cutler, Salt Lake City Atty., Paul G. Maughan, Deputy Salt Lake City Atty., Salt
Lake City, for defendants and appellant.

[7]

Stephen R. McCaughey of Salt Lake Legal Defenders Assn., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff
and respondent.

[8]

Maughan, Justice, wrote the opinion.

[9]

Tuckett, J., concurs.

[10]

Henriod, C.j., concurs in the result.

[11]

Crockett, Justice (dissenting).

[12]

Ellett, J., concurs in the views expressed in the Dissenting opinion of Crockett, J.

[13]

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Maughan

[14]

MAUGHAN, Justice:

[15]

Plaintiff was arrested, charged, and convicted of trespassing; under a Salt Lake City

APPENDIX R
Richfield City vs. Walker 790 P.2d 87,90-91 (Utah App. 1990)
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03/26/90 RICHFIELD CITY v. JAMES M. WALKER
[1]

COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH

[2]

No. 890156-CA

[3]

1990.UT.73 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 790 P.2d 87, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 37

[4]

March 26,1990

[5]

RICHFIELD CITY, PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT,
v.
JAMES M. WALKER, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT

[6]

Sixth Circuit, Sevier County, The Honorable David L. Mower.

[7]

Sheldon R. Carter, Provo, for Appellant.

[8]

Richard K. Chamberlain, Richfield, for Respondent.

[9]

Regnal W. Garff, Judge, Russell W. Bench, Judge, John Fair Larson, *fhl Judge, concur.

[10]

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Garff

[11]

FACTS. - Walker was found drunk in his truck, engine off, headlights on, and keys in the
ignition. He was asleep, lying with his head toward the passenger door.

[12]

PROCEEDINGS. - Walker was convicted of being in actual physical control of the vehicle
and appealed.

[13]

RESULT. - Affirmed. Per Garff; Bench & Larson concur.

[14]

HELD. - The Richfield ordinance was not inconsistent with the controlling statute. Walker
was in actual physical control of the vehicle under the circumstances.

[15]

REGNAL W. GARFF, Judge:

APPENDIX S
Cannon v. Neuberger, 1 Utah 2d 396, 268 P.2d 425
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03/22/54 CANNON v. NEUBERGER ET UX.
[1]

SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

[2]

No. 8083

[3]

1954.UT.31 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 268 P.2d 425, 1 Utah 2d 396

[4]

March 22, 1954

[5]

CANNON
v.
NEUBERGER ET UX.

[6]

George C. Heinrich, Logan, for appellant.

[7]

George D. Preston, Logan, for respondents.

[8]

McDONOUGH, Crockett, Henriod, and Wade, JJ., concur.

[9]

Wolfe, C. J., being disqualified does not participate herein.

[10]

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Dunford

[11]

DUNFORD, District Judge. Plaintiff brought this action to abate a claimed nuisance in the
form of three Carolina Poplar trees and two Siberian Elm trees which defendants have upon
their property. The trial court ordered the Carolina Poplar trees 'topped' by cutting twenty
feet from the tops thereof, ordered removed the dead wood and sufficient of the branches to
overcome a danger of the trees being blown over onto plaintiffs property. Plaintiff appealed
claiming under three assignments of error, that the court should have ordered defendants to
remove the offending trees from their property or require them to so control their growth as
to keep their branches from overspreading, or the roots from permeating, or the leaves,
twigs and branches from falling or being blown upon plaintiffs lot and buildings. We affirm
the judgment of the lower court with costs to the respondents.

[12]

This action being in equity, the court will review the evidence and determine its weight.
However, much consideration must be given to the trial court's findings, inasmuch as the
presiding Judge saw and heard the witnesses, had a better opportunity to determine their
knowledge of the facts testified to, to observe their demeanor indicating interest, prejudice,
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APPENDIX T
Dahl v. Utah Oil Refining Co. 71 Utah 1, 262 P.2 69

APPENDIX U
Hatch v. Hatch Co., 3 Utah 2d 295, 283 P.2d 217 (Utah 1955)

VerSUS.UaW IVCSCcil^ll

Lsaiauao^

05/05/55 GLEN A. HATCH AND EDITH E. HATCH v. W. S.
[1]

SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

[2]

No. 8215

[3]

1955.UT.42 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 283 P.2d 217, 3 Utah 2d 295

[4]

May 5, 1955

[5]

GLEN A. HATCH AND EDITH E. HATCH, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS,
v.
W. S. HATCH COMPANY, A CORPORATION, AND WILLARD S. HATCH,
DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS

[6]

Oscar W. Moyle, Jr., Moyle & Moyle, Salt Lake City, for appellants.

[7]

Marr, Wilkins & Cannon, Mark K. Boyle, Salt Lake City, for respondents.

[8]

Crockett, Wade and Worthen, JJ., and Lewis, District Judge, concurred.

[9]

Henriod, J., having disqualified himself did not participate herein.

[10]

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Mcdonough

[11]

McDONOUGH, Chief Justice. Plaintiffs appeal from a dismissal of their cause after a trial
on the merits by the court sitting without a jury, contending that the trial court erred in
finding that no actionable nuisance is maintained by the defendants on property adjoining
plaintiffs' residential property.

[12]

Plaintiff Glen A. Hatch and defendant W. S. Hatch are brothers, who inherited contiguous
pieces of property, with a house on each lot, situated in Woods Cross, Davis County, Utah.
Plaintiffs moved into their home in 1917, but did not obtain title until 1935, doing
substantial remodelling in 1935 and again in 1951; they occupy the property primarily as a
residence, doing some farming thereon and maintaining a filling pump and storage garage
in the rear of their house for trucks belonging to Hatch Brothers Company, a livestock
corporation in which both brothers hold stock. Defendant moved into his residence,
immediately north of plaintiff s property, about 1935 and utilized the area behind the house
to establish a business of transporting road tars and oils. The company, here also made

APPENDIX V
Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v. Barrack, 118 W.Va. 608,191 S.E. 368,110
A.L.R. 1461

APPENDIX W
Turnbaugh v. Anderson, 793 P.2d 939 (Utah App. 1990)

05/31/90 SHIRLEY TURNBAUGH v. EVAN ANDERSON AND RED
[1]

COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH

[2]

No. 880501-CA

[3]

1990.UT.133 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 793 P.2d 939, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 72

[4]

May 31,1990

[5]

SHIRLEY TURNBAUGH, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE
OF LE ROY TURNBAUGH, FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE HEIRS OF LE ROY
TURNBAUGH, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT,
v.
EVAN ANDERSON AND RED DOME, INC., A UTAH CORPORATION,
DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES

[6]

Fourth District, Millard County, The Honorable Ray M. Harding.

[7]

D.m. Amoss (Argued), Roger T. Nuttall, Attorneys at Law, Salt Lake City, Utah.

[8]

Dexter L. Anderson (Argued), Attorney, Fillmore, Utah.

[9]

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge. Norman H. Jackson, Judge, Gregory K. Orme, Judge, concur.

[10]

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Greenwood

[11]

FACTS. - Turnbaugh was killed when the heavy equipment he was operating ran out of
fuel, thereby lost power, brakes, and steering, and overturned into an open pit mine owned
by Red Dome. Anderson owned the heavy equipment.

[12]

PROCEEDINGS. - Tumbaugh's personal representative sued Anderson and Red Dome for
wrongful death. From a judgment for the defendants, Turnbaugh appeals.

[13]

RESULT. - Affirmed. Per Greenwood; Jackson & Orme concur.

[14]

HELD. - Lacking a showing of unreasonable interference with a right common to the

APPENDIX X
Helmkamp v. Clark Ready Mix Co, 214 N.W.2d 126,129 (Iowa 1974)

HELMKAMP v. CLARK READY MIX COMPANY, 214 N.W.2d 126 (Iowa 01/16/1974)
[1]

Supreme Court of Iowa.

[2]

No. 56112

[3]

214 N.W.2d 126, 1974.IA.0042344< http://www.versuslaw.com>

[4]

January 16, 1974

[5]

CLARK HELMKAMP ET AL., APPELLANTS,
V.
CLARK READY MIX COMPANY, APPELLEE.

[6]

APPEAL FROM CARROLL DISTRICT COURT, PAUL E. HELLWEGE, J. [214 NW2d
Page 127]

[7]

Edward S. White, Carroll, for appellants.

[8]

Minnich & Neu, Carroll, for appellee.

[9]

Heard before Moore, C.J., and Mason, Rees, Uhlenhopp and Harris, JJ.

[10]

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Uhlenhopp, Justice.

[11]

The question in this appeal is whether we should enjoin as a nuisance the operation of the
cement ready-mix plant of defendant Clark Ready Mix Company in Carroll County, Iowa.
We hear [214 NW2d Page 128]

[12]

the appeal de novo. We give weight to the trial court's fact findings but are not bound by
them. Schlotfelt v. Vinton Farmers' Supply Co., 252 Iowa 1102, 109 N.W.2d 695.

[13]

United States Highway 71, which carries substantial traffic, runs north and south along the
west side of Carroll, Iowa. In 1959, owners of land in the northwest part of Carroll platted
Thomas Addition on the east side of the highway. Residential restrictions apply in the
addition, except for two lots adjoining the highway which are zoned commercial. At time of
trial in October 1972, the respective plaintiffs had owned and lived in homes in the addition
for periods ranging from three to nine years. The homes vary in value for tax purposes from

APPENDIX Y
Restatement (Second) of Torts 821A (1979)

APPENDIX Z
Solar Salt Co. vs. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 555 P.2d 286, 289 (Utah 1976)

V l U v n ,

09/10/76 SOLAR SALT COMPANY v. SOUTHERN PACIFIC
[1]

SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

[2]

No. 14427

[3]

1976.UT.187 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 555 P.2d 286

[4]

September 10, 1976

[5]

SOLAR SALT COMPANY, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT,
v.
SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, A CORPORATION,
DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT

[6]

Frank J. Allen, of Clyde & Pratt, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.

[7]

Haldor T. Benson and James R. Amschler, of VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy, Salt
Lake City, for defendant and respondent.

[8]

Ellett, Justice, wrote the opinion.

[9]

Henriod, C.j., concurs.

[ 10]

Crockett, Justice (concurring).

[11]

Maughan, Justice (dissenting).

[12]

Tuckett, J., concurs in the views expressed in the Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Maughan.

[13]

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Ellett

[14]

ELLETT, Justice:

[15]

The plaintiff has a lease from the State of Utah on land bordering the shore of the Great Salt

5/20/2008

APPENDIX AA
Sims v. Tax Commission, 841 P.2d 6 (Utah 1992)

10/22/92 LOUIE E. SIMS v. COLLECTION DIVISION UTAH
[1]

SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

[2]

No. 900324

[3]

1992.UT.218 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 841 P.2d 6, 198 Utah Adv. Rep. 5

[4]

October 22, 1992

[5]

LOUIE E. SIMS, PETITIONER,
v.
COLLECTION DIVISION OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
RESPONDENT

[6]

Original Proceeding in this Court

[7]

R. Paul Van Dam, Leon A. Dever, John C. McCarrey, Salt Lake City, for Tax Commission.

[8]

G. Fred Metos, Salt Lake City, for Sims.

[9]

Durham, Zimmerman, Stewart, Howe, Hall

[10]

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Durham

[11]

DURHAM, Justice:

[12]

Petitioner Louie E. Sims seeks review of a formal order of the Utah State Tax Commission
("the Commission") affirming a tax and penalty assessment under the Illegal Drug Stamp
Tax Act ("the Act"). Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-19-101 to -107. We reverse the decision of the
Commission and vacate the tax and penalty assessed.

[13]

On July 27, 1988, the Utah Highway Patrol and the Juab County Sheriffs Department set
up a roadblock on Interstate Highway 15 approximately two miles outside of Nephi, Utah.
When Sims' car was stopped at the roadblock, the officers observed an open container of
alcohol in the back seat area. Sims was asked to exit the car, at which time he consented to
a search of the interior. There, the officers discovered the remnants of one or two marijuana
cigarettes. Sims then consented to a search of the trunk. When the latter search revealed two
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APPENDIX BB
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 75 L.Ed.2d 903, 909,103 S.Ct. 1855 (1983)

KOLENDER v. LAWSON, 103 S. Ct. 1855, 461 U.S. 352 (U.S. 05/02/1983)
[1]

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

[2]

No. 81-1320

[3]

103 S. Ct. 1855, 461 U.S. 352, 75 L. Ed. 2d 903, 51 U.S.L.W. 4532, 1983.SCT.41818
<http://www.versuslaw.com>

[4]

decided: May 2, 1983.

[5]

KOLENDER, CHIEF OF POLICE OF SAN DIEGO, ET AL
v.
LAWSON

[6]

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH
CIRCUIT.

[7]

A. Wells Petersen, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for appellants.
With him on the briefs were George Deukmejian, Attorney General, Robert H. Philibosian,
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Daniel J. Kremer, Assistant Attorney General, and Jay
M. Bloom, Deputy Attorney General.

[8]

Mark D. Rosenbaum, by invitation of the Court, 459 U.S. 964, argued the cause as amicus
curiae in support of the judgment below. With him on the brief were Dennis M. Perluss,
Fred Okrand, Mary Ellen Gale, Robert H. Lynn, and Charles S. S i m s . - ^

[9]

O'connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a concurring
opinion, post, p. 362. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, J., joined,
post, p. 369.

[10]

Author: O'connor

[ 461 U.S. Page 353]

[11]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

APPENDIX CC
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 92 S.Ct. 2294 (1972)

GRAYNED v. CITY ROCKFORD, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 408 U.S. 104 (U.S. 06/26/1972)
[1]

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

[2]

No. 70-5106

[3]

92 S. Ct. 2294, 408 U.S. 104, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222, 1972.SCT.42411
<http://www.versuslaw.com>

[4]

decided: June 26, 1972.

[5]

GRAYNED
v.
CITY OF ROCKFORD

[6]

APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.

[7]

Sophia H. Hall argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs were William R.
Ming, Jr., and Aldus S. Mitchell.

[8]

William E. Collins argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were A. Curtis
Washburn and Charles F. Thomas.

[9]

Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan,
Stewart, White, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed a statement joining
in the judgment and in Part I of the Court's opinion and concurring in the result as to Part
II of the opinion, post, p. 121. Douglas, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part and joining in
Part I of the Court's opinion, post, p. 121.

[10]

Author: Marshall

[408 U.S. Page 105]

[11]

MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

[12]

Appellant Richard Grayned was convicted for his part in a demonstration in front of West
Senior High School in Rockford, Illinois. Negro students at the school had first presented
their grievances to school administrators. When the principal took no action on crucial

APPENDIX DD
Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816 (Utah 1991)

09/10/91 KATE GREENWOOD AND ANDREW GREENWOOD v.
[1]

SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

[2]

No. 890355

[3]

1991.UT.216 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 817 P.2d 816, 169 Utah Adv. Rep. 6

[4]

September 10, 1991

[5]

KATE GREENWOOD AND ANDREW GREENWOOD, PERSONALLY, AND
RALPH GREENWOOD, BOTH PERSONALLY AND AS PRESIDENT AND
MEMBERS OF AMERICAN DOG BREEDERS' ASSOCIATION, INC.,
PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS,
v.
CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, AN INCORPORATED MUNICIPALITY,
DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE

[6]

Second District, Davis County; The Honorable Rodney S. Page.

[7]

David Paul White, Salt Lake City, for appellants.

[8]

Kent Christiansen, Salt Lake City, for appellee.

[9]

Stewart, Justice. Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice, Richard C. Howe, Associate Chief Justice,
Christine M. Durham, Justice, Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice, concur.

[10]

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Stewart

[11]

FACTS. - North Salt Lake enacted an ordinance regulating dogs classified as "fierce,
dangerous, or vicious," including pit bulls. Greenwoods own and breed pit bulls.

[12]

PROCEEDINGS. - Greenwoods sued to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance.
The district court upheld the ordinance for the most part, and Greenwoods appealed.

[13]

RESULT. - Affirmed. Per Stewart; all concur.

APPENDIX EE
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,494, 71 L.Ed.2d
362,102 S.Ct. 1186(1982)

ILLAGE HOFFMAN ESTATES ET AL. v. FLIP-SIDE, 102 S. Ct. 1186, 455 U.S. 489 (U.S.
3/03/1982)
[1 ]

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

[2]

No. 80-1681

[3]

102 S. Ct. 1186,455 U.S. 489, 71 L. Ed. 2d 362, 50U.S.L.W. 4267, 1982.SCT.40974
<http://www.versuslaw.com>

[4]

decided: March 3, 1982.

[5]

VILLAGE OF HOFFMAN ESTATES ET AL
v.
THE FLIP-SIDE, HOFFMAN ESTATES, INC.

[6]

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT.

[7]

Richard N. Williams argued the cause and filed briefs for appellants.

[8]

Michael L. Pritzker argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee.

[9]

Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan,
Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'connor, JJ., joined. White, J., filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment, post, p. 507. Stevens, J., took no part in the consideration or
decision of the case.

[10]

Author: Marshall

[455 U.S. Page 491]
[11]

JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

[12]

This case presents a pre-enforcement facial challenge to a drug paraphernalia ordinance on
the ground that it is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The ordinance in question
requires a business to obtain a license if it sells any items that are "designed or marketed

^/On/9008

APPENDIX FF
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515, 92 L.Ed 840, 68 S.Ct. 665 (1948)

WINTERS v. NEW YORK, 68 S. Ct. 665, 333 U.S. 507 (U.S. 03/29/1948)
[1]

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

[2]

No. 3

[3]

68 S. Ct. 665, 333 U.S. 507, 92 L. Ed. 840,1948.SCT.40361
<http://www.versuslaw.com>

[4]

decided: March 29,1948.

[5]

WINTERS
v.
NEW YORK

[6]

APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF SPECIAL SESSIONS OF NEW YORK CITY.

[7]

Arthur N. Seiff argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant. With him on the
original argument and the first reargument was Emanuel Redfield.

[8]

Whitman Knapp argued the cause for appellee. With him on the briefs was Frank S.
Hogan.

[9]

Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Sidney R. Fleisher for the Authors'
League of America, Inc.; and Emanuel Redfield, Osmond K. Fraenkel and Morris L. Ernst
for the American Civil Liberties Union.

[10]

Vinson, Black, Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, Murphy, Jackson, Rutledge, Burton

[11]

Author: Reed

[ 333 U.S. Page 508]

[12]

MR. JUSTICE REED delivered the opinion of the Court.

[13]

Appellant is a New York City bookdealer, convicted, on information,^^- of a
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COLAUTTI v. FRANKLIN ET AL., 99 S. Ct. 675, 439 U.S. 379 (U.S. 01/09/1979)
[1]

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

[2]

No. 77-891

[3]

99 S. Ct. 675, 439 U.S. 379, 58 L. Ed. 2d 596,1979.SCT.40246
<http://www.versuslaw.com>

[4]

decided: January 9, 1979.

[5]

COLAUTTI, SECRETARY OF WELFARE OF PENNSYLVANIA, ET AL
v.
FRANKLIN ET AL.

[6]

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN
DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA.

[7]

Carol Los Mansmann, Special Assistant Attorney General of Pennsylvania, argued the
cause for appellants. With her on the brief was J. Jerome Mansmann, Special Assistant
Attorney General.

[8]

Roland Morris argued the cause and filed a brief for appellees.

[9]

Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, Stewart, Marshall,
Powell, and Stevens, JJ., joined. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Burger, C.
J., and Rehnquist, J., joined, post, p. 401.

[10]

Author: Blackmun

[ 439 U.S. Page 380]

[11]

MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.

[12]
At issue here is the constitutionality of subsection (a) o f ? 5 * ^ of the Pennsylvania
Abortion Control Act, 1974 Pa. Laws,
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01/17/90 LOGAN CITY v. RALPH LOWELL HUBER
[1]

COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH

[2]

No. 890093-CA

[3]

1990.UT.15 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 786 P.2d 1372, 126 Utah Adv. Rep. 6

[4]

January 17, 1990

[5]

LOGAN CITY, PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT,
v.
RALPH LOWELL HUBER, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT

[6]

First Circuit, Cache County, The Honorable Burton H. Harris.

[7]

A.w. Lauritzen, Attorney for Appellant, Logan, Utah.

[8]

Cheryl A. Russell, Logan City Attorney, Logan, Utah.

[9]

Norman H. Jackson, Judge, Richard C. Davidson, Judge, Regnal W. Garff, Judge, concur.

[10]

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Jackson

[11]

FACTS. - Huber had an angry verbal interchange with police and was arrested.

[12]

NORMAN H. JACKSON, Judge:

[13]

Ralph Lowell Huber was convicted by a jury of disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor, in
violation of a Logan City ordinance. On appeal, he challenges the constitutionality of the
ordinance on its face and as applied. We reverse.

[14]

In the early morning hours of December 11, 1988, Officers Russell Roper and Greg Monroe
were on alcohol enforcement detail. They were parked off the road in their unmarked patrol
car when they heard and saw a small car approaching them. The car made a wide turn at the
corner and started to slide on the pea gravel in the road. The car accelerated and went past
the police vehicle, at a speed estimated by the officers at 35-38 m.p.h. in a 25 m.p.h. zone,
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Provo City,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

OPINION
(For Official Publicat

v.
Case No. 981642-C
Scott A. Whatcott,
Defendant and Appellant

FILED
(March 23, 2000)

2000 UT App 86

Fourth District, Provo Department
The Honorable Gary D. Stott
Attorneys: Margaret P. Lindsay and Thomas H. Means, Provo, for
Appellant
Vernon F. Romney, Provo, for Appellee

Before Judges Jackson, Billings, and Orme.
JACKSON, Associate Presiding Judge:
T[l Scott A. Whatcott challenges his conviction for telephone harassment, a Class B misdemeanor in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-201 (1999). Because subsections (a) and (d) of the telephone
harassment statute are unconstitutionally overbroad, we reverse Whatcott's conviction.

BACKGROUND

JL U £ V s £* U l

^[2 "When iCMcvviiig
iiiiiu; IIIL
J^ Mil- and all reasonable inferences in a .u: ..
most favorable to the verdict, reciting the facts accordingly. We present conflicting evidence onh when
necessary to understand issues raised on appeal." State v. Heaps; 2000 UT 5, f2, 386 Utah Adv. Rep. 31
(citations omitted).
f3 Whatcoti admitted IO placing a telephone call to the home of Anne lv • * <\.>. i.u iUuti.^ii-e,
Kathryn Convey. Nieison and Whatcott were friends, and Convey was * • • • * i nic/\i with WhaicuU.
Whatcott left !'••. fHkm ing message on their answering machine:
I \ e g^i uu^ I^J.. w., ..,_, iCoiii.iL liiaiju .
jiL consistently and
constantly and it's painful and it's red .at or a third testicle. And I
was wondering if like Kath\ or Ann[ej. w Hie of; ou could help me out here, if
either one of you could like grab my crotch and just like fondle that third
testicle of mine. It's just oozing all over the place, to get their hands kind of
greasy. If you have any advice, please, give me a call. You know the mimhn
Thanks. Bye,
]\4 / u i. iai, >v iiaicou testified that Convey nuu um-n laiked about ner mice
. i nan, t. IK1^ on
her breast, and other health problems. He said that his intent in making the . . . . . . .
' \y a prank" on
Convey and to "parody" what he had heard her saying about her physical ailmenU
cribed tin.
phone call as a "sick kind of joke." Convey testified that the message shocked and otlended ner, d\\c >hc
referred to the message as obscene, lewd, and lascivious. Whatcott was convicted by a jury of one count
of telephone harassment in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-0-901 i 'oooi ^ jpcMt-p'^tfvi K ^ P T V O ,
Ctah Code < h <4o.o; >viOO<M.
ISSUES AND S I AN HARD OF K V \ i I' W
^[5 Whatcott argues there was niM.ifiincn; evidence to show that Liu: telephone message was lewd,
lascivious, or profane, further K- nntends the telephone harassment statute is unconstitutionally
overbroad, both on its face and as applied, and is void for vagueness. A challenge to the constitutionality
of a statute presents a question of law, which we review for correctness, according no deference to the
trial court's ruling. See Provo City Corp. v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 1989)
1|6 Because we conclude the telephone harassment statute is unconstitutionally overbroad, we need ilot
reach Whatcott's c^dlr*1*^ *•* lU-> suPV : o"rv -r&, - - ; }crrc — M- vagueness argument.
ANAI ,YSIS
\J Whai
:;; J.S mai seeuon O-V-JM is unci .
road, both on its face and as applied
to him,;.
,ti u is void for vagueness. I We ilis. ,.
^ . .. ..aicott's overbreadth challenge. We need
consider his vagueness challenge onh' il we conclude the statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad. See
Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d 1372 J ?"\S (UfahO, App. 1990).
1|8 A statute will De niwnidatcd lor overbreadth only il n uue> I M <mn specifically at evils within the
allowable area of state control but, on the contrary, sweeps within its ambit other activities that in
ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of freedom of speech or the press.1" Logan City, 786 P.2d
at 1375 (citation omitted). "[Particularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved . , . the
overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well. . . ." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
U.S. 601, 615, 93 S. Ct. 2908, 2918 (1973); see State v. Haig, 578 P.2d 837, 841 (Utah 1978). Further, a
"'statute should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily subject to a narrowing

^

construction."' Haig, 578 P.2d at 841 (Maughan, J., concurring in result) (quoting Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216, 95 S. Ct. 2268, 2276 (1975)). As an overarching principle, we will
construe a statute as constitutional whenever possible. See State v. Mohi. 901 P.2d 991, 1009 (Utah
1995).
Tf9 The telephone harassment statute, section 76-9-201, provides:
(1) A person is guilty of telephone harassment and subject to prosecution in the
jurisdiction where the telephone call originated or was received if with intent to
annoy, alarm another, intimidate, offend, abuse, threaten, harass, or frighten
any person at the called number or recklessly creating a risk thereof, the person:
(a) makes a telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues;
(b) makes repeated telephone calls, whether or not a conversation
ensues, or after having been told not to call back, causes the
telephone of another to ring repeatedly or continuously;
(c) makes a telephone call and insults, taunts, or challenges the
recipient of the telephone call or any person at the called number in
a manner likely to provoke a violent or disorderly response;
(d) makes a telephone call and uses any lewd or profane language
or suggests any lewd or lascivious act; or
(e) makes a telephone call and threatens to inflict injury, physical
harm, or damage to any person or the property of any person.
(2) Telephone harassment is a class B misdemeanor.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-201 (1999). 2
flO We acknowledge at the outset that the state has a legitimate interest in protecting the public from
certain unreasonable telephone calls. Presumably, the Legislature intended to prohibit threatening and
menacing calls, and calls that would provoke a breach of the peace. This is certainly within the
Legislature's power, and does not offend the First Amendment.
TJ11 But section 76-9-201 sweeps even more broadly. Under subsection (a), the statute prohibits any
"telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues," where the caller has "recklessly creat[ed] a risk"
of "annoy[ing], alarm[ing] . . ., intimidating], offend[ing], abus[ing], threatening], harassing], or
frightening]" the recipient. kL Read thus, the statute would prohibit a potentially huge universe of
otherwise legitimate telephone calls.
1J12 For example, unwanted telephone solicitations made to a private home during the dinner hour would
be prohibited, as those calls surely risk annoying, offending, or harassing the recipients. Or, imagine a
young adult who has recently moved out of the family home. To his exasperation (frequently and
vocally expressed), his mother calls often to make sure he is alright. Under this statute, the worried
mother's telephone calls-whether or not she actually conversed with or in fact annoyed him—could
subject her to prosecution. Her conscious disregard of the substantial likelihood that the call would
annoy her son would bring the call within the statute's ambit.

J Clf^V T U l

J

^|13 Subsection (d) is aLo pioblenialit boi example, one could call n liiend in i |iii il oi good Jun,
intending to play a joke on the friend. 3 At the very same time, one could also has e the specific intent to
annoy or offend the friend by using "lewd or piofane language" or even by "suggesting] a[] lewd or
lascivious act." Id. § 76-9-201(d). This lewd language, in fact, could be part and parcel of the joke. The
specific intent to annoy or offend while telling a joke would bring the telephone call under the statute
One could also call a friend, intending to tell a lewd joke and assuming that the friend would not be
offended—but nonetheless violate the statute because telling the joke created the reckless risk that the
friend would take offense.
*]! 14 The potential ovei breadth of the statute is not, oi course, lunik d to the scenarios posed abuu i ither
legitimate telephone calls, made with a specific intent to annoy or offend the recipient, could im hide "a
consumer calling the seller or producer of a product to express dissatisfaction of product perfoniiance, a
businessman calling another to protest failure to perform a contractual obligation, a constituent calling
his legislator to protest the legislator's stand on an issue, etc." State v. Dronso, 279 N.W.2d 710, 714
(Wis. Ct. App. 1979). These few examples show that the overbreadth of subsections (a) and (d) is real
and substantial, as they m"sweep[] within [their] ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances
constitute an exercise of freedom of speech.'"" Logan City, 786 P.2d at 1375 (quoting Waters v.
McGuriman, 656 F. Supp. 923, 925 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (citation omitted)). Thus, we hold that subsections
(a) and (d) of section 76-9-201 are unconstitutionally overbroad. See State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, ^[18.
20, 980 P.2d 191 (stating "if a portion of fa] statute might be saved by severing the part that is
unconstitutional, such should be donef,]" so long as severance does not "destroy the purpose of the
statute"),
^| 15 Our holding here should "not suggest that the first amendment gives one the unlimited right to
annoy another, by speech or otherwise." People v. Klick, 362 N.E.2d 329, 331 (111. 1977). However, the
First Amendment does not prohibit the kind of essentially harmless communications described above.
Simply put, "[t]he First Amendment is made of sterner stuff." Bolles v. People, *"] 1 P 'M 80 83 (Colo.
1975)

I OIN< I UNION
^[10 Subsections (a) and (d) of the telephone harassment statute, section 76-9-201 of the Utah Code, are
unconstitutionally overbroad both facially and as applied. We thus icverse Whatcott's conviction
Because of our disposition, we do not reach Whatcott's arguments thai insufficient evidence supported
his conviction and that the statute is also unconstitutionally vaimr
1f 17 Reversed.
Noiniiin 11 I.iii k'.nii,

Associate Presiding Judge

1J18WF CONCUR:
Judith M Hillings, Judge
Gregory K. Orme, Judge

FOOTNOTES
1 "[W]e assume, arguendo, the applicability of federal first amendment standing principles in Utah
courts." Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d 1372, 1375 n.10 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Because Whatcott is
mounting a First Amendment challenge to the telephone harassment statute, he has standing to challenge
it "on behalf of others not before the court even if the law could be constitutionally applied to" him, Salt
Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259, 1263 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), unless we are able to construe the
statute in a manner that "will apply only to unprotected activity." Provo City Corp. v. Willden, 768 P.2d
455, 458 (Utah 1989). Because we cannot impose a limiting construction in this case, Whatcott has
standing to challenge the statute both on its face and as applied to him.
2 The information charging Whatcott did not indicate under which subsection Whatcott was charged.
Similarly, the jury was instructed to evaluate whether Whatcott's conduct satisfied any of the
subsections, without specifying a particular one. Both Whatcott and the City contend that Whatcott's
actions could fall only under subsections (a) or (d). We agree that the call would most logically fall
under one of these subsections. Thus, we interpret Whatcott's appeal as a challenge to subsections (a)
and (d) only, and we do not address the constitutionality of subsections (b), (c), or (e).
3 In fact, Whatcott's defense in this case is that he intended only to "play a prank, to have fun, give a
joke." Puerile and offensive as the call may have been, it is nonetheless protected expression under the
First Amendment.
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05/24/67 EVAN P. JONES v. LOGAN CITY CORPORATION
[1]

SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

[2]

No. 10622

[3]

1967.UT.74 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 428 P.2d 160, 19 Utah 2d 169

[4]

May 24, 1967

[5]

EVAN P. JONES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT,
v.
LOGAN CITY CORPORATION, DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT

[6]

Theodore S. Perry, Logan, for appellant.

[7]

H. Preston Thomas, Logan, for respondent.

[8]

Tuckett, Justice, wrote the opinion.

[9]

Henriod, J., concurs.

[10]

Callister, Justice (concurring in result).

[11]

Ellett, Justice (concurring and Dissenting).

[ 12]

Crockett, Chief Justice (dissenting).

[13]

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Tuckett

[14]

TUCKETT, Justice:

[15]

This is an action brought by the plaintiff wherein he seeks to restrain Logan City from
destroying a home owned by him. The City's Board of Condemnation, after a hearing and
inspection of the building in question, made findings that the building owned by the
plaintiff constituted a menace to public safety and further found that the building should be
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se, 92 U.S. 214, 221, 25 L.Ed. 563 (1876)

U.S. Supreme Court
United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875)
United States v. Reese
92 U.S. 214
ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
Syllabus
1. Rights and immunities created by or dependent upon the Constitution of the United States can be protected
by Congress. The form and manner of that protection may be such as Congress, in the legitimate exercise of its
legislative discretion, shall provide, and may be varied to meet the necessities of a particular right.
2. The Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution does not confer the right of suffrage, but it invests citizens of
the United States with the right of
Page 92 U.S. 215
exemption from discrimination in the exercise of the elective franchise on account of their race, color, or
previous condition of servitude, and empowers Congress to enforce that right by "appropriate legislation."
3. The power of Congress to legislate at all upon the subject of voting at state elections rests upon this
amendment, and can be exercised by providing a punishment only when the wrongful refusal to receive the
vote of a qualified elector at such elections is because of his race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
4. The third and fourth sections of the Act of May 31, 1570, 16 Stat. 140, not being confined in their operation to
unlawful discrimination on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, are beyond the limit of the
Fifteenth Amendment and unauthorized.
5. As these sections are in general language broad enough to cover wrongful acts without as well as within the
constitutional jurisdiction, and cannot be limited by judicial construction so as to make them operate only on that
which Congress may rightfully prohibit and punish, held that Congress has not provided by "appropriate
legislation" for the punishment of an inspector of a municipal election for refusing to receive and count at such
election the vote of a citizen of the United States of African descent.
6. Since the passage of the act which gives the presiding judge the casting vote in cases of division and
authorizes a judgment in accordance with his opinion, Rev.Stat., sec. 650, this Court, if it finds that the
judgment as rendered is correct, need do no more than affirm it. If, however, that judgment is reversed, all
questions certified, which are considered in the final determination of the case here, should be answered.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case comes hare by reason of a division of opinion between the judges of the Circuit Court in the District of

Kentucky. It presents an indictment containing four counts, under sees. 3 and 4 of the Act of May 31, 1870, 16
Stat. 140, against two of the inspectors of a municipal election in the State of Kentucky for refusing to receive
and count at such election the vote of William Garner, a citizen of the United States of African descent. All the
questions presented by the certificate of divisior i arose upon general demurrers to the several counts of the
indictment.
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I N 1 H.E S U P R E M E C O l I K T OJ: T H E S T A T E O F UTAH:
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S t a t e of U t a h ,
P l a i n t i f f ;HK1 f;e«jpuTHlC"iita

No.

15725

FILED
December

v.
K;i i I i M e m m e r t ,
Defendant and Appellant.

Geoffrey J./Bxffter,

CI e r f e ^

MA U GI IA N a J u s t i c e ;
D e f e n d a n t - w a s c h a r g e d i n A j u s t i c e s n m n ' , w i t h a v i o l a t i o n of a . S a l t L a k e
C o u n t y z o n i n g o r d i n a n c e . S p e c i f i c a l l y , , d e f e n d a n t w a s a c c u s e d of m a i n t a i n i n g a
d w e l l i n g w i t h a n a t t a c h e d c a r p o r t on h i s p r o p e r t y w i t h l e s s t h a n t h e r e q u i s i t e s i d e
yard* T h e side y a r d o r d i n a n c e is not in i s s u e h e r e . The defense stipulated a s to
t h e f a c t s , -ir,-' dei«.-ndaiit v.-.- s* f o u n d g u i l t y . D e f e n d a n t a p p e a l e d t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ,
b e f o r e w h o m the c a s e w a s s u b m i t t e d b a s e d on stipulated f a c t s . W e d e c l a r e t h e
s e lit e n ^ n p o ^ r: * n <"•> r r • * - :- T * * * f : - ' 1 a i t J-J i i, s t (<i,? i J t h e j u d g m cut of fh e c o u r f.
U H o ; t ' ;*-* -'"." . • ' « o u r t d e f e n d a n t u r g e d t h e r e w a s d i s c r i m i n a t o r y e n f o r c e m e n t of t h e z o n i n g o r d i n a n c e , , T o s u s t a i n h i s c l a i m d e f e n d a n t c i t e d n i n e v i o l a t i o n s
of z o n i n g o r d i n a n c e s i n a n o t h e r s u b d i v i s i o n , a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h r e e m i l e s f r o m h i s
r e s i d e n c e , which the county had not p r o s e c u t e d ,
"The t r i a l c o u r t r u l e d i n t e n t i o n a l d i s c r i m i n a t o r y e n f o r c e m e n t \would be in
v i o l a t i o n of t h e e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n g u a r a n t e e d b y t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
a n d t h e S t a t e of U t a h * I n c o n t r a s t , m e r e l a x i t y of e n f o r c e m e n t , e v e n t h o u g h i t m a y
r e s u l t in. u n e q u a l a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e l a w t o t h o s e e n t i t l e d t o b e t r e a t e d a l i k e # d o e s
n o t c o n s t i t u t e a d e n i a l of e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n , ^ T h e t r i ^ l c o u r t f o u n d t h e r e w a s n o
e v i d e n c e of i n t e n t i o n a l d* P<~ H n ^ h i ^ t i o n ; a n d , t h e r e i n .re, fonnd d e f e n d a n t w a s g u i l t y
as charged.
T h e coi iiity h a s u r g e d t h e d u u ^ . Q t i of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ;> final,
A r t i c l e V I I I , S e c t i o n 9» C o n s t i t u t i o n o( U t a h * p r o v i d e s "two e x c e p t i o n s t o t h e
f i n a l i t y of t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t o:-, a p p e a l s f r o m a j u s t i c e of t h e p e a c e ,
t h e y a r e 3 ' i n c a s e s i n v o l v i n g t h e v a l i d i t y 07- c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of a s t a t u t e „ l l
A t 1 h e t i m e of s e n t e n c i n g d e f e n s e c o u n s e l m o v e d t h e s e n t e n c e n o t b e i m p o s e d
a n d t h e c o n v i c t i o n v a c a t e d o n t h e g r o u n d s t h e o r d i n a n c e s e t t i n g f o r t h t h e p e n a Ity w a s
b o t h u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and i n v a l i d by r e a s o n that the County C o m m i s s i o n exceeded its
s t a t u t o r y authority. Specifically, defendant urged the ordinance was discriminatory
a n d d e n i e d e q u a 1 p r o t e c t i o n of t h e l a w s i n c e b y f a i l u r e t o p r o s e c u t e a v i o l a t o r f o r a
I . P e o p l e y:# U t i e a Dav?s D r u g C o m p a n y , I n c . , 16 Ap„ Div„ 2d 12, 2 2 5 N . Y . S . 2d
1 2 8 , 4 A . L . -R. 3d 3 9 3 ( 1 9 6 2 ) .

p e r i o d of five y e a r s , t h e v i o l a t i o n b e c o m e s a n o n c o n f o r m i n g u s e . Secondly, t h e
C o u n t y C o m m i s s i o n e x c e e d e d i t s s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y "by c o n f e r r i n g on t h e P l a n n i n g
C o m m i s s i o n t h e p o ^ e r t o e s t a b l i s h a. n o n c o n f o r m i n g u s e , which in effect, p e r m i t s
t h e l a t t e r t o a m e n d t h e zoning o r d i n a n c e * T h i r d l y , d e f e n d a n t a s s e r t e d t h e o r d i n a n c e w a s a p p l i e d in a d i s c r i m i n a t o r y m a n n e r b y r e a s o n t h a t long t e r m v i o l a t o r s
w e r e not p r o s e c u t e d a l t h o u g h t h e y h a d f a i l e d to follow t h e p r o c e d u r e s e t f o r t h in
t h e ordinance to e s t a b l i s h the nonconforming use a s provided therein.
The challenged ordinance, Section 2 2 - 1 - 1 1 , provides:
2 2 - 1 - 1 1 . P e n a l t i e s . Any p e r s o n , f i r m or c o r p o r a t i o n ,
w h e t h e r a s p r i n c i p a l , a g e n t e m p l o y e e or o t h e r w i s e , v i o l a t i n g o r
c a u s i n g or p e r m i t t i n g the v i o l a t i o n of t h e p r o v i s i o n of this T i t l e
s h a l l b e g u i l t y of a m i s d e m e a n o r and p u n i s h a b l e a s p r o v i d e d b y l a w .
Such p e r s o n , f i r m o r corporation who intentionally violates this
T i t l e s h a l l b e d e e m e d to b e g u i l t y of a s e p a r a t e offense fox e a c h
and every d a y d u r i n g w h i c h a n y v i o l a t i o n of t h i s T i t l e i s c o m m i t t e d ,
c o n t i n u e d ; o r p e r m i t t e d b y s u c h p e r s o n , or c o r p o r a t i o n a n d s h a l l
b e p u n i s h a b l e a s h e r e i n s t a t e d , p r o v i d e d , h o w e v e r , that w h e n a n y
s t r u c t u r e o r u s e i s i n c o n t i n u o u s v i o l a t i o n of t h i s O r d i n a n c e f o r a
p e r i o d e x c e e d i n g five (5) y e a r s , a n d u p o n p r o p e r affidavits b e i n g
s u b m i t t e d t o t h e Salt L a k e County p l a n n i n g C o m m i s s i o n t o t h e
effect t h a t n o a c t i o n h a s b e e n i n s t i g a t e d o r c o m p l a i n t r e c e i v e d
d u r i n g s a i d p e r i o d w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e v i o l a t i o n , and when s a i d
C o m m i s s i o n f i n d s t h a t i n the i n t e r e s t of j u s t i c e and the g e n e r a l
p u b l i c good and w e l f a r e s u c h s t r u c t u r e o r u s e should be a l l o w e d
to c o n t i n u e , t h e n a n d in t h a t e v e n t s a i d C o m m i s s i o n m a y d e c l a r e
s u c h s t r u c t u r e or u s e n o n - c o n f o r m i n g . H o w e v e r , t h e p e r i o d of
l i m i t a t i o n of five (5) y e a r s p r e s c r i b e d h e r e i n s h a l l not c o m m e n c e
t o r u n u n t i l t h e effective d a t e of t h i s O r d i n a n c e and in no w a y
s h a l l b e i n t e r p r e t e d to p e r m i t t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n of any v i o l a t i o n w h i c h
w h i c h e x i s t s o n t h e effective d a t e h e r e o f «
It c l e a r l y e x c e e d s p o w e r s d e t a i l e d in four- l e g i s l a t i v e e n a c t m e n t s * The pow
c o n f e r r e d on t h e b o a r d s of county c o m m i s s i o n e r s to p r o v i d e for z o n i n g and plant
a r e s e t f o r t h in C h a p t e r 2 7 , T i t l e 17, U . C . A . 1 9 5 3 .
Section 17-27-1B provides statutory regulation for a nonconforming u s e .
i t s e x p r e s s t e r m s a n o n c o n f o r m i n g u s e i s , i n effect, defined as a n e x i s t i n g and la^
u s e a t t h e t i m e of a d o p t i o n of a zoning r e s o l u t i o n o r i t s a m e n d m e n t . Such a nonca:
f o r m i n g u s e m a y b e c o n t i n u e d , e x c e p t a s p r o v i d e d i n t h e s t a t u t e . A l l t h e provision
i n t h e s t a t u t e c o n c e r n i n g n o n c o n f o r m i n g u s e s r e q u i r e t h e t e r m s and c o n d i t i o n s to t
s e t f o r t h in a z o n i n g r e s o l u t i o n *
1 7 - 2 7 - 1 5 c o n f e r s on t h e B o a r d of C o u n t y C o m m i s s i o n e r s p o w e r t o a u t h o r i z
t h e b o a r d of a d j u s t m e n t {by zoning r e s o l u t i o n ) , to m a k e s p e c i a l e x c e p t i o n s , w h e
s u c h w i l l b e in h a r m o n e y with t h e g e n e r a l p u r p o s e and i n t e n t of t h e r e g u l a t i o n s . T'
p o w e r to m a k e e x c e p t i o n s i s 1 J subject to a p p r o p r i a t e p r i n c i p l e s , s t a n d a r d s , r u l e s ,
c o n d i t i o n s , and s a f e g u a r d s set f o r t h i n t h e zoning r e g u l a t i o n . t !
Noo 15725
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17-27 23 p r o v i d e s t h a t any person,... v i o l a t i n g any r e g u lation o r any p r o v i s i o n
of a zoning re.sol.iition .shall he guilty of a m i s d e m e a n o r ,
I h e effect of the o r d i n a n c e i± lo c s U L J i ^ ; « ^uiiditional five y e a r s t a t u t e of
l i m i t a t i o n s for v i o l a t i o n of a z o n i n g o r d i n a n c e . The o r d i n a n c e f u r t h e r v i o l a t e s the
s t a t u t o r y s t a n d a r d w h i c h e s t a b l i s h e s a n o n c o n f o r m i n g e*e a s an e x i s t i n g and lawful
u s e at t h e t i m e of the adoption of a zoning r e s o l u t i o n , or a m e n d m e n t * The o r d i n a n c e
a t t e m p t s to e s t a b l i s h a p r o c e d u r e t o c o n v e r t a n e x i s t i n g , 'unlawful u s e into a n o n c o n f o r m i n g u s e in c o n t r a v e n t i o n of the s t a t u t e . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e r e is no s t a t u t o r y
p r o v i s i o n c o n f e r r i n g on t h e Board, of County C o m m i s s i o n e r s the a u t h o r i t y to d e l e g a t e to t h e P l a n n i n g C o m m i s s i o n the power t o g r a n t a n o n c o n f o r m i n g u s e s t a t u s , on
a c a s e b y c a s e b a s i s . T h e e s t a b l i s h e d s t a t u t o r y p r o c e d u r e to c r e a t e an e x c e p t i o n
to a zoning r e s o l u t i o n i s s e t f o r t h in Section 1 7 - 2 7 - 1 5 . F i n a l l y t h e o r d i n a n c e e x c e e d s
t h e p o w e r g r a n t e d the Board! of County C o m m i s s i o n e r s by c r e a t i n g a five y e a r l i m i tation peiind
-:M1 providing e a c h day of v i o l a t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s a s e p a r a t e offense.
_-.:•-.*-

• : - * * • -

e

s:

It s h a l l be 'unlawful to e r e c t a , « any « «, ,. s t r u c t u r e .
,
in v i o l a t i o n of m „ » any zoning r e s o l u t i o n * or any a m e n d m e n t
t h e r e o f , e n a c t e d or a d o p t e d by any b o a r d of county c o m m i s s i o n e r s u n d e r the a u t h o r i t y of the a c t . Any" p e r son ,
viola.ting „ . . a n y zoning r e s o l u t i o n , or any a m e n d m e n t o f
t h i s a c t , s h a l l b e guilt v of a m i s d e m e a n o r
[Emphasis
supplied.] •
r

i iii* s t a t u t e d e s i g n a t e s a v i o l a t i o n of a zoning r e s o l u t i o n a s
"v i z # , ^ m i s d e m e a n o r . T h e o r d i n a n c e e x c e e d s the s t a t u t o r y l i m i t s
e a c h day :/. violation c o n s t i t u t e s a s e p a r a t e o f f e n s e . The five y e a r
c o n t r a v e n e s S e c t i o n 7 6 - 1 - 3 0 2 ( b ) , which p r o v i d e s a, p r o s e c u t i o n for
mu st 1"-* - o m m c r . c e d within two y e a r s a f t e r i t is c o m m i t t e d .

a. single c r i m e ,
by p r o v i d i n g
limitation period
a misdemeanor

T h e p r o v i s i o n s of (he c h a l l e n g e d o r d i n a n c e a r e c l e a r l y invalid by r e a son of
the B o a r d of C o m m i s s i o n e r s e x c e e d i n g t h e s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y c o n f e r r e d "upon t h e m
u n d e r C h a p t e r 27, T i t l e 17, T h e i n v a l i d i t y of t h e o r d i n a n c e does not p r e c l u d e the
i m p o s i t i o n of s e n t e n c e on d e f e n d a n t , since the s t a t u t e , Section 1 7 - 2 7 - 2 3 , p r o v i d e s
*he p E*na It y. H o w e v e r , in vie v. of the s t a t e s t a t u t e ' s p r o v i s i o n for one offense r a t h e r
tli*n ;i s e r i e s of offense*;, the t r i a l c o u r t m a y want to modify t h i s s e n t e n c e .

C R O C K E T T5 J u s t i c e ;

( C o n c u r r i i n ; , u-j.ri: r e s e r v a t i o n )

1 vo;)cui in a f f i r m i n g t h e c o n v i c t i o n and the i m p o s i t i o n of s e n t e n c e . But
i n a s m u c h a s that i s d o n e , I s e e n e i t h e r r e a s o n n o r n e c e s s i t y for c r i t i c i z i n g the
o r d i n a n c e r e f e r r e d t o , nor for d e c l a r i n g t h a t it e x c e e d s the p o w e r s g r a n t e d to the
-3-
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C o u n t y C o m m i s s i o n e r s . 1 It i m p r e s s e s m e a s w i t h i n t h e zoning, and planning
a u t h o r i t y c o n f e r r e d upon the C o m m i s s i o n "by t h e s t a t u t e s r e f e r r e d t o , and that i s
w e l l d e s i g n e d to a c c o m p l i s h i t s p r o p e r o b j e c t i v e s , , T h i s i n c l u d e s the p r o v i s i o n
t h a t w h e n any s t r u c t u r e h a s e x i s t e d c o n t i n u o u s l y f o r a p e r i o d of five y e a r s , with
no complaint and no a c t i o n t h e r e o n , the C o m m i s s i o n then has d i s c r e t i o n to d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r " i n t h e i n t e r e s t of j u s t i c e a n d t h e g e n e r a l public good and w e l f a r e
s u c h s t r u c t u r e o r u s e should b e a l l o w e d t o continue* 1 1
T h a t p r o v i s i o n i s in h a r m o n y w i t h w h a t should, b e t h e g e n e r a l p u r p o s e of
a l l l a w s a n d r e g u l a t i o n s , t h a t of a l l o w i n g a n o w n e r t h e h i g h e s t p o s s i b l e d e g r e e of
f r e e d o m of u s e of h i s p r o p e r t y s o long a s it i s "not a n i n f r i n g e m e n t upon r e c o g n i t i o n of s i m i l a r r i g h t s in o t h e r s
i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e g e n e r a l w e l f a r e , The
f a c t t h a t a s t r u c t u r e h a s e x i s t e d f o r a p e r i o d of five y e a r s with no one m a k i n g any
c o m p l a i n t a b o u t it s e e m s a t l e a s t a p r i m a f a c i e b a s i s f o r a s s u m i n g t h a t i t i s not
"bothering or a d v e r s e l y affecting o t h e r i n d i v i d u a l s o r t h e p u b l i c * w e l f a r e . Allowing
t h e C o m m i s s i o n to t h e n m a k e s u c h a d e t e r m i n a t i o n , a n d g r a n t i n g or denying v*hat
•is s o m e t i m e s a l s o r e f e r r e d t o a s 1r a v a r i a n c e , 1 1 r e c o g n i z e s t h a t t h e r e m a y b e
m a r g i n a l s i t u a t i o n s a n d / o r c i r c u m s t a n c e s of p r a c t i c a l e x i g e n c y w h i c h j u s t i f y the
C o m m i s s i o n in u s i n g s o m e j u d g m e n t and d i s c r e t i o n i n c a r r y i n g out i t s zoning and
planning responsibilities,

E l l e t t , Chief J u s t i c e , c o n c u r s i n t h e v i e w s e x p r e s s e d in t h e c o n c u r r i n g
o p i n i o n of M r . J u s t i c e C r o c k e t t .
1* T h a t t h e c o u r t s h o u l d a v o i d i n t r u d i n g i n t o t h e l e g i s l a t i v e p r e r o g a t i v e unlesf
n e c e s s a r y t o r e s o l v e a c o n t r o v e r s y b e f o r e i t , s e e 3 A m * Jux» 383 and c a s e s t h e r e i
c i t e d ; c i t e d in H e a t h m a n v* G i l e s , 13 U t a h 2d 3 6 8 , 374 F , 2 d S39; and t h a t a l e g i s h
f i v e e n a c t m e n t s h o u l d b e p r e s u m e d v a l i d and not d e c l a r e d o t h e r w i s e u n l e s s i t
a p p e a r s s o b e y o n d a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , s e e New c o m b v . Ogden City, e t c . , l2lUtcL
5 0 3 , 243 P # 2 d 9 4 1 .

HALL, Justice:

(Concurring, with reservation)

I c o n c u r i n a f f i r m i n g t h e j u d g m e n t of t h e t r i a l c o u r t . H o w e v e r , t h e r e i s nc
n e c e s s i t y t o d i s c u s s t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l m e r i t s of t h e o r d i n a n c e w h i c h s u p p o r t s the
c o n v i c t i o n a s t h a t m a t t e r w a s not r a i s e d below and h e n c e i s not b e f o r e u s on t h i s
a p p e a l , •*
"Wilkins, J u s t i c e , d o e s not p a r t i c i p a t e h e r e i n .
1,

No,

A r t i c l e VHI, S e c t i o n 9, C o n s t i t u t i o n of Utah*

15725
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APPENDIX NN
Marbury vs. Madison, 5 U.S. 137,1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed, 60

WILLIAM MARBURY v. JAMES MADISON, SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
5 U.S. 137
FEBRUARY, 1803 Term

Is Marfaury
entitled to his
commission?

Does Section 13
of the Judiciary
Act authorize
the Court to
issue a writ of
mandamus?

Is Section 13 of
the Judiciary
Act
constitutional?

If Section 13 of
the Judiciary Act
is
unconstitutional,
does the
Supreme Court
have the power
to declare it
void?

Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the court.
In the order in which the court has viewed this subject, the following questions
have been considered and decided:
1st. Has the applicant a right to the commission he demands?
2dly. If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of his
country afford him a remedy?
3dly. If they do afford him a remedy, is it a mandamus issuing from this court?
The first object of enquiry is: Has the applicant a right to the commission he
demands?
|His right originates in an act of congress passed in February, 1801,
(concerning the district of Columbia. This law enacts, "that there shall be
appointed in and for each of the said counties, such number of discreet persons to be justices of the peace
as the president of the United States shall, from time to time, think expedient, to continue in office for five
years."
It appears, from the affidavits, that in compliance with this law, a commission for William Marbury as a
justice of peace for the county of Washington, was signed by John Adams, then president of the United
States; after which the seal of the United States was affixed to it; but the commission has never reached
the person for whom it was made out.
In order to determine whether he is entitled to this commission, it becomes necessary to enquire whether
he has been appointed to the office. For if he has been appointed, the law continues him in office for five
years, and he is entitled to the possession of those evidences of office, which, being completed, became
his property.
The 2d section of the 2d article of the constitution, declares, that "the president shall nominate, and, by and
with the advice and consent of the senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not otherwise provided for." The third
section declares, that "he shall commission all the officers of the United States." An act of congress directs
the secretary of state to keep the seal of the United States, "to make out and record, and affix the said seal
to all civil commissions to officers of the United States, to be appointed by the President, by and with the
consent of the senate, or by the President alone; provided that the said seal shall not be affixed to any

l
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commission before the same shall have been signed by the President of the United States."
These are the clauses of the constitution and laws of the United States, which affect this part of the case.
They seem to contemplate three distinct operations:
1st, The nomination. This is the sole act of the President, and is completely voluntary.
2d. The appointment. This is also the act of the President, and is also a voluntary act, though it can only be
performed by and with the advice and consent of the senate.
3d. The commission. To grant a commission to a person appointed, might perhaps be deemed a duty
enjoined by the constitution. "He shall," says that instrument, "commission all the officers of the United
States."
This is an appointment by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, and is
evidenced by no act but the commission itself.... The last act to be done by the President, is the signature
of the commission. He has then acted on the advice and consent of the senate to his own nomination. The
time for deliberations has then passed. He has decided. His judgment, on the advice and consent of the
senate concurring with his nomination, has been made, and the officer is appointed. This appointment is
evidenced by an open, unequivocal act; and being the last act required from the person making it,
necessarily excludes the idea of its being, so far as respects the appointment, an inchoate and incomplete
transaction.
The signature is a warrant for affixing the great seal to the commission; and the great seal is only to be
affixed to an instrument which is complete. It asserts, by an act supposed to be of public notoriety, the
verity of the Presidential signature.
It is never to be affixed till the commission is signed, because the signature, which gives force and effect to
the commission, is conclusive evidence that the appointment is made.
The commission being signed, the subsequent duty of the secretary of state is prescribed by law, and not
to be guided by the will of the President. He is to affix the seal of the United States to the commission, and
is to record it.
This is not a proceeding which may be varied, if the judgment of the executive shall suggest one more
eligible; but is a precise course accurately marked out by law, and is to be strictly pursued. It is the duty of
the secretary of state to conform to the law, and in this he is an officer of the United States, bound to obey
the laws. He acts, in this regard, as has been very properly stated at the bar, under the authority of law,
and not by the instructions of the President. It is a ministerial act which the law enjoins on a particular
officer for a particular purpose....
The discretion of the executive is to be exercised until the appointment has been made. But having once
made the appointment, his power over the office is terminated in all cases, where, by law, the officer is not
removable by him. The right to the office is then in the person appointed, and he has the absolute,
unconditional, power of accepting or rejecting it.
Mr. Marbury, then, since his commission was signed by the President, and sealed by the
secretary of state, was appointed; and as the law creating the office, gave the officer a
right to hold for five years, independent of the executive, the appointment was not
revocable; but vested in the officer legal rights, which are protected by the laws of his
country.
To withhold his commission, therefore, is an act deemed by the court not warranted by
law, but violative of a vested legal right.
This brings us to the second enquiry; which is, 2dly. If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do
the laws of his country afford him a remedy?
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of

the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection.
The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men.
It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a
vested legal right.
By the constitution of the United States, the President is invested with certain important political powers, in
the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political
character, and to his own conscience. To aid him in the performance of these duties, he is authorized to
appoint certain officers, who act by his authority and in conformity with his orders.
In such cases, their acts are his acts; and whatever opinion may be entertained of the manner in which
executive discretion may be used, still there exists, and can exist, no power to control that discretion. The
subjects are political. They respect the nation, not individual rights, and being entrusted to the executive,
the decision of the executive is conclusive. The application of this remark will be perceived by adverting to
the act of congress for establishing the department of foreign affairs. This office, as his duties were
prescribed by that act, is to conform precisely to the will of the President. He is the mere organ by whom
that will is communicated. The acts of such an officer, as an officer, can never be examinable by the
courts.
But when the legislature proceeds to impose on that officer other duties; when he is directed peremptorily
to perform certain acts; when the rights of individuals are dependent on the performance of those acts; he
is so far the officer of the law; is amenable to the laws for his conduct; and cannot at his discretion sport
away the vested rights of others.
The conclusion from this reasoning is, that where the heads of departments are the political or confidential
agents of the executive, merely to execute the will of the President, or rather to act in cases in which the
executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their
acts are only politically examinable. But where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights
depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself
injured, has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.
If this be the rule, let us enquire how it applies to the case under the consideration of the court.
The power of nominating to the senate, and the power of appointing the person nominated, are political
powers, to be exercised by the President according to his own discretion. When he has made an
appointment, he has exercised his whole power, and his discretion has been completely applied to the
case.
The question whether a right has vested or not, is, in its nature, judicial, and must be tried by the judicial
authority. If, for example, Mr. Marbury had taken the oaths of a magistrate, and proceeded to act as one; in
consequence of which a suit had been instituted against him, in which his defence had depended on his
being a magistrate; the validity of his appointment must have been determined by judicial authority.
So, if he conceives that, by virtue of his appointment, he has a legal right, either to the commission which
has been made out for him, or to a copy of that commission, it is equally a question examinable in a court,
and the decision of the court upon it must depend on the opinion entertained of his appointment.
That question has been discussed, and the opinion is, that the latest point of time which can be taken as
that at which the appointment was complete, and evidenced, was when, after the signature of the
president, the seal of the United States was affixed to the commission.
It is then the opinion of the court: 1st. That by signing the commission of Mr. Marbury, the president of the
United States appointed him a justice of peace, for the county of Washington in the district of Columbia;
and that the seal of the United States, affixed thereto by the secretary of state, is conclusive testimony of
the verity of the signature, and of the completion of the appointment; and that the appointment conferred
on him a legal right to the office for the space of five years. 2dly. That, having this legal title to the office, he
has a consequent right to the commission; a refusal to deliver which, is a plain violation of that right, for
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which the laws of his country afford him a remedy.
It remains to be enquired whether, 3dly. He is entitled to the remedy for which he applies. This depends on,
1st. The nature of the writ applied for, and, 2dly. The power of this court.
1 st. The nature of the writ.
If one of the heads of departments commits any illegal act, under the color of his office, by which an
individual sustains an injury, it cannot be pretended that his office alone exempts him from being sued in
the ordinary mode of proceeding, and being compelled to obey the judgment of the law. How then can his
office exempt him from this particular mode of deciding on the legality of his conduct, if the case be such a
case as would, were any other individual the party complained of, authorize the process?
It is not by the office of the person to whom the writ is directed, but the nature of the thing to be done that
the propriety or impropriety of issuing a mandamus, is to be determined. Where the head of a department
acts in a case, in which executive discretion is to be exercised; in which he is the mere organ of executive
will; it is again repeated, that any application to a court to control, in any respect, his conduct, would be
rejected without hesitation.
But where he is directed by law to do a certain act affecting the absolute rights of individuals, in the
performance of which he is not placed under the particular direction of the President, and the performance
of which, the President cannot lawfully forbid, and therefore is never presumed to have forbidden; as for
example, to record a commission which has received all the legal solemnities, it is not perceived on what
ground the courts of the country are further excused from the duty of giving judgment, that right be done to
an injured individual, than if the same services were to be performed by a person not the head of a
department....
It was at first doubted whether the action of detinue was not a specified legal remedy for the commission
which has been withheld from Mr. Marbury; in which case a mandamus would be improper. But this doubt
has yielded to the consideration that the judgment in detinue is for the thing itself, or its value. The value of
a public office not to be sold, is incapable of being ascertained; and the applicant has a right to the office
itself, or to nothing. He will obtain the office by obtaining the commission, or a copy of it from the record.
This, then, is a plain case for a mandamus, either to deliver the commission, or a copy of it from the record;
and it only remains to be enquired, Whether it can issue from this court.
The act to establish the judicial courts of the United States authorizes the supreme court "to issue writs of
mandamus, in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons
holding office, under the authority of the United States."
The secretary of state, being a person holding an office under the authority of the United States, is
precisely within the letter of the description; and if this court is not authorized to issue a writ of mandamus
to such an officer, it must be because the law is unconstitutional, and therefore absolutely incapable of
conferring the authority, and assigning the duties which its words purport to confer and assign.
The constitution vests the whole judicial power of the United States in one supreme court, and such inferior
courts as congress shall, from time to time, ordain and establish. This power is expressly extended to all
cases arising under the laws of the United States; and consequently, in some form, may be exercised over
the present case; because the right claimed is given by a law of the United States.
In the distribution of this power it is declared that "the supreme court shall have original jurisdiction in all
cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a
party. In all other cases, the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction."
It has been insisted, at the bar, that as the original grant of jurisdiction, to the supreme and inferior courts,
is general, and the clause, assigning original jurisdiction to the supreme court, contains no negative or

restrictive words; the power remains to the legislature, to assign original jurisdiction to that court in other
cases than those specified in the article which has been recited; provided those cases belong to the judicial
power of the United States.
If it had been intended to leave it to the discretion of the legislature to apportion the judicial power between
the supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that body, it would certainly have been useless to
have proceeded further than to have defined the judicial powers, and the tribunals in which it should be
vested. The subsequent part of the section is mere surplusage, is entirely without meaning, if such is to be
the construction. If congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction, where the
constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original; and original jurisdiction where the constitution
has declared it shall be appellate; the distribution of jurisdiction, made in the constitution, is form without
substance.
Affirmative words are often, in their operation, negative of other objects than those affirmed; and in this
case, a negative or exclusive sense must be given to them or they have no operation at all.
It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect; and therefore
such a construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it.
When an instrument organizing fundamentally a judicial system, divides it into one supreme, and so many
inferior courts as the legislature may ordain and establish; then enumerates its powers, and proceeds so
far to distribute them, as to define the jurisdiction of the supreme court by declaring the cases in which it
shall take original jurisdiction, and that in others it shall take appellate jurisdiction; the plain import of the
words seems to be, that in one class of cases its jurisdiction is original, and not appellate; in the other it is
appellate, and not original. If any other construction would render the clause inoperative, that is an
additional reason for rejecting such other construction, and for adhering to their obvious meaning.
To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate
jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.
It has been stated at the bar that the appellate jurisdiction may be exercised in a variety of forms, and that
if it be the will of the legislature that a mandamus should be used for that purpose, that will must be
obeyed. This is true, yet the jurisdiction must be appellate, not original.
It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction, that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause
already instituted, and does not create that cause. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to
courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper, is in effect the same as to sustain an
original action for that paper, and therefore seems not to belong to appellate, but to original jurisdiction.
Neither is it necessary in such a case as this, to enable the court to exercise its appellate jurisdiction.
The authority, therefore, given to the supreme court, by the act establishing the judicial courts of the United
States, to issue writs of mandamus to public officers, appears not to be warranted by the constitution; and
it becomes necessary to enquire whether a jurisdiction, so conferred, can be exercised.
The question, whether an act, repugnant to the constitution, can become the law of the land, is a question
deeply interesting to the United States; but, happily, not of an intricacy proportioned to its interest. It seems
only necessary to recognize certain principles, supposed to have been long and well established, to decide
it.
That the people have an original right to establish, for their future government, such principles as, in their
opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis, on which the whole American fabric has
been erected. The exercise of this original right is a very great exertion; nor can it, nor ought it to be
frequently repeated. The principles, therefore, so established, are deemed fundamental. And as the
authority, from which they proceed, is supreme, and can seldom act, they are designed to be permanent.
This original and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns, to different departments, their
respective powers. It may either stop here; or establish certain limits not to be transcended by those

'&
departments.
The government of the United States is of the latter description. The powers of the legislature are defined,
and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written. To what
purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may,
at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained? The distinction, between a government with
limited and unlimited powers, is abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are
imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed, are of equal obligation. It is a proposition too plain to be
contested, that the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter
the constitution by an ordinary act.
Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The constitution is either a superior, paramount law,
unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts, is
alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.
If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the constitution is not law: if the
latter part be true, then written constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power,
in its own nature illimitable.
Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental
and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an
act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void.
If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void, does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind
the courts, and oblige them to give it effect? Or, in other words, though it be not law, does it constitute a
rule as operative as if it was a law? This would be to overthrow in fact what was established in theory; and
would seem, at first view, an absurdity too gross to be insisted on. It shall, however, receive a more
attentive consideration.
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply
the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each
other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.
So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case,
so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or
conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting
rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.
If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and the constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the
legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.
Those then who controvert the principle that the constitution is to be considered, in court, as a paramount
law, are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the constitution, and
see only the law.
This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions. It would declare that an act,
which, according to the principles and theory of our government, is entirely void; is yet, in practice,
completely obligatory. It would declare, that if the legislature shall do what is expressly forbidden, such act,
notwithstanding the express prohibition, is in reality effectual. It would be giving to the legislature a practical
and real omnipotence, with the same breath which professes to restrict their powers within narrow limits. It
is prescribing limits, and declaring that those limits may be passed at pleasure.
That it thus reduces to nothing what we have deemed the greatest improvement on political institutions - a
written constitution - would of itself be sufficient, in America, where written constitutions have been viewed
with so much reverence, for rejecting the construction. But the peculiar expressions of the constitution of
the United States furnish additional arguments in favor of its rejection.
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The judicial power of the United States is extended to all cases arising under the constitution. Could it be
the intention of those who gave this power, to say that, in using it, the constitution should not be looked
into? That a case arising under the constitution should be decided without examining the instrument under
which it arises? This is too extravagant to be maintained.
In some cases then, the constitution must be looked into by the judges. And if they can open it at all, what
part of it are they forbidden to read, or to obey? There are many other parts of the constitution which serve
to illustrate this subject. It is declared that "no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state."
Suppose a duty on the export of cotton, of tobacco, or of flour; and a suit instituted to recover it. Ought
judgment to be rendered in such a case? ought the judges to close their eyes on the constitution, and only
see the law. The constitution declares that "no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed."
If, however, such a bill should be passed and a person should be prosecuted under it; must the court
condemn to death those victims whom the constitution endeavors to preserve?
Why otherwise does it direct the judges to take an oath to support it? This oath certainly applies, in an
especial manner, to their conduct in their official character. How immoral to impose it on them, if they were
to be used as the instruments, and the knowing instruments, for violating what they swear to support!
The oath of office, too, imposed by the legislature, is completely demonstrative of the legislative opinion on
the subject. It is in these words, "I do solemnly swear that I will administer justice without respect to
persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich; and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge all
the duties incumbent on me as according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the
constitution, and laws of the United States."
Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreeably to the constitution of the United States, if that
constitution forms no rule for his government? if it is closed upon him, and cannot be inspected by him?
If such be the real state of things, this is worse than solemn mockery. To prescribe, or to take this oath,
becomes equally a crime.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the
principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is
void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.
Note: Top image: Chief Justice John Marshall; bottom i m a g e : W i l l i a m Marbury
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YOUNGSTOWN SHEET & TUBE CO. ET AL. v. SAWYER, 72 S. Ct. 863, 343 U.S. 579 (U.S.
06/02/1952)
[1]

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

[2]

No. 744

[3]

72 S. Ct. 863, 343 U.S. 579, 96 L. Ed. 1153, 1952.SCT.40707
<http://www.versuslaw.com>

[4]

decided: June 2, 1952.

[5]

YOUNGSTOWN SHEET & TUBE CO. ET AL
v.
SAWYER

[6]

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA C I R C U I T . ^

[7]

John W. Davis argued the cause for petitioners in No. 744 and respondents in No. 745. On
the brief were Mr. Davis, Nathan L. Miller, John Lord O'Brian, Roger M. Blough,
Theodore Kiendl, Porter R. Chandler and Howard C. Westwood for the United States Steel
Co.; Bruce Bromley, E. Fontaine Broun and John H. Pickering for the Bethlehem Steel
Co.; Luther Day, T. F. Patton, Edmund L. Jones, Howard Boyd and John C. Gall for the
Republic Steel Corp.; John C. Bane, Jr., H. Parker Sharp and Sturgis Warner for the Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp.; Mr. Gall, John J. Wilson and J. E. Bennett for the Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. et al.; Charles H. Tuttle, Winfred K. Petigrue and Joseph P. Tumulty, Jr.
(who also filed an additional brief) for the Armco Steel Corp. et al.; and Randolph W.
Childs, Edgar S. McKaig and James Craig Peacock (who also filed an additional brief) for
E. J. Lavino & Co., petitioners in No. 744 and respondents in No. 745.

[8]

Solicitor General Perlman argued the cause for respondent in No. 744 and petitioner in No.
745. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Baldridge, James L.
Morrisson, Samuel D. Slade, Oscar H. Davis, Robert W. Ginnane, Marvin E. Frankel,
Benjamin Forman and Herman Marcuse.

[9]

By special leave of Court, Clifford D. O'Brien and Harold C. Heiss argued the cause for
the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers et al., as amici curiae, supporting petitioners in
No. 744 and respondents in No. 745. With them on the brief were Ruth Weyand and V. C.
Shuttleworth.
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In re Young
1999 UT 6
976 P.2d 581
Case Number: 970032
Decided: 01/22/1999
Utah Supreme Court
Cite as 1999 UT 6, 976 P 2d 581

In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, the Honorable David S Young, District Judge
From the Judicial Conduct Commission
Attorneys:
Steven H Stewart, Francis M Wikstrom, Salt Lake City, for Judicial Conduct Commission
Dame! L Berman, Peggy A Tomsic, D Frank Wilkins, Salt Lake City, for Judge Young
Brent M Johnson, Richard H Schwermer, Margaret K Gentles, Salt Lake City, for amici Utah
Judicial Council and Administrative Office of the Courts
M Gay Taylor, Robert H Rees, Salt Lake City, for amici legislative members of Judicial Conduct
Commission
Jan Graham, Att'y Gen , Annina M Mitchell, Asst Att'y Gen , Salt Lake City, for amici Governor
Leavitt and Attorney General Graham
On Petition for Rehearing
ZIMMERMAN, Justice
fl1 This matter is before us on a petition for rehearing The original decision in this case was handed down on July
10. 1998, and was published as In re Youruj, 961 P 2d 918 (Utah 1998) (hereinafter referred to as original
opinion) 1 In that decision, we held that sections 78-7-27(1 )(a) and (b) of the Code were violative of article V,
section 1 of the Utah Constitution Those Code subsections provide that two members of the Senate, appointed
by the President, and two members of the House, appointed by the Speaker, shall serve on the ten-member
Judicial Conduct Commission As a consequence, we held void proceedings of the commission that led it to
recommend that this court enter a public sanction against Judge David S Young
Tf2 The Judicial Conduct Commission moved for permission to file a petition for rehearing This court granted the
motion, as well as the motions of various parties for permission to file briefs as amici curiae in support of the
petition for rehearing 2 The respondent, Judge Young, filed an opposition to the petition for rehearing Oral
argument was held on December 21, 1998 We now grant the petition and issue this opinion on rehearing
TI3 The petition for rehearing and the briefs of the various amici have raised several issues of substantial import
First and foremost, the amicus brief of the legislative members of the Judicial Conduct Commission has brought
to our attention much new material about the origins of the present judicial article of the Utah Constitution, article
VIM, which was rewritten in its entirety and passed by the voters in 1984 Section 13 of that article elevated the
Judicial Conduct Commission to constitutional status The legislator amici contend that this new matenai
demonstrates that the drafters of the amended article, the judges who participated in the hearings preceding its
being finalized, the legislators who then passed the proposed amendment and put it on the ballot, and the voters
who approved it at a general election all understood that the amended article contemplated legislative
participation on the Judicial Conduct Commission Therefore, they argue, our original decision holding such
participation unconstitutional was in error
114 The objective importance of this historical material cannot be overstated The petition of the Judicial Conduct '
Commission for rehearing had narrowly asked only that we declare whether the commission can continue to
function without the legislative members But at oral argument, the chair of the commission, who previously had
been unaware of the historical materials provided us by the amici, apologized for failing to bring this critical
material to our attention in the original proceeding He also announced in open court that he was now convinced
that our original decision was wrong and should be reversed
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08/05/94 SALT LAKE CITY v. MASON A. OHMS
[1]

SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

[2]

No. 930580

[3]

1994.UT.16295 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 881 P.2d 844, 245 Utah Adv. Rep. 22

[4]

August 5,1994

[5]

SALT LAKE CITY, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE,
v.
MASON A. OHMS, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT

[6]

Third Circuit, Salt Lake County. Commissioner Sandra N. Peuler

[7]

Cheryl D. Luke, Salt Lake City, for Salt Lake City.

[8]

David L. Sanders, Salt Lake City, for Ohms.

[9]

Russon, Stewart, Howe, Durham, Zimmerman

[10]

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Russon

[11]

AMENDED OPINION

[12]

RUSSON, Justice:

[13]

Mason A. Ohms appeals his conviction of giving false or misleading information to a
police officer, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Salt Lake City Ordinance §
11.04.100. We reverse and remand.

[14]

I. FACTS

[15]

At approximately 9:30 p.m. on August 25, 1992, a disturbance involving the distribution of
beer erupted in the third-level plaza area of the Delta Center. Sergeant Foster Mayo of the
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11/17/77 STATE UTAH v. DEBRA KAY GALLION
[1 ]

SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

[2]

No. 14966

[3]

1977.UT.262 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 572 P.2d 683

[4]

November 17,1977

[5]

STATE OF UTAH, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT,
v.
DEBRA KAY GALLION, DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT.

[6]

Robert B. Hansen, William W. Barrett, Noall T. Wootton for plaintiff and appellant.

[7]

Michael D. Esplin for defendant and respondent.

[8]

Maughan, Justice, wrote the opinion. WE Concur: D. Frank Wilkins, Justice, Gordon R.
Hall, Justice. Crockett, Justice: [Concurring Separately]. Ellett, Chief Justice: .

[9]

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Maughan

[10]

MAUGHAN, Justice The state appeals from an order of the district court quashing an
information filed against defendant. Defendant was charged with a violation of Section 5837-8(4) D (a)(iii), U.C.A. 1953, as enacted in 1972, that she altered a forged prescription for
a Schedule II controlled substance, demerol. Conviction under this section provides the
penalty for a felony in the third degree. We affirm.

[11]

In Section 58-37-4(3)(b), the substances which were determined by the legislature to be
included in Schedule II were set forth. The substance, demerol, does not appear therein. The
state asserted in a memorandum to the trial court that the attorney general had added
demerol to Schedule II in accordance with the Utah Controlled Substances Act, Title 58,
Chapter 37. Specifically the state claimed:

[12]

... Since the adoption of the Controlled Substance Act, Demerol has been added to the
controlled substance list, a true list being in the possession of Dr. Wesley Parish, a chemist,
located at 815 West Columbia Lane, Provo, Utah. *fhl
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10/10/84 TIMPANOGOS PLANNING AND WATER MANAGEMENT
[1]

SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

[2]

No. 19482

[3]

1984.UT.198 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 690 P.2d 562

[4]

October 10, 1984

[5]

TIMPANOGOS PLANNING AND WATER MANAGEMENT AGENCY, A UTAH
INTERLOCAL CO-OPERATION ACT ENTITY, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND
APPELLANTS,
v.
CENTRAL UTAH WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, A UTAH WATER
DISTRICT, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS.

[6]

James S. Jardine, Salt Lake City; Kent H. Murdock, Salt Lake City; John A. Adams, Salt
Lake City, for Plaintiff.

[7]

Edward W. Clyde, Salt Lake City; Merlin K. Jensen (Weber Basin), Ogden; Douglas A.
Taggart (Weber Basin), Ogden; Hugh W. Colton (Uintah), Vernal; Therold N. Jensen
(Carbon), Price, for Defendant.

[8]

Howe, Justice, wrote the opinion. WE Concur: Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice, Christine M.
Durham, Justice, J. Dennis Frederick, District Judge. Stewart, Justice, does not participate
herein; Frederick, District Judge, sat. Zimmerman, Justice, does not participate herein.

[9]

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Howe

[10]

HOWE, Justice: Plaintiff Timpanogos Planning and Water Management Agency and others
brought this suit to have U.C.A., 1953, § 73-9-9, as constituted prior to its amendment in
1983, declared unconstitutional on the ground that it violated the separation of powers
mandated by Utah Constitution article V, section 1. The statute provided for the
appointment of boards of directors of water conservancy districts to be made by the district
court. By its 1983 amendment, L. 1983, ch. 350, § 1, the legislature provided for the
appointment to be made by the board of county commissioners of a single county district
and by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate in multi-county districts.

[11]

Inasmuch as six of the court-appointed directors of defendant Central Utah Water
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In re Hammermaster, 139 Wash.2d 211, 985 P.2d 924 (Wash. 10/07/1999)
[1]

Washington Supreme Court

[2]

No.JD#15

[3]

139 Wash.2d 211, 985 P.2d 924, 1999.WA.0043634 <http://www.versuslaw.com>

[4]

October 07, 1999

[5]

IN REl HONORABLE A. EUGENE HAMMERMASTER, RESPONDENT JUDGE.

[6]

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Madsen, J.

[7]

EN BANC

[8]

Municipal Court Judge A. Eugene Hammermaster appeals a determination by the
Commission on Judicial Conduct (the Commission) ordering censure, and recommending
suspension for 30 days without pay. The Commission found that Judge Hammermaster
violated the Code of Judicial Conduct (CJC) Canons 2(A), 3(A)(1) and 3(A)(3) by making
improper threats of life imprisonment and indefinite jail sentences, improperly accepting
guilty pleas, holding trials in absentia, and engaging in a pattern of undignified and
disrespectful conduct toward defendants. Judge Hammermaster admits that he engaged in the
alleged conduct, but maintains that his conduct was a reasonable exercise of judicial
independence which did not violate the Canons. We affirm the Commission's findings of
misconduct, but also find that Judge Hammermaster's practice of ordering defendants to
leave the country constitutes a violation of Canon 3(A)(3). We substantially agree with the
Commission's order of censure but find that a six-month suspension without pay is more
appropriate than the sanction recommended by the Commission.

[9]

Facts

[10]

Judge Hammermaster is an appointed part-time municipal court Judge for the Sumner,
Orting, and South Prairie courts of Pierce County, Washington. He has been a Judge for one
or more of these courts for 30 years. Report of Commission Proceedings (RP) at 322. On
June 25, 1996, the Commission on Judicial Conduct received a letter of complaint about
Judge Hammermaster from an inmate at the Sumner City Jail who was serving jail time
because he had not paid a fine imposed by the Judge. In the letter the inmate stated that
"Judge Hammermaster has told me before that if I didn't pay my 300$(sic) fine he would
throw me in jail for life. I've sat out the time in jail to pay off the fine but thats (sic) not
exaptbl (sic) to him." CJC, Finding of Probable Cause (May 13, 1998). The letter goes on to
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SALT LAKE COUNTY COUNCIL
Committee of the Whole
-MIN UTES ~
Tuesday, May 4, 2004
12:35 p.m.

COMMITTEE MEMBERS
PRESENT:

Randy Horiuchi
Jim Bradley
Joe Hatch
Michael Jensen
David Wilde
Russell Skousen
Cortlund Ashton
Marvin Hendrickson
Steve Harmsen, Chair

Criminal Justice System Assessment Report
The Institute of Law & Policy Plonning wos engoged by Moyor Workmon on
beholf of the Criminol Justice Advisory Council to conduct a comprehensive
Criminol Justice System ossessment. The impetus for the study wos crowding
of the Adult Detention Center, a facility that opened in January 2000 and
shortly thereafter reached near capacity.
Crowding occurred despite a
decrease in the overall crime rate and the existence of various jail
population control mechanisms. The system assessment's goals were: 1) find
ways to reduce
current
and future jail population,
2)
provide
recommendations
for alternatives to incarceration,
and 3) provide a
planned process for implementation
of the study's
recommendations.
Mr. Alan Kalmanoff, The Institute for Law & Policy Planning (ILPP), presented a
summary of the final report. He stated ILPP performed two major statistical analyses to
determine the primary causes of the growing inmate population: an inmate tracking
analysis to look for delays in the case flow a n d a profile analysis to analyze the seriousness
of the current inmate population. The analyses clearly showed that the growth in jail
population was due to a dramatic increase in the average length of stay for inmates, not
due to increase in crime or population. Since 1977, the average length of stay has more
than d o u b l e d to 29 days. Doubling the average length of stay a n d then multiplying it by
the thousands of offenders that enter the jail has led to a rapid increase in the jail
population.
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He reviewed "leverage points" in the justice system that are attributable to
deficiencies in the justice system, such as: no uniform arrest policy; pretrial release options
are not broad; municipalities a n d their Ji jstice Courts overly rely on the jail; Justice Courts'
sentences to
jail vary considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction; the Sheriff's Office's authority is
circumvented; continuances a n d delays in the District Court; two-tiered court system is
problematic (district court a n d justice courts) because it is neither coordinated nor
m a n a g e d as a cohesive system; case priorities are not set; drug courts have inappropriate
participants; waiting lists for substnce abuse treatment are too long; the County has not
developed a plan for reduced resources; a n d the Criminal Justice Advisory Council has
developed into a briefing forum rather than a m a n a g e m e n t forum that c a n provide
leadership.
He stated that tf \e analysis yielded over 60 recommendations to enhance the
efficiency a n d effectiveness of the criminal justice system. He reviewed the primary
recommendations to help alleviate congestion and jail overcrowding:
1.
Adopt a Goutvtywide field citation release policy that includes
circumstances a n d offenses suitable for citation releases and supervisory review
requirements on discretionary arrests.
2. Create a pre-processing intake center at the Jail.
3. Develop sentencing guidelines a n d a continuum of sanctions at the
Justice Court level that favor community-based sanctions rather than incarceration at the
jail.
4. Discontinue a c c e p t i n g Class B misdemeanants at the Jail with the
exception of certain offenses such as DUI a n d violation of protection from abuse orders.
5. Establish through legislation that pre-trial a n d sentenced inmates for all
courts are ultimately in the "custody of the Sheriff," whereby the Sheriff c a n move offenders
between the jail and various alternative programs based on custody factors and behavior.
6. Assist the municipalities in developing a strategic plan for a minimumsecurity detention facility that c a n be implemented if other avenues of controlling the jail
population do not prevail.
7. Encourage appeals of justice court convictions that result in excessive or
disproportionate sentences, especially when the sentence is in lieu of payment of a fine, so
long as the interest of ftle individual client in e a c h case is served.
8. Create a new case mnnan^nv ?nt syst* i n < il tin.' Pistrid Courl II u il supports
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cases time standards.
9. Develop consolidated or regional mental health and drug courts at the
Justice Court level.
10. Institute municipal-level community service programs that provide a
method for defendants to work off fines and costs.
11. Develop a 48-hour DUI intervention program (in lieu of jail).
12. Expand the community custody program to include additional lower risk
inmates especially those who have been incarcerated for failure to pay fines/costs.

13. Work toward the goal of conducting a substance abuse assessment prior
to placing offenders in programs to ensure that treatment resources are appropriately
utilized.
14. Restructure the Criminal Justice Advisory Council (CJAC) so that it
becomes an engine or coordination, collaboration, and change.
15. Hire a criminal justice coordinator to facilitate CJAC and implement
recommendations of this report and previous studies.
In conclusion, Mr. Kalmanoff emphasized the need for CJAC to take the lead
in implementing the recommendations and becoming the management group of the
criminal justice system. This will require some restructuring of CJAC. Presently, CJAC consists
of over 25 members representing all of the criminal justice players, such as treatment
organizations, the legal community, the business community, and government agencies.
There are so many people representing so many stakes, CJAC has become quite
cumbersome. Its size needs to be reduced to an executive group of no more than 10
people, who can grab the reins and make things happen. This executive group should
include the Mayor, District Attorney, Sheriff, a key judge, and a few others. Other people
can be assigned to task forces to work on issues such as pre-trial release, a county wide jail
policy, court delays, etc. He felt it would also be helpful to have an outside coordinator or
facilitator for CJAC to help push things along.
Council Member Jensen stated he would be helpful for CJAC to look at the
study recommendations and suggest what the Council can do to help implement some of
the recommendations.
Mr. Gary Dalton, Director, Criminal Justice Services Division and a member of
CJAC, stated CJAC will hold an executive meeting on May 13, 2004, to lift some of the
issues out of the report and discuss them. He would appreciate the Council making a
gesture of support, in concert with the Mayor, to direct CJAC to analyze and prioritize the
recommendations in the assessment report.
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Council Memer Horiuchi, seconded by Council Member Jensen, m o v e d to
support the assessment report and to join with the Mayor in directing CJAC to analyze and
prioritize the recommendations in the report. The motion passed unanimously

Discussion Regarding Contract with Contract Cities for Sheriff's Law Enforcement Services
On April 23, 2004, Council Member Ashton, Jensen, and Hatch met with the
cities that contract with the Sheriff's Office for law enforcement
services,
Sheriff's Office representatives,
Auditor's Office representatives,
and
Attorney's Office representatives regarding the law enforcement
contract
for the upcoming year.
Council Member Harmsen stated that there is a misconception circulating
that the County does not have a firm contract price a n d the price could exceed the 5
percent c a p . (Under the term of the three-year contract, it is anticipated that the cost per
deputy as well as the a g g r e g a t e cost of pooled services will increase from the base level
price by 5 percent e a c h year for t h e three-year period.)
Council Member Jensen stated it was also discussed at the meeting that
there is a potential for unforseen, nondiscretionary increases that could raise the contract
price by more than 5 percent. This could happen if the price of gasoline rose to $4 per
gallon, or the State increased retirement fund contributions. An agreement was reached
that if an outside external force necessitated a price increase, everyone would pay the
increase, but before a greater expenditure is allowed that would exceed the budget, the
County 11H ist inform the cities a n d give them an opportunity to provide input. The cities
discussed making lists of nondiscretionary and discretionary expenditures, but the decision
whether or not to create such lists was left in the hands of the cities
Mr. Darrin Casper, Fiscal Analyst, Council Office, stated the plan was for the
contract prices to increase by 5 percent each year for three years, and hold the
expenditure growth to 3.6 percent per year for three years to c a t c h the revenues up with
the expenditures. It was discussed at the meeting that unavoidable increases could go
beyond the 3.6 percent growth expenditure c a p and whether or not the budget could be
a m e n d e d for discretionary versus nondiscretionary reasons. If the 3.6 percent expenditure
growth per year is circumvented, even due to circumstances beyond the County's control,
it will nlanifest itself in a liability that is c r e a t e d at the end of the year.
Council Member Russ Wall, Taylorsville City, stated the biggest issue is that the
budget c a p seems to be a moving target. Last year the cities were hit with a $1.5 million
error, which the cities had to pick up; then they were hit with the liability issue; a n d then
they were hit with the reconciliation issue. Taylorsville City has a $13-million budget and
law enforcement is one-third of that budget. Taylorsville City cannot afford any more
surprises. Eventually, they have to set a price c a p and say that is as far as they will go.
1ftIrrnhor 1 Inrr h siaien I tl ie figures tt ie County gave the cities for the coming
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contract should be totally in li ne with the 5 percent per year cap.
Council Member Jensen stated John Brems, the attorney for the contract Cities,
and Dick Nixon, Deputy District Attorney, are negotiating the contract. A draft should be completed
within one to two weeks.

Gifts to Clark Planetarium
Mr. Alan Dayton, Deputy Mayor, explained the following gifts were auctioned
at the Clark Planetarium VIP fund raising gala on April 15, 2004, to benefit the planetarium.
Formal a c c e p t a n c e of the gifts has been p l a c e d on the Council a g e n d a .
Lorry H. Miller

Gateway Basket
Girl Scout Cookies
Clark Star Party
Kennedy Space Center
Flight with Winston Scott

$ 600
400
10,000
8,500
10,500

Mike & Mary Beth Clark

Clark Star Party
Flight with Sen. Jake Garn

$ 6,500
5,000

Terry Diehl

Car Detailing
Jazz Basketball

$ 300
1,000

Mark Hansen

Autographed AK-47 Shoes

$

Mayor Nancy Workman

Autographed Arroyo Shoes

Charles Brown

Flight with Terry Fregly

$ 6,200

Richard James

Fishing with Sterling Poulson

$ 2,600

600
$

500

Council Member Jensen, seconded by Council Member Horiuchi, moved to
forward acceptance of the gifts to the 4:00 p.m. Council meeting. The motion passed
unanimously.

Resolution Regarding Reconstruction a n d Realignment of 11400 South
At the April 20, 2004, Committee
of the Whole meeting,
the Utah
Department
of Transportation reviewed the 11400 South
Environmental
Impact Statement
listing five alternatives
for the reconstruction
and
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realignment ot I1400 South. Ihe Council instructed flic I )islncf AMomey's
Office to draft a resolution supporting Alternative 4.
Mr. Karl Hendrickson, Deputy District Attorney, stated a resolution has been
drafted endorsing Alternative 4 of the Utah Department of Transportation's Environmental
Impact Study regarding the reconstruction and realignment of 11400 South. The resolution
has been placed on the Council agenda for final approval and execution.
Council Member Jensen, seconded by Council Member Honuchi, moved to
forward the resolution to the 4:00 p.m Council meeting for formal consideration. The motion
passed unanimously.

Resolution and Interlocal Agreement
Mr. Alan Dayton, Deputy Mayor, explained the following interlocal
agreement. The resolution authorizing the execution of this agreement has been placed
on the Council aqenda for final approval and execulion:
1) Utah Department ot Public Safety regarding campaign to increase safety
restraint use.
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Council Member Jensen, seconded by Council Member Horiuchi, moved to
forward the agreement to the 4:00 p.m. Council meeting for formal consideration. The
motion passed unanimously.

Review of Property Tax Committee Recommendations
Ms. JodiAnn Martin, Chair, Property Tax Committee, reviewed the
recommendations of the Property Tax Committee regarding requests of taxpayers for
consideration of tax-related matters. These recommendations have been p l a c e d on the
Council a g e n d a for final approval.
Council Member Jensen, seconded by Council Member Horiuchi, moved to
forward the recommendations to the 4:00 p.m. Council agenda for formal consideration.
The motion passed unanimously.

Mr. Alan Dayton, Deputy Mayor, explained that the Zoo, Arts & Parks Tier I
Advisory Board has r e c o m m e n d e d that the following organizations receive funding under
the Tier I Zoo, Arts & Parks Program for 2004. The recommendations have been p l a c e d on
the Council a g e n d a for final approval. (The agreements with these organizations will be
signed a n d executed by the Mayor):
Ballet West
Children's Dance Theater
Friends of Tracy Aviary
Gina Bachauer
Grand Theater
Red Butte Garden
Ririe-Woodbury
Dance
Salt Lake Acting
Company
Salt Lake Art Center
Salt Lake City Arts Council
Sundance Institute
Tree Utah
Utah Humanities Council
Utah Museum of Fine Arts
Utah Museum of Nat His
Utah Symphony & Opera
The Advisory Board has also r e c o m m e n d e d that the following organizations
receive funding under the Tier I Zoo, Arts & Parks Program for 2004, subject to a financial
health plan being submitted a n d a c c e p t e d by the staff a n d Advisory Board.
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Children's Mubt
First Night
Hale Center Theater
Pianeer Theater
Repertory Dance Theater
This is the Place Foundation
Utah Arts Festival
Odyssey Dance
Utah Heritage
Foundation
Council Member Jensen, seconded by Council Member Horiuchi, moved to
forward the recommendations to the 4:00 p.m. Council meeting for formal consideration.
The motion passed unanimously.

Other Business
Acceptance

of Minutes

Council Member Jensen, seconded by Council Member Horiuchi, moved to
accept the April 20, 2004, minutes. The motion passed unanimously.

The meeting was adjourned at 2:30 p .m.

Chair, Committee of the Whole

Deputy Clerk
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11/06/79 MERRILL BLANKENSHIP v. MINTON CHEVROLET
[1]

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

[2]

Nos. 14559, 14435, 14394

[3]

1979.WV.33 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 266 S.E.2d 902, 164 W.Va. 446

[4]

November 6, 1979

[5]

MERRILL BLANKENSHIP
v.
MINTON CHEVROLET, INC., ET AL.; THOMAS L. ANDERSON, AND JAMES A.
LIOTTA, ADIVTR., ETC V. M. C. MORAN; DONALD SHAFFER, ETC. V. J. O.
MARKO, ETC., ET AL. AND RICHARD S. STEPHENSON

[6]

Appeals from decisions of the Circuit Court, Logan County, Harvey Oakley, Judge, the
Circuit Court, Marion County, Fred L. Fox, II, Judge, and a writ of error from Circuit
Court, Monongalia County, Frank J. DePond, Judge, were consolidated for decision.

[7]

Charles R. Garten, Jr., Daniel F. Hedges, for Blankenship.

[8]

Eric H. O'Briant, Valentine, Wilson & Partain, for Minton Chevrolet, et al.

[9]

J. Scott Tharp, James A. Liotta, for Anderson, et al.

[10]

Rose, Southern & Padden, Herschel Rose, Duane Southern, Philip C. Petty, for Moran.

[11]

Richard S. Stephenson, pro se.

[12]

No appearance by Shaffer.

[13]

Neely, Justice.

[14]

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Neely
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09/28/92 STATE TENNESSEE v. CI IES7 ER B AR R El T
[1]

SUPREME COURT OF 1 ENNESSEE, \I N ^ SI l\ 'II I ,E

[2]
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[3]

1992.TN.1728 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 840 S.W.2d 895

[4]

September 28, 1992

[5]

STATE Of TENNESSEE, BY AND THROUGH THE TOV
CARTHAGE, TENNESSEE, PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT,
Y

CHESTER B A R R E T T , DEFENDANT/APPELLEE.

[6]

CIRCUIT COURT. SMITH COUNTY. HON. BOBBY CAPERS, JUDGE.

[7]

For Appellant:'David Bass, Bass And Bass, Carthage, Tennessee

X|

Foi Appellee : Jacky 0 Bellai , Cai tl lage, I ennessee.

[9]

Anderson, Reid, Drowota, OfBrien, Daughtrey.

[10]

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Anderson
ANDERSON, J.

[12]

The sole issue raised in this direct appeal is whether municipal or "corporation" courts may
constitutionally exercise concurrent jurisdiction over state criminal offenses committed
within the municipality's boundaries. The Smith County Circuit Court held that the
legislation (Term. Code Ann. § 6-2-403) granting such concurrent jurisdiction to the
Municipal Court of the Town of South Carthage violates the separation of powers
provisions of the Tennessee Constitution. We agree and affirm,

[13]

BACKGROUND

114]

The parties have stipulated the following factual and procedural background:
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05/23/88 JERRY H. SUMMERS v. MAYOR ROBERT L.
[1]

SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

[2]

No. 229

[3]

1988.TN.772 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 764 S.W.2d 182

[4]

May 23, 1988

[5]

JERRY H. SUMMERS, PETITIONER-APPELLEE,
v.
MAYOR ROBERT L. THOMPSON, ET AL., RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS

[6]

HAMILTON CHANCERY, Hon. R. Vann Owens, Chancellor.

[7]

Petition for Rehearing Overruled July 18,1988

[8]

Jacqueline E. Schulten, Soddy-Daisy City Attorney, Chattanooga, Tennessee, W. J. Michael
Cody, Attorney General and Reporter, Kevin Steiling, Assistant Attorney General,
Nashville, Tennessee for Appellants.

[9]

Jerry H. Summers, Chattanooga, Tennessee, Jack R. Brown, Chattanooga, Tennessee for
Appellee.

[10]

Deborah S. Swettenam, Tennessee Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Dickson,
Tennessee, J. Anthony Farmer, Tennessee Trial Lawyers' Association, Knoxville,
Tennessee for Amicus Curiae.

[11]

Frank F. Drowota, III, Justice, Harbison, C.j., Fones, Cooper and O'Brien, JJ., Concur.

[12]

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Drowota

[13]

FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, Justice.

[14]

This direct appeal raises a significant issue of Tennessee constitutional law, that is, whether
certain statutes permitting a municipal Judge to be terminated at will are valid. The
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Calligy v. Mayor and Council of City of Hoboken, 284 N.J.Super. 365, 665 A.2d 408(N.J.Super.Law
Div. 06/23/1995)
[1]

New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division

[2]

DOCKET NO. HUD-L-2005-95

[3]

284 N.J.Super. 365, 665 A.2d 408, 1995.NJ.4 <http://www.versuslaw.com>

[4]

June 23, 1995

[5]

THOMAS P. CALLIGY, PLAINTIFF,
v.
THE MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF HOBOKEN, DEFENDANT.

[6]

Thomas P. Calligy, Attorney, Pro Se.

[7]

David F. Corrigan for defendant (Murray, Murray & Corrigan, attorneys).

[8]

Dfitalia,A.j.s.c.

[9]

The opinion of the court was delivered by: D'italia

[10]

D'ITALIA, AJ.S.C.

[11]

This is a taxpayer action challenging an ordinance of the City of Hoboken that creates the
offices of municipal court Judge and additional municipal court Judge "in the Department
of Administration" of City government. Plaintiff argues that the assignment of the
municipal court to a department of municipal government, a practice which has existed in
Hoboken under various ordinances since at least 1959, violates the separation of powers
doctrine. This matter is before the court on cross-motions for summary judgment.

[12]

The amended sections of the Hoboken Code about which complaint is made provide in
pertinent part: *fnl

[13]

Sec.4-22. Municipal Court Judge.
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Bernat v. Allphin, 106 P.3d 707,2005 UT 1 (Utah 01/07/2005)
[1]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

[2]

No. 20030567

[3]

106 P.3d 707,2005 UT 1, 516 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 2005.UT.0000009<
http://www.versuslaw.com>

[4]

January 7, 2005

[5]

SEAN BERNAT, LESA BEUCHERT, JEREMY KEE, BRANDON KVENVOLD,
DONALD LANG, DARRIN MANN, MATTHEW PHILLIPS, JOSEPH SCOVELL,
DYLAN T. SERRE, MARK WAHLSTROM, AND HENRY T. ZAHKARIAN,
PLAINTIFFS AND PETITIONERS,
v.
THE HONORABLE MICHAEL G. ALLPHIN, THE HONORABLE ANN BOYDEN,
THE HONORABLE MICHAEL K. BURTON, THE HONORABLE GLEN R.
DAWSON, THE HONORABLE DONALD J. EYRE, THE HONORABLE DENISE P.
LINDBERG, THE HONORABLE BRUCE C. LUBECK, DEFENDANTS AND
RESPONDENTS.

[6]

Attorneys:

[7]

Benjamin A. Hamilton, Salt Lake City, for petitioners.

[8]

Brent M. Johnson, Salt Lake City, for respondents.

[9]

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Durrant, Justice

[10]

Original Proceeding in the Utah Court of Appeals

[11]

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

[12]

^[1 Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of Utah's two-tier justice court system, arguing
that this system violates the prohibition against double jeopardy and denies defendants due
process and equal protection under the law. They assert that, in light of these alleged
violations, the court of appeals abused its discretion when it refused to issue writs of
mandamus directing various district courts to dismiss the charges against Petitioners. We
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[1]

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

[2]

No. 87-1437

[3]

109 S. Ct. 1289, 489 U.S. 538,103 L. Ed. 2d 550, 57 U.S.L.W. 4314, 1989.SCT.41329
<http://www.versuslaw.com>

[4]

decided: March 6, 1989.

[5]

BLANTON ET AL
v.
CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS, NEVADA

[6]

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA.

[7]

John J. Graves, Jr., argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was John G.
Watkins.

[8]

Mark L. Zalaoras argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Roy A.
Woofter.^"

[9]

Marshall, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

[10]

Author: Marshall

[ 489 U.S. Page 539]
[11]

JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

[12]

The issue in this case is whether there is a constitutional right to a trial by jury for persons
charged under Nevada law with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). Nev. Rev.
Stat. ? 484.379(1) (1987). We hold that there is not.

[13]

DUI is punishable by a minimum term of two days' imprisonment and a maximum term of
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Justice Court Appeals: The Good, the Bad, and the Unintended
by Sam Newton
Your client has been charged with a criminal misdemeanor which is being heard in a justice court.
What a lucky draw, right? The client gets two bites at the apple. He can run motions, and then he
can try the case. If he wins, then he is done. But if he loses, then he has the option to appeal the case
to District Court, wipe the slate clean, and start everything from scratch. What could be better? The
Utah Court of Appeals agrees. In Lucero v. Kennard, 2004 UT App 94, the defendant wanted
review of a justice court decision, and he did it by filing an extraordinary writ.l The Court of
Appeals disagreed with defendant's decision to pursue a writ: "A trial de novo would have remedied
any constitutional violations Petitioner may have suffered in the Justice Court." Lucero, 2004 UT
App 94, 113. But is this statement true? Is the trial de novo the complete "fix-all"? Is it possible that
pursuing a trial de novo may actually create problems for a defendant?

Everything is Not So Rosy
In Shakespeare's Measure for Measure one character laments: "O, what may man within him hide.
Though angel on the outward side!"2 The trial de novo process seems to be a perfect fix to most any
problems which would occur injustice court. What could be better than a fresh start? But we may
not consider (or realize) that pursuing a trial de novo may be unintentionally complicated or may
bring unintended consequences.
I. No or Limited Review of Justice Court Judges1 Legal Rulings
Supreme Court Justice William Brennan once said, "there are few, if any situations in our system of
justice in which a single judge is given unreviewable discretion over matters concerning a
personOOs liberty or property . . . ."3 Because de novo review results in a case simply starting over
as though it was never heard, the justice court judges are almost completely insulated from true
appellate review. They have the power to make legal conclusions and to impose criminal sanctions

which impact defendants1 most fundamental constitutional rights. Yet the trial de novo remains the
only procedure in place in Utah law to remedy any justice court problem. While the trial de novo
gives our clients a fresh start, the justice court judge's legal rulings or sentence remain unchecked.
Outside of the United States Supreme Court, the justice courts are the only other body in this
jurisdiction to have virtually no appellate review. Of course the trial de novo most often fixes or
eliminates a poor justice court decision. But what is alarming is that in a system which thrives on
the ability of higher courts to check the abuses of lower courts, the decisions of justice court judges
cannot be checked or called into question. Sure, justice court sentences and convictions no longer
stand when one successfully pursues a trial de novo, but the higher court is not able to tell a lower
court that a particular process or practice is unconstitutional. The procedure lacks a mechanism to
review a judicial officer's exercise of discretion. This essentially gives justice court judges free rein they know that their specific rulings cannot be reviewed or their abuses of discretion called into
question.
Interestingly, the Utah Code gives the prosecution an opportunity to have the district court review a
justice court decision. If the justice court dismisses a case, invalidates a statute or ordinance,
excludes evidence, or grants a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, then the prosecution is entitled to a
hearing de novo in district court on that issue.4 No such provision exists for the defendant. This is
arguably because she has a better right: she can start the whole proceeding over and run all of her
motions or arguments again in the district court. But the problem remains: a defendant lacks a
procedural mechanism to ask a higher court to review a justice court decision.
Let's assume the worst. What if a justice court decided to illegally detain a defendant? Or what if
that court refused to afford people their constitutional trial rights? What are defendants' remedies?
They must plead guilty and appeal. Or they must go to trial and then appeal. Neither of these options
fixes the problem that occurred below, and neither option slaps the justice court on the wrist. That
court may engage in repetitively unconstitutional practices, yet Utah law lacks a mechanism which
tells that court that it is in the wrong.
Some may assume that the extraordinary writ may keep a justice court in check. The writ may be
used when a court "has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion."5 Yet before one may
pursue the extraordinary writ there must be "no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy"
available.6 But in the current state of the law, it appears that the availability of the writ may be
questionable. The Court of Appeals in Lucero v. Kennard. 2004 UT App 94, held that a defendant
who pursued an extraordinary writ should have pursued the trial de novo, even though that
defendant was not represented by counsel in the justice court.
The problem is fundamental. The extraordinary writ may be the only way a defendant has to check a
justice court judge's abuse of discretion. And while the appellate courts have reviewed justice court
writs in the past,7 Lucero illustrates that the appellate courts have become more reticent about using
the writ as a method of review. They seem to prefer use of the trial de novo. The writ still seems to
be an option that is out there, but there are no guarantees that the appellate courts will accept one.
Interestingly, the vast majority of persons encounter the criminal justice system through the justice

courts. People think that because the justice courts only handle class B and C misdemeanors, they
can only do limited damage to peoples' liberties. But recently the justice court sentencing practices
have been coming under fire. That is, even though the justice courts lack the ability to punish
severely, they make up for it in their more-frequent use of punitive measures. 8 This issue has
become increasingly political with the release of a study commissioned by the Criminal Justice
Advisory Counsel (CJAC) this last May. Because of massive overcrowding at the Salt Lake County
Jail, the CJAC study made some rather drastic recommendations regarding the justice courts.
Among others, the study recommended that the jail should discontinue accepting class B and C
misdemeanants, that justice court judges should be given a limited number of beds at the jail based
on their jurisdiction's population, and that defense attorneys should "adopt a policy of routinely
appealing all justice court convictions that result in excessive or disproportionate sentences,
especially when the sentence is in lieu of payment of a fine .. ."9 Alan Kalmanoff, of the Institute
for Law and Policy Planning, and the consultant on the study, said that justice courts have been
overusing jail as a sanction: they have been incarcerating "those we're angry at," rather than "those
we're scared of." 10
Of course the majority of justice court judges act within their discretion and act to protect
defendants. But it is not necessarily the justice court judges as a whole who are the problem. The
problem is created by a system which allows judges to overstep the bounds of propriety. The
concern is not that these judges should lack the authority to incarcerate defendants. The concern is
that the current state of the law lacks a mechanism to check a justice court judge's abuse of that
power.
If our clients plan on pursuing a trial de novo, and if we wish to allege some sort of unconstitutional
error or practice in the justice court, we must realize that it may be extremely difficult to even get
the appellate courts to take a look at the issue.
II. Custody Status Pending Appeal
Not only does a defendant lack the means to get a justice court decision reviewed, but he may suffer
other collateral consequences by entering a plea or going to trial and then asking for a trial de novo.
Let's say that a person is arrested for simple assault on Friday. Under the law, he must be arraigned,
his bail must be set, and he must be given a court date within a few days. Now let's take an identical
defendant, but this time he enters a plea to simple assault in the justice court on Friday - and let's say
that he is taken into custody. He files his appeal that day. This same defendant may not get his case
heard in the district court, nor may he get his bail set for periods of up to twenty days or more. How
can this defendant make sure that the justice court sentence is stayed or that the district court hears
his case within a reasonably prompt period of time?
According to Rule 38 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, once a defendant has filed a notice of
appeal and the justice court has issued a certificate of probable cause, the judgment of the justice
court is stayed. 11 Yet interestingly, the rule states that once a defendant has filed a notice, then the
district court must issue all further orders governing the case (with the exception of the certificate of
probable cause) and must "conduct anew the proceedings." 12 But what happens with these
defendants who are either in custody, or who are taken into custody, when the justice court enters its

sentence? Are they instantly released from jail upon counsel's filing for the trial de novo? Is the
justice court sentence automatically stayed?
These are unanswered questions. 13 According to Rule 38, in order to obtain a stay of the justice
court sentence, two requirements must be met: 1) the defendant must file a notice of appeal, and 2)
the justice court judge must issue a certificate of probable cause. 14 This matter starts to get
complicated when one looks at the standard for obtaining a certificate of probable cause, which is
found in Rule 27. According to Rule 27, in order to obtain the certificate, the judge must make two
findings: 1) the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay; and 2) the appeal "raises substantial issues
of law or fact reasonably likely to result in reversal.. ."15 Add one more rule to the sticky pot: if
the defendant is in custody or sentenced to jail, the judge must determine by clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant is not likely to flee and that he does not pose a danger to the community
if he were to be released. 16
Now here's where it really gets messy. Utah Code Ann, an 78-5-120 contains the trial de novo
standard, and is completely clear: "In a criminal case, a defendant is entitled to a trial de novo in the
district court" when a notice of appeal is filed within thirty days of either 1) sentencing after a trial
or a plea of guilty, or 2) after a plea held in abeyance. 17 Here is the problem: a defendant has an
automatic right to a trial de novo. She doesn't have to make a showing. She doesn't have a burden.
She files her notice on time and the statute automatically gives her a new trial.
But what is the justice court judge supposed to do with the issuance of the certificate of probable
cause? The rules clearly require one to issue. Additionally, they require the justice court judge to
make findings regarding whether the defendant raises a good question of law or whether the appeal
is just a delay tactic. But she gets her new trial automatically, so arguably, the certificate should also
issue as a matter of course.
Not all justice court judges agree. Some will automatically stay a sentence once a notice of appeal is
received. Others want to go through the formalities of the certificate of probable cause - and it is not
uncommon for a justice court judge to deny a stay based on some of the prongs traditionally
required for issuing a certificate. 18
The Court of Appeals seems to have agreed with justice courts who have automatically issued the
stay. In a series of memorandum decisions, the Court held that defendants would not have to show a
likelihood that they will prevail on appeal: "A defendant appealing a justice court judgment is
entitled to a trial de novo without any demonstration of error in the justice court. In this context, we
agree it appears unnecessary to require a defendant to demonstrate that the 'appeal... raises
substantial issues of law or fact reasonably likely to result in a reversal. . . .'"19
Despite this pronouncement from the Court of Appeals, the rules still appear to be contradictory and it appears that these questions remain unresolved in the minds of many district and justice court
judges. When a defendant appeals, is her justice court sentence automatically stayed? Or does the
justice court retain the power to hold the defendant? At what point may the district court step in and
order a defendant's release or set an appropriate bail? As one can see, the questions are not answered
by the rules and as a result, some defendants may get caught in the middle.

Counsel must realize that if a client is sentenced to jail in the justice court and is taken into custody
(or the client is already in custody) that he or she may not get out of jail, nor may the justice court
sentence be stayed, until counsel can get a district court judge to act on the matter.
The problem is further complicated because the district courts may not generate a file until they
have received the file from the justice courts. In the event that the defendant is only being held on
the justice court sentence, it may leave counsel with the only option of filing an extraordinary writ in
order to have the district court hear the issue in the meantime. Some justice court judges think that
because the Rule gives them twenty days to transfer the file to the district court,20 that they can hold
a defendant in custody for the full twenty days before transferring the file. This attitude only
prolongs the amount of time our clients may sit in custody while we attempt to secure their release.
Securing our clients' release may be further complicated because different district court judges have
different procedural approaches. Some will sign an order which stays the justice court sentence as a
matter of course. Others want defense counsel to file a motion. Others want to wait until the district
court clerks have generated a file. Some want stipulations from both counsel. Some want a formal
denial from the justice court and an appeal of that denial. Others want counsel to use the
extraordinary writ. But what if the justice court sentences a defendant to twenty days jail and waits
the full twenty to transfer the file? Or what if that court refuses to transfer the file at all? Then
defense counsel must spend time at the district court to try to get a judge to act. We, as counsel
should not judge-shop. In the Third District Court in downtown Salt Lake City, there has been an
attempt to solve this problem. The District Court will generate a file upon defense counselOOs
promise that an appeal is "on its way." The file is created then assigned to the judge on rotation for
accepting new cases. Counsel can then file a motion with the newly-assigned judge and raise the
issue. Then that judge has a case, and can begin making rulings on the matter.
It can be extraordinarily complicated to try to secure a defendant's release from custody, or to get a
stay of the justice court sentence, pending one's appeal. Hopefully the rule can be clarified in the
future to make appropriate resolution of some of these procedural problems.
III. Remand Without Notice
Another problem arises when our clients fail to appear at the initial stage of the trial de novo appeal.
According to Rule 38, the district court may dismiss the appeal and remand the case back to the
justice court if the defendant fails to appear or "fails to take steps necessary to prosecute the
appeal."21 While this may be helpful in practice, it may not be entirely fair to a defendant.
When counsel asks for a trial de novo, the justice court has the responsibility to transfer the file to
the district court. The district court, in turn, will generate its own file and set a new court date. The
problem is that defendants may not get notice of the new court date. This may be because the district
court does not look for the defendant's address in the justice court file, or perhaps it is because the
justice court does not put the defendant's address in its file. Of course, it can always be that the
defendant has chosen, for whatever reason, not to appear. Whatever the problem may be, the fact
remains that defendants often do not receive notice from the district court of their new date. As a
result, they may not appear. Because of their failure to appear the district court dismisses the appeal
and remands the case.

If we as counsel are planning to pursue a trial de novo, we must take great care to inform our clients
of new court dates. Perhaps to avoid this problem, we should also advise our clients to call the
district court and/or our offices periodically to find out the new date. That way we avoid the
potential problem of losing our appeal for something that is not our client's fault.
IV. Loss of Privileges
The last complication of a justice court appeal is that a plea of guilty or a finding of guilt at trial
followed by an appeal may subject a defendant to a number of collateral consequences. First, on
drug, DUI, and reckless driving cases, the Driver License Division will most likely pull a
defendantOOs license upon receipt of the conviction.22 It does not matter to the Division that the
defendant's conviction is actually wiped clean and that the process starts over with the filing of a
notice of appeal injustice court. The Division treats the justice court plea or finding of guilt as a
conviction and pulls the license. The problem is that the Driver License Division does not get notice
of the trial de novo from the justice court. It's a classic situation of the left hand not knowing what
the right hand is doing.
There are additional collateral consequences: defendants may lose their funding for student loans.23
They may be subject to deportation or suffer other immigration consequences.24 If the defendant is
in the military, it is likely that he or she will not be able to bear arms because of the conviction.25
Counsel may not have considered that by entering a plea, her client may lose a significant number of
privileges. Other independent agencies and/or government entities may take actions against the
defendant, merely because he has entered a plea and a "conviction" has been entered. As of yet,
there is no solution. The statute requires that there be a finding or verdict of guilt before a defendant
may pursue the appeal.26 What other agencies will do with that finding of guilt is slightly up in the
air. Practically speaking, they may do nothing. But the risk is there, and the fact remains that these
agencies have been known to act following a guilty plea or such a finding.
Conclusion
There is no question that the justice courts serve a wonderful purpose. They alleviate the rather
stressful burden of the district courts by taking jurisdiction over the class B and class C
misdemeanors. Additionally, clients who are charged injustice court usually get two chances to
have their cases heard. The benefits to these defendants are outstanding and crucial. But we must be
aware that several complications may arise from trying to move the case from justice court to the
district court. Outside of the extraordinary writ, justice court judges remain insulated from any sort
of judicial review of the legal conclusions made in favor of the prosecution. Defendants may have
great difficulty securing a stay of a justice court sentence pending the trial de novo. Defendants may
not obtain notice of their new court dates. Finally, criminal defendants may lose a significant
number of privileges merely because they have entered a plea or because they have been found
guilty.
If we are aware of these consequences, then we can adequately advise our clients in pursuing their
appeals in district court.
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APPENDIX FFF
Objection to the Oral Order of the Court and to the Judgement of Conviction

A.W.Lauritzen(1906J
15 East 600 North #1
P.O.Box 171
Logan, UT 84321
435-753-3391
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

OBJECTION TO ORAL VERDICT,
JUDGEMENT AND SENTENCE

JERALD RIO DAVIS,
Defendant.

Case No. 071100143 MO
Judge Clint S. Judkins

COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through is Attorney of record, with this his
Objection to the ruling from the bench, Judgment and Sentence as entered on the 19th day of
September, 2007 in that the Judge's Order imposed the maximum sentence and in that, the
Defendant was convicted of an infraction with the ordinance prescribing the maximum fine of
Fifty Dollars ($50.00). No jail time may be imposed upon conviction of the infraction under
either municipal or state law and in that Defendant has suffered the maximum penalty, no
probation or further sanction may be imposed should the fine be paid as required by the Court in
its written Judgement.
Dated the g>7Iay~of October, 2007.

^ . w . Lauritzen

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, OBJECTION TO
ORAL VERDICT, JUDGEMENT AND SENTENCE, postage prepaid, to the following listed
below on the i""3ay of Sgpgff&er, 2007.

jfYLoaKcxj^
Jonathan E. Jenkins, Esq.
108 North Main
Logan, UT 84321

2

(hudJ^UAj/i^cy^

United States Constitution
14th Amendment

*

Amendment 14 - Citizenship Rights. Ratified 7/9/1868. Note History
1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers,
counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to
vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the
Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age,
and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and VicePresident, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having
previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member
of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of
the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or
comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.
4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for
payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be
questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or
emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.
5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
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Article I, Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.]
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their lives and liberties;
to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship according to the dictates of their
consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress of
grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse
of that right.
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Article I, Section 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
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Article V, Section 1. [Three departments of government]
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct
departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with the
exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any
functions appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or
permitted.
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Article VIII, Section 1. [Judicial powers -- Courts.]
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a Supreme Court, in a trial court of general
jurisdiction known as the district court, and in such other courts as the Legislature by statute
may establish. The Supreme Court, the district court, and such other courts designated by
statute shall be courts of record. Courts not of record shall also be established by statute.
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Article VIII, Section 4. [Rulemaking power of Supreme Court -- Judges pro tempore - Regulation of practice of law.]
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used in the courts of
the state and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The Legislature may amend the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote of two-thirds of
all members of both houses of the Legislature. Except as otherwise provided by this
constitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize retired justices and judges and judges
pro tempore to perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the United
States, Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah. The Supreme Court by rule shall
govern the practice of law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and discipline
of persons admitted to practice law.
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Article XI, Section 5. [Cities and towns not to be created by special laws Legislature to provide for the incorporation, organization, dissolution, and classification
of cities and towns -- Charter cities.]
The Legislature may not create cities or towns by special laws.
The Legislature by statute shall provide for the incorporation, organization, and dissolution
of cities and towns and for their classification in proportion to population. Any incorporated city
or town may frame and adopt a charter for its own government in the following manner:
The legislative authority of the city may, by two-thirds vote of its members, and upon
petition of qualified electors to the number of fifteen per cent of all votes cast at the next
preceding election for the office of the mayor, shall forthwith provide by ordinance for the
submission to the electors of the question: "Shall a commission be chosen to frame a charter?"
The ordinance shall require that the question be submitted to the electors at the next regular
municipal election. The ballot containing such question shall also contain the names of
candidates for members of the proposed commission, but without party designation. Such
candidates shall be nominated in the same manner as required by law for nomination of city
officers. If a majority of the electors voting on the question of choosing a commission shall vote
in the affirmative, then the fifteen candidates receiving a majority of the votes cast at such
election, shall constitute the charter commission, and shall proceed to frame a charter.
Any charter so framed shall be submitted to the qualified electors of the city at an election
to be held at a time to be determined by the charter commission, which shall be not less than
sixty days subsequent to its completion and distribution among the electors and not more than
one year from such date. Alternative provisions may also be submitted to be voted upon
separately. The commission shall make provisions for the distribution of copies of the
proposed charter and of any alternative provisions to the qualified electors of the city, not less
than sixty days before the election at which it is voted upon. Such proposed charter and such
alternative provisions as are approved by a majority of the electors voting thereon, shall
become an organic law of such city at such time as may be fixed therein, and shall supersede
any existing charter and all laws affecting the organization and government of such city which
are now in conflict therewith. Within thirty days after its approval a copy of such charter as
adopted, certified by the mayor and city recorder and authenticated by the seal of such city,
shall be made in duplicate and deposited, one in the office of the secretary of State and the
other in the office of the city recorder, and thereafter all courts shall take judicial notice of such
charter.
Amendments to any such charter may be framed and submitted by a charter commission in
the same manner as provided for making of charters, or may be proposed by the legislative
authority of the city upon a two-thirds vote thereof, or by petition of qualified electors to a
number equal to fifteen per cent of the total votes cast for mayor on the next preceding
election, and any such amendment may be submitted at the next regular municipal election,
and having been approved by the majority of the electors voting thereon, shall become part of
the charter at the time fixed in such amendment and shall be certified and filed as provided in
case of charters.
Each city forming its charter under this section shall have, and is hereby granted, the
authority to exercise all powers relating to municipal affairs, and to adopt and enforce within its
limits, local police, sanitary and similar regulations not in conflict with the general law, and no
enumeration of powers in this constitution or any law shall be deemed to limit or restrict the
general grant of authority hereby conferred; but this grant of authority shall not include the
power

to regulate public utilities, not municipally owned, if any such regulation of public utilities is
provided for by general law, nor be deemed to limit or restrict the power of the Legislature in
matters relating to State affairs, to enact general laws applicable alike to all cities of the State.
The power to be conferred upon the cities by this section shall include the following:
(a) To levy, assess and collect taxes and borrow money, within the limits prescribed by
general law, and to levy and collect special assessments for benefits conferred.
(b) To furnish all local public services, to purchase, hire, construct, own, maintain and
operate, or lease, public utilities local in extent and use; to acquire by condemnation, or
otherwise, within or without the corporate limits, property necessary for any such purposes,
subject to restrictions imposed by general law for the protection of other communities; and to
grant local public utility franchises and within its powers regulate the exercise thereof.
(c) To make local public improvements and to acquire by condemnation, or otherwise,
property within its corporate limits necessary for such improvements; and also to acquire an
excess over than [that] needed for any such improvement and to sell or lease such excess
property with restrictions, in order to protect and preserve the improvement.
(d) To issue and sell bonds on the security of any such excess property, or of any public
utility owned by the city, or of the revenues thereof, or both, including, in the case of public
utility, a franchise stating the terms upon which, in case of foreclosure, the purchaser may
operate such utility.
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this state shall extend to any other land and territory now acquired, or t h a t may
hereafter be acquired, by compact or agreement with other states, or otherwise,
although such land and territory are not included within the boundaries herein
before designated.
S e c t i o n 32. That the erection of safe prisons, the inspection of prisons, and
the humane treatment of prisoners, shall be provided for.
S e c t i o n 3 3 . That slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment
for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, are forever prohibited
in this state.
S e c t i o n 34. The General Assembly shall make no law recognizing the right
of property in man.
S e c t i o n 35. To preserve and protect the rights of victims of crime to justice
and due process, victims shall be entitled to the following basic rights:
S e c t i o n 35a. The right to confer with the prosecution.
S e c t i o n 35b. The right to be free from intimidation, harassment and abuse
throughout the criminal justice system.
S e c t i o n 35c The right to be present at all proceedings where the defendant
has the right to be present.
S e c t i o n 35d. The right to be heard, when relevant, at all critical stages
of the criminal justice process as defined by the General Assembly.
S e c t i o n 35e. The right to be informed of all proceedings, and of the release,
transfer or escape of the accused or convicted person.
S e c t i o n 35f. The right to a speedy trial or disposition and a prompt and
final conclusion of the case after the conviction or sentence.
S e c t i o n 35g. The right to restitution from the offender.
S e c t i o n 35h. The right to be informed of each of the rights established
for victims.
The General Assembly has the authority to enact substantive and procedural
laws to define, implement, preserve and protect the rights guaranteed to victims
by this section.
A R T I C L E II.
Distribution of Powers.
S e c t i o n 1. The powers of the government shall be divided into three distinct
departments: legislative, executive, and judicial.
S e c t i o n 2. No person or persons belonging to one of these departments shall
exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others, except in
the cases herein directed or permitted.
Legislative

Department.

S e c t i o n 3. The legislative authority of this state shall be vested in a General
Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives, both
dependent on the people. Representatives shall hold office for two years and senators for four years from the day of the general election, except t h a t the speaker
of the Senate and the speaker of the House of Representatives each shall hold
his office as speaker for two years or until his successor is elected and qualified
provided however, that in the first general election after adoption of this amendment senators elected in districts designated by even numbers shall be elected
for four years and those elected in districts designated by odd numbers shall be
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and the items or parts of items disapproved or reduced shall be void to the extent that they have been disapproved or reduced unless repassed as hereinafter
provided. The governor, within ten calendar days (Sundays excepted) after the
bill shall have been presented to him, shall report the items or parts of items
disapproved or reduced with his objections in writing to the House in which the
bill originated, or if the General Assembly shall have adjourned, to the office of
the secretary of state. Any such items or parts of items so disapproved or reduced
shall be restored to the bill in the original amount and become law if repassed by
the General Assembly according to the rules and limitations prescribed for the
passage of other bills over the executive veto.
ARTICLE IV.
Elections.
Section 1. Every person, being eighteen years of age, being a citizen of the
United States, being a resident of the state for a period of time as prescribed by
the General Assembly, and being duly registered in the county of residence for
a period of time prior to the day of any election as prescribed by the General Assembly, shall be entitled to vote in all federal, state, and local elections held in
the county or district in which such person resides. All such requirements shall
be equal and uniform across the state, and there shall be no other qualification
attached to the right of suffrage.
The General Assembly shall have power to enact laws requiring voters to vote
in the election precincts in which they may reside, and laws to secure the freedom
of elections and the purity of the ballot box.
All male citizens of this state shall be subject to the performance of military
duty, as may be prescribed by law.
S e c t i o n 2. Laws may be passed excluding from the right of suffrage persons
who may be convicted of infamous crimes.
Section 3. Electors shall, in all cases, except treason, felony, or breach of the
peace, be privileged from arrest or summons, during their attendance at elections
and in going to and returning from them.
S e c t i o n 4. In all elections to be made by the General Assembly, the members
thereof shall vote viva voce, and their votes shall be entered on the journal. All
other elections shall be by ballot.
ARTICLE V.
Impeachments.
Section 1. The House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment.
S e c t i o n 2. All impeachments shall be tried by the Senate. When sitting for
that purpose the senators shall be upon oath or affirmation, and the chief justice
of the Supreme Court, or if he be on trial, the senior associate judge, shall preside
over them. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of
the senators sworn to try the officer impeached.
Section 3. The House of Representatives shall elect from their own body three
members, whose duty it shall be to prosecute impeachments. No impeachment
shall be tried until the Legislature shall have adjourned sine die, when the Senate shall proceed to try such impeachment.
S e c t i o n 4. The governor, judges of the Supreme Court, judges of the inferior
courts, chancellors, attorneys for the state, treasurer, comptroller, and secretary
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of state, shall be liable to impeachment, whenever they may, in the opinion of the
House of Representatives, commit any crime in their official capacity which may
require disqualification but judgment shall only extend to removal from office,
and disqualification to fill any office thereafter. The party shall, nevertheless, be
liable to indictment, trial, judgment and punishment according to law. The Legislature now has, and shall continue to have, power to relieve from the penalties
imposed, any person disqualified from holding office by the judgment of a Court of
Impeachment.
Section 5. Justices of the peace, and other civil officers not herein before
mentioned, for crimes or misdemeanors in office, shall be liable to indictment in
such courts as the Legislature may direct; and upon conviction, shall be removed
from office by said court, as if found guilty on impeachment; and shall be subject
to such other punishment as may be prescribed by law.
ARTICLE VI.
Judicial
Department.
Section 1. The judicial power of this state shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such Circuit, Chancery and other Inferior Courts as the Legislature shall
from time to time, ordain and establish; in the judges thereof, and in justices of
the peace. The Legislature may also vest such jurisdiction in Corporation Courts
as may be deemed necessary. Courts to be holden by justices of the peace may
also be established.
Section 2. The Supreme Court shall consist of five judges, of whom not more
t h a n two shall reside in any one of the grand divisions of the state. The judges
shall designate one of their own number who shall preside as chief justice. The
concurrence of three of the judges shall in every case be necessary to a decision.
The jurisdiction of this court shall be appellate only, under such restrictions and
regulations as may from time to time be prescribed by law; but it may possess
such other jurisdiction as is now conferred by law on the present Supreme Court.
Said court shall be held at Knoxville, Nashville and Jackson.
Section 3. The judges of the Supreme Court shall be elected by the qualified
voters of the state. The Legislature shall have power to prescribe such rules as
may be necessary to carry out the provisions of section two of this article. Every
judge of the Supreme Court shall be thirty-five years of age, and shall before his
election have been a resident of the state for five years. His term of service shall
be eight years.
Section 4. The Judges of the Circuit and Chancery Courts, and of other Inferior Courts, shall be elected by the qualified voters of the district or circuit to
which they are to be assigned. Every judge of such courts shall be thirty years of
age, and shall before his election, have been a resident of the state for five years,
and of the circuit or district one year. His term of service shall be eight years.
Section 5. An attorney general and reporter for the state, shall be appointed
by the judges of the Supreme Court and shall hold his office for a term of eight
years. An attorney for the state for any circuit or district, for which a judge having criminal jurisdiction shall be provided by law, shall be elected by the qualified voters of such circuit or district, and shall hold his office for a term of eight
years, and shall have been a resident of the state five years, and of the circuit or
district one year. In all cases where the attorney for any district fails or refuses
to attend and prosecute according to law, the court shall have power to appoint
an attorney pro tempore.
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10-3-703. Criminal penalties for violation of ordinance -- Civil penalties prohibited Exceptions.
(1) The governing body of each municipality may impose a minimum criminal penalty for the
violation of any municipal ordinance by a fine not to exceed the maximum class B
misdemeanor fine under Section 76-3-301 or by a term of imprisonment up to six months, or
by both the fine and term of imprisonment.
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(b), the governing body may prescribe a
minimum civil penalty for the violation of any municipal ordinance by a fine not to exceed the
maximum class B misdemeanor fine under Section 76-3-301.
(b) A municipality may not impose a civil penalty and adjudication for the violation of a
municipal moving traffic ordinance.
Amended by Chapter 156, 2003 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 10_03_070300.ZIP 1,928 Bytes
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10-8-6. Borrowing power -- Warrants and bonds.
They may borrow money on the credit of the corporation for corporate purposes in the
manner and to the extent allowed by the Constitution and the laws, and issue warrants and
bonds therefor in such amounts and forms and on such conditions as they shall determine.
No Change Since 1953
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10-8-60. Nuisances.
They may declare what shall be a nuisance, and abate the same, and impose fines upon
persons who may create, continue or suffer nuisances to exist.
No Change Since 1953
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10-8-84. Ordinances, rules, and regulations -- Passage -- Penalties.
(1) The municipal legislative body may pass all ordinances and rules, and make all
regulations, not repugnant to law, necessary for carrying into effect or discharging all powers
and duties conferred by this chapter, and as are necessary and proper to provide for the safety
and preserve the health, and promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace and good
order, comfort, and convenience of the city and its inhabitants, and for the protection of
property in the city.
(2) The municipal legislative body may enforce obedience to the ordinances with fines or
penalties in accordance with Section 10-3-703.
Amended by Chapter 323, 2000 General Session
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76-1-103. Application of code -- Offense prior to effective date.
(1) The provisions of this code shall govern the construction of, the punishment for, and
defenses against any offense defined in this code or, except where otherwise specifically
provided or the context otherwise requires, any offense defined outside this code; provided
such offense was committed after the effective date of this code.
(2) Any offense committed prior to the effective date of this code shall be governed by the
law, statutory and non-statutory, existing at the time of commission thereof, except that a
defense or limitation on punishment available under this code shall be available to any
defendant tried or retried after the effective date. An offense under the laws of this state shall
be deemed to have been committed prior to the effective date of this act if any of the elements
of the offense occurred prior thereto.
Enacted by Chapter 196, 1973 General Session
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76-1-104. Purposes and principles of construction.
The provisions of this code shall be construed in accordance with these general purposes.
(1) Forbid and prevent the commission of offenses.
(2) Define adequately the conduct and mental state which constitute each offense and
safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as criminal.
(3) Prescribe penalties which are proportionate to the seriousness of offenses and which
permit recognition or differences in rehabilitation possibilities among individual offenders.
(4) Prevent arbitrary or oppressive treatment of persons accused or convicted of offenses.
Enacted by Chapter 196,1973 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 76_01_010400.ZIP 1,836 Bytes
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76-3-301. Fines of persons.
(1) A person convicted of an offense may be sentenced to pay a fine, not exceeding:
(a) $10,000 for a felony conviction of the first degree or second degree;
(b) $5,000 for a felony conviction of the third degree;
(c) $2,500 for a class A misdemeanor conviction;
(d) $1,000 for a class B misdemeanor conviction;
(e) $750 for a class C misdemeanor conviction or infraction conviction; and
(f) any greater amounts specifically authorized by statute.
(2) This section does not apply to a corporation, association, partnership, government, or
governmental instrumentality.
Amended by Chapter 291, 1995 General Session
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76-10-801. "Nuisance" defined - Violation -- Classification of offense.
(1) A nuisance is any item, thing, manner, condition whatsoever that is dangerous to human
life or health or renders soil, air, water, or food impure or unwholesome.
(2) Any person, whether as owner, agent, or occupant who creates, aids in creating, or
contributes to a nuisance, or who supports, continues, or retains a nuisance, is guilty of a class
B misdemeanor.
Enacted by Chapter 196, 1973 General Session
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76-10-801. "Nuisance" defined -- Violation - Classification of offense.
(1) A nuisance is any item, thing, manner, condition whatsoever that is dangerous to human
life or health or renders soil, air, water, or food impure or unwholesome.
(2) Any person, whether as owner, agent, or occupant who creates, aids in creating, or
contributes to a nuisance, or who supports, continues, or retains a nuisance, is guilty of a class
B misdemeanor.
Enacted by Chapter 196, 1973 General Session
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Sections in this ChapterjChapters in this TitlejAII Titles|Legislative Home Page
Last revised: Thursday, May 01, 2008

Utah Code Annotated
§76-10-803

UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE

Home | Site Map | Calendar | Code/Constitution | House | Senate | Search

76-10-803. "Public nuisance" defined -- Agricultural operations.
(1) A public nuisance is a crime against the order and economy of the state and consists in
unlawfully doing any act or omitting to perform any duty, which act or omission:
(a) annoys, injures, or endangers the comfort, repose, health, or safety of three or more
persons;
(b) offends public decency;
(c) unlawfully interferes with, obstructs, or tends to obstruct, or renders dangerous for
passage, any lake, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park, square, street, or highway;
(d) is a nuisance as defined in Section 78B-6-1107; or
(e) in any way renders three or more persons insecure in life or the use of property.
(2) An act which affects three or more persons in any of the ways specified in this section is
still a nuisance regardless of the extent to which the annoyance or damage inflicted on
individuals is unequal.
(3) (a) Agricultural operations that are consistent with sound agricultural practices are
presumed to be reasonable and do not constitute a public nuisance under Subsection (1)
unless the agricultural operation has a substantial adverse effect on the public health and
safety.
(b) Agricultural operations undertaken in conformity with federal, state, and local laws and
regulations, including zoning ordinances, are presumed to be operating within sound
agricultural practices.
Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 76_10_080300.ZIP 2,436 Bytes
Sections in this ChapterjChapters in this TitlejAII Titles|Legislative Home Page
Last revised: Thursday, May 01, 2008

Utah Code Annotated
§77-18a-l (1953 As Amended)

UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE

Home | Site Map j Calendar | Code/Constitution | House | Senate | Search

77-18a-1. Appeals -- When proper.
(1) A defendant may, as a matter of right, appeal from:
(a) a final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea;
(b) an order made after judgment that affects the substantial rights of the defendant;
(c) an order adjudicating the defendant's competency to proceed further in a pending
prosecution; or
(d) an order denying bail, as provided in Subsection 77-20-1(7).
(2) In addition to any appeal permitted by Subsection (1), a defendant may seek
discretionary appellate review of any interlocutory order.
(3) The prosecution may, as a matter of right, appeal from:
(a) a final judgment of dismissal, including a dismissal of a felony information following a
refusal to bind the defendant over for trial;
(b) a pretrial order dismissing a charge on the ground that the court's suppression of
evidence has substantially impaired the prosecution's case;
(c) an order granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contested) an order arresting judgment or granting a motion for merger;
(e) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double jeopardy or denial of
a speedy trial;
(f) an order holding a statute or any part of it invalid;
(g) an order adjudicating the defendant's competency to proceed further in a pending
prosecution;
(h) an order finding, pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 19, Part 2, Competency for Execution,
that an inmate sentenced to death is incompetent to be executed;
(i) an order reducing the degree of offense pursuant to Section 76-3-402; or
(j) an illegal sentence.
(4) In addition to any appeal permitted by Subsection (3), the prosecution may seek
discretionary appellate review of any interlocutory order entered before jeopardy attaches.
Amended by Chapter 93, 2006 General Session
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Note 1
statewide, whether those rulings are constitutionally based or not; therefore, as Court of
Appeals adjudicates cases only in three-judge
panels, rulings of panel of Court of Appeals also

§ 78-2a-3.

apply statewide.
U.C.A. 1953, 78-2a-2(2).
Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 1995, 904
p.2d 677. Courts <&* 91(2); Courts <S> 248

Court of Appeals jurisdiction

(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and
to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to c a m ' into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service
Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands
Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources,
Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the
state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except
those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving
a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except
petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first
degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging
the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a
first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody,
support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has
original appellate jurisdiction.
26
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(8) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the district court has subject matter
jurisdiction in class B misdemeanors, class C misdemeanors, infractions, and
violations of ordinances only if:
(a) there is no justice court with territorial jurisdiction;
(b) the matter was properly filed in the circuit court prior to July 1, 1996;
(c) the offense occurred within the boundaries of the municipality in which
the district courthouse is located and that municipality has not formed a
justice court; or
(d) they are included in an indictment or information covering a single
criminal episode alleging the commission of a felony or a class A misdemeanor.
(9) The district court has jurisdiction of actions under Title 78, Chapter 3h,
Child Protective Orders, if the juvenile court transfers the case to the district
court.
Laws 1951, c. 58. § 1; Laws 1983, c. 75, § 2; Laws 1986, c. 47, § 50; Laws 1987, c.
161, § 305; Laws 1988, c. 248, § 10; Laws 1991, c. 268, § 23; Laws 1992, c. 290, § 8;
Laws 1993, c. 59. § 6; Laws 1996, c. 198, § 50, eff. July 1, 1996; Laws 1997, c. 216,
§ 2, eff. July 1, 1997; Laws 1998, c. 313, § 1, eff. July 1, 1998; Laws 2000, c. 323, § 11,
eff. March 16, 2000; Laws 2004, c. 201, § 2, eff. May 3, 2004.
Codification C. 1943. Supp., § 104-3-4.
Cross References
Concurrent jurisdiction with juvenile court, see § 78-3a-105.
District court jurisdiction, see Const. Art. 8, § 5.
Extraordinary writs, judicial code, see § 78-35-1 et seq.
Jurisdiction of district courts, see Const. Art. 8, § 5.
Library References
Administrative Law and Procedure <S=>663.
Attorney and Client <^36.
Courts ^ 1 5 6 , 176 5
Cnminal Law<S=>86, 93.
Infants <3=>196
Justices of the Peace <s=*141.
Municipal Corporations <s=>642.
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 106kl56;
231kl41; 106kl76.5; 45k36; 15Ak663;
268k642; 110k86; 110k93; 211kl96.

C.J.S. Attorney and Client §§ 59 to 60.
Criminal Law §§ 157 to 158.
C.J.S. Infants §§ 41, 53 to 54.
^,^
c ^
r i
C.J.S. Justices of the Peace 9 127.
C.J.S. Municipal Corporations §§ 204 to 205.
C.J.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedure § 186.

CJ.S.

Research References
ALR Library
89 A.L.R. 2nd 506, Age of Child at Time of
Alleged Offense or Delinquency, or at Time
of Legal Proceedings, as Criterion of Jurisdiction of Juvenile Court.

Treatises and Practice Aids
SF28 American Law Institute-American Bar
Association 93, White Coats and Blue Collars: Physician Collective Bargaining Legislation on the National and State Levels.

Notes of Decisions
In general 1
Administrative adjudications 21
Attorney discipline 20
Concurrent and conflicting jurisdiction

Consent of parties as to jurisdiction
Constitutional provisions 10
Counterclaims 16
Crimes and offenses, generally 11
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Cross References

Judicial Council Rules of Judicial Administration, see Jud. Admin., Rule 1-101 et seq.
Library References
Courts ®=>74, 78.
Westlaw Key Number
106k78.

§ 78-3-12.

§ 78-3-12.5.

C J . S . Courts §§ 7, 121, 124 to 126.
Searches:

106k74;

Repealed by Laws 1988, c. 152, § 26 and c. 248, § 50, eff. April
25,1988
Costs of system

(1) The cost of salaries, travel, and training required for the discharge of the
duties of district court judges, court commissioners, secretaries of judges or
court executives, court executives, and court reporters shall be paid from
appropriations made by the Legislature.
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (1), the Judicial Council may directly
provide for the actual and necessary expenses of operation of the district court,
including personnel salary and benefits, travel, training, facilities, security,
equipment, furniture, supplies, legal reference materials, and other operating
expenses, or may contract with the county in a county seat or with the unit of
local government in municipalities other than a county seat for the actual and
necessary expenses of the district court. Any necessary contract with the
county or unit of local government shall be pursuant to Subsection
78-3-13.4(4).
Laws 1988, c. 152, § 19; Laws 1991, c. 268, § 25; Laws 1996, c. 198, § 51, eff. July 1,
1996; Laws 1997, c. 10, § 139, eff. May 5, 1997.
Library References
Counties <3=>136.
Judges o=>22(3).
States <S» 129 to 134.
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 360k 129 to
360kl34; 227k22(3); 104kl36.

§ 78-3-13.

C J . S . Counties § 175.
C J . S . Judges §§ 75, 81.
C J . S . States §§ 226, 230 to 241.

Repealed by Laws 1988, c. 152, § 26; Laws 1988, c. 248, § 50,
eff. April 25, 1988

§ 7 8 - 3 - 1 3 . 4 . Transfer
StafF—Budget

of court

operating

responsibilities—Facilities—

(1) A county's determination to transfer responsibility for operation of the
district court to the state is irrevocable.
(2)(a) Court space suitable for the conduct of judicial business as specified by
the Judicial Council shall be provided by the state from appropriations made by
the Legislature for these purposes.
(b) The state may, in order to carry out its obligation to provide these
facilities, lease space from a county, or reimburse a county for the number of
40
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square feettused by the district. Any lease and reimbursement shall be
determined in accordance with the standards of the State Building Board
applicable to state agencies generally. A county or municipality terminating
a lease with the court shall provide written notice to the Judicial Council at
least one year prior to the effective date of the termination.
(c) District courts shall be located in municipalities that are sites for the
district court or circuit court as of January 1, 1994. Removal of the district
court from the municipality shall require prior legislative approval by joint
resolution.
(3) The state shall provide legal reference materials for all district judges'
chambers and courtrooms, as required by Judicial Council rule. Maintenance
of county law libraries shall be in consultation with the court executive of the
district court.
(4)(a) At the request of the Judicial Council, the county or municipality shall
provide staff for the district court in county seats or municipalities under
contract with the administrative office of the courts.
(b) Payment for necessary expenses shall be by a contract entered into
annually between the state and the county or municipality, which shall
specifically state the agreed costs of personnel, supplies, and services, as well
as the method and terms of payment.
(c) Workload measures prepared by the state court administrator and
projected costs for the next fiscal year shall be considered in the negotiation
of contracts.
(d) Each May 1 preceding the general session of the Legislature, the county
or municipality shall submit a budget request to the Judicial Council, the
governor, and the legislative fiscal analyst for services to be rendered as part
of the contract under Subsection (b) for the fiscal year immediately following
the legislative session. The Judicial Council shall consider this information
in developing its budget request. The legislative fiscal analyst shall provide
the Legislature with the county's or municipality's original estimate of
expenses. By June 15 preceding the state's fiscal year, the county and the
state court administrator shall negotiate a contract to cover expenses in
accordance with the appropriation approved by the Legislature. The contracts may not include payments for expenses of service of process, indigent
defense costs, or other costs or expenses provided by law as an obligation of
the county or municipality.
Laws 1988, c. 152, § 20; Laws 1991, c. 268, § 26, Laws 1996, c. 198, § 52, eff. July 1,
1996.
Cross References
Budgetary Procedures Act, see § 63-38-1 et seq
otate officials, reports of expenditures and appropriations, see § 67-10-1 et seq

Counties o=> 13 6.
Courts <£»74

Library References
Judges ^22(3)
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Westlaw Key Number Searches: 104kl36;
227k22(3); 360kl29; 360k90; 106k74
C J S Counties § 175

§ 78-3-13.5.
§ 78-3-14.
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Repealed by Laws 1967, c. 222, § 9
Repealed by Laws 1988, c. 152, § 26; Laws 1988, c. 248, § 50,
eff. April 25, 1988
District court case management

(1) The district court of each district shall develop systems of case management.
(2) The case management systems developed by a district court shall:
(a) ensure judicial accountability for the just and timely disposition of
cases;
(b) provide for each judge a full judicial work load that accommodates
differences in the subject matter or complexity of cases assigned to different
judges; and
(c) provide that judges of the district court and judges of the court formerly
denominated the circuit court who took office prior to July 1, 1991, are
entitled to be assigned only cases from the subject matter jurisdiction of their
respective courts as that jurisdiction existed on June 30, 1996. If the volume
of such cases does not constitute a full work load, other cases shall be
assigned.
(3) A district court may establish divisions within the court for the efficient
management of different types of cases. The existence of divisions within the
court may not affect the jurisdiction of the court nor the validity of court
orders. The existence of divisions within the court may not impede public
access to the courts.
Laws 1996, c. 198, § 53, eff. July 1, 1996.
Library References
Courts <s=78, 70, 50
Westlaw Key Number
106k70; 106k50.

C.J.S. Courts §§ 7, 106, 123 to 126.
Searches:

106k78;

United States Supreme Court
Access to courts,
Access to courts, identification of underlying cause of action and lost remedy,
government conspiracy to destroy or
cover up evidence of crime, torture and

death of foreign spouse of American
citizen by foreign army officers allegedly paid by the CIA, see Christopher v.
Harbury, U.S.D.C.2002, 122 S.Ct.
2179, 536 U.S. 403.

§ 7 8 - 3 - 1 4 . 5 . Allocation of district court fees and forfeitures
(1) Except as provided in this section, district court fines and forfeitures
collected for violation of state statutes shall be paid to the state treasurer.
(2) Fines and forfeitures collected by the court for violation of a state statute
or county or municipal ordinance constituting a misdemeanor or an infraction
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shall be remitted 1/2 to the state treasurer and 1/2 to the treasurer of the state
or local governmental entity which prosecutes or which would prosecute the
violation.
(3) Fines and forfeitures collected for violations of Title 23, Wildlife Resources Code of Utah, Title 41, Chapter 22, Off-highway Vehicles, or Title 73,
Chapter 18, State Boating Act, shall be paid to the state treasurer.
(a) For violations of Title 23, the state treasurer shall allocate 85% to the
Division of Wildlife Resources and 15% to the General Fund.
(b) For violations of Title 4 1 , Chapter 22, or Title 73, Chapter 18, the state
treasurer shall allocate 85% to the Division of Parks and Recreation and 15%
to the General Fund.
(4) Fines and forfeitures collected for violation of Section 72-7-404 or
72-7-406, less fees established by the Judicial Council, shall be paid to the state
treasurer for deposit in the B and C road account. Fees established by the
Judicial Council shall be deposited in the state General Fund. Money deposited
in the class B and C road account is supplemental to the money appropriated
under Section 72-2-107 but shall be expended in the same manner as other
class B and C road funds.
(5) Until July 1, 2007, fines and forfeitures collected by the court for a
violation of Subsection 41-1 a-1303(2) related to registration of vehicles after
establishing residency shall be remitted:
(a) 50% to the state or local governmental entity which issued the citation
for a violation to be used for law enforcement purposes; and
(b) 50% in accordance with Subsection (2).
(6) Fines and forfeitures collected for any violations not specified in this
chapter or otherwise provided for by law shall be paid to the state treasurer.
(7) Fees collected in connection with civil actions filed in the district court
shall be paid to the state treasurer.
(8) The court shall remit money collected in accordance with Title 51,
Chapter 7, State Money Management Act.
Laws 1988, c. 152, § 21, Laws 1990, c 128, § 7; Laws 1996, c. 198, § 54, ett July 1,
1996; Laws 1998, c 270, § 352, eff. March 21, 1998; Laws 2004, c 273, § 1, ett July 1,
2004; Laws 2004, c. 349, § 6, eff July 1, 2004.
Historical and Statutory Notes
Composite section by the Office of Legislative
Research and General Counsel of Laws 2004, c
2
' 3 , § 1 and Laws 2004, c 349, § 6
Cross References
nipromise of traffic charges, plea in abeyance fee, surcharge, see § 77-2-4 2
N«» and forfeitures, distribution and allocation, see § 63-63a-2
*«*UC mitigation surcharge, distribution of monies, see § 63-63b-102
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^Jf78-5-°-5 to 78-5-41 • R e P e a l e d
»o^5_ J 0 1 .

Creation of justice court—Not of record

ter Article VIII, Section 1, Utah Constitution, there is created a court not
rd imown as the justice court. The judges of this court are justice court
1 ^ 1 9 8 9 c 157, § 10, Laws 1997, c 216, § 4, eff July 1, 1997, Laws 1999, c 21,

fjS # eff.May3,1999
l^pf * r

Cross References

IWtlflcation of justice courts, see Jud Admin , Justice Court Recert Standards App B
ltdai of Civil Procedure, applicability, see Rules Civ Proc , Rule 81
* *~ *
^Ljts $»41, 49
v^lftttlaw Key Number Searches

^J8j06k49.

Library References
C J S Courts §§ 4 93 to 100
106k41,
Research References

Am. Jur PI & Pr Forms Justice of the
$MLCC § 3, Statutory References

1 7 8 - 5 - 1 0 1 . 5 . Creation of justice courts—Classes of justice courts
FftU
(l)(a) For the purposes of this section, to "create a justice court" means to
^ *' (i) establish a justice court, or
%r* (ii) establish a justice court under Title 11, Chapter 13, Interlocal Coop£* erationAct.
™*(b) A municipality or county that has created a justice court may change
* the form of its court to another listed in Subsection (l)(a) without being
^0)nsidered to have created a court
l)LJustice courts shall be divided into the following classes
|a) Class I: 501 or more citations or cases filed per month,
p(b) Class II: 201-500 citations or cases filed per month,
B(c)*Class III: 61-200 citations or cases filed per month, and
W Class IV: 60 or fewer citations or cases filed per month
Municipalities or counties can elect to create a Class I or Class II justice
• by filing a written declaration with the Judicial Council on or before July
C least two years prior to the effective date of the election Upon demonstraJ*™ Of compliance with operating standards as established by statute and the
K ^ w l Council, the Judicial Council shall certify the creation of the court
sJfcNAntto Section 78-5-139
327
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Section
78-5-140.

Dissolution of Justice Courts.

§§ 7 8 - 5 - 0 . 5 to 7 8 - 5 - 4 1 .

Repealed

§ 7 8 - 5 — 1 0 1 . Creation of justice court—Not of record
Under Article VIII, Section 1, Utah Constitution, there is created a court not
of record known as the justice court. The judges of this court are justice court
judges.
Uws 1989, c. 157, § 10; Laws 1997, c. 216, § 4, eff. July 1, 1997; Laws 1999, c. 21.
§ 103, eff. May 3, 1999.
Cross References
Certification of justice courts, see Jud Admin , Justice Court Recert Standards App B
Rules of Civil Procedure, applicability, see Rules Civ Proc , Rule 81

Courts <s=>41, 49
Westlaw Key Number Searches
106k49

Library References
C J S Courts §§ 4, 93 to 100
106k41,
Research References

Forms
15A Am Jur PI & Pr Forms Justice of the
Peace § 3, Statutory References

§ 78-5-101.5.

Creation of justice courts—Classes of justice courts

(l)(a) For the purposes of this section, to "create a justice court" means to
(i) establish a justice court; or
(ii) establish a justice court under Title 11, Chapter 13, Interlocal Cooperation Act.
(b) A municipality or county that has created a justice court may change
the form of its court to another listed in Subsection (l)(a) without being
considered to have created a court.
(2) Justice courts shall be divided into the following classes:
(a) Class
(b) Class
(c) Class
W) Class

I: 501 or more citations or cases filed per month;
II: 201-500 citations or cases filed per month,
III: 61—200 citations or cases filed per month; and
IV: 60 or fewer citations or cases filed per month.

_v) Municipalities or counties can elect to create a Class I or Class II justice
Jr**! by filing a written declaration with the Judicial Council on or before July
,!efst t w o v e a r s prior to the effective date of the election. Upon demonstracompliance with operating standards as established by statute and the
Council, the Judicial Council shall certify the creation of the couit
Mto Section 78-5-139.
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(4)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (5), municipalities or countie^!*!
elect to create a Class III or Class IV justice court by establishing the need fiSF
the court and filing a written declaration with the Judicial Council on or befoi
July 1 at least one year prior to the effective date of the election.
'*(b) In evaluating the need for the creation of a Class III or Class IV justiciT
court, the Judicial Council shall consider factors of population, case filings*
public convenience, availability of law enforcement agencies and court sim.
port services, proximity to other courts, and any special circumstance!1
(c) The Judicial Council shall determine whether the municipality or coun*
ty seeking to create a Class III or Class IV justice court has established the
need for the court.
(d) Upon demonstration of compliance with operating standards as established by statute and the Judicial Council, the Judicial Council shall certify
the creation of the court pursuant to Section 78-5-139.
(5)(a) The following municipalities may create a justice court by filing a
written declaiation with the Judicial Council: American Fork, Bountiful, Brigham City, Cedar City, Clearfield, Elk Ridge, Kaysville, Layton, Logan, Moab,
Murray, Ogden, Orem, Park City, Price, Provo, Richfield, Roosevelt, Roy,
Salem, Salt Lake City, Sandy, Spanish Fork, St. George, Taylorsville, Tooele,
Vernal, and West Valley City.
(b) To form a Class I or Class II justice court, the municipalities listed in
Subsection (5)(a) shall file a written declaration with the Judicial Council on
or before July 1 at least two years prior to the effective date of the election.
(c) To form a Class III or Class IV justice court, the municipalities listed in
Subsection (5)(a) shall file a written declaration with the Judicial Council on
or before July 1 at least one year prior to the effective date of the election.
(d) Upon demonstration of compliance with operating standards as established by statute and the Judicial Council, the Judicial Council shall certify
the creation of the court pursuant to Section 78-5-139.
(6) Upon request from a municipality or county seeking to create a justice
court, the Judicial Council may shorten the time required between the city's or
county's written declaration or election to create a justice court and the
effective date of the election.
(7) The Judicial Council may by rule provide resources and procedures
adequate for the timely disposition of all matters brought before the courts.
The administrative office of the courts and local governments shall cooperate in
allocating resources to operate the courts in the most efficient and effective
manner based on the allocation of responsibility between courts of record and
not of record.
Laws 1998, c. 313, § 2, eff. July 1, 1998; Laws 1999, c. 166, § 2, eff. May 3, 1999.
Library References
Courts <S=>41
Westlaw Key Number Search 106k41
C J S Courts §§ 93 to 100
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of trial was made. Beck v. Lewis, 1917, 49
Utah 368, 164 P. 480. Justices Of The Peace ®=*
60

, 57 Utah 365, 195 P. 194^ Justices Of The

192a

»58(1)

F ilure of the complaint filed in a justice's
H to allege one of the grounds specified in
*° n Laws 1917, § 7426, showing that the
SSon was commenced in the city or precinct as
uired by such section, did not deprive the
^ t i c e of the peace, or the district court on
ncal of jurisdiction, notwithstanding sections
7147 and 7448, since section 7426 is not directV. t 0 ^ question of jurisdiction, but is a legisutive direction as to the place of commencing
lotions Silver City Mercantile Co. v. District
£ L t of Utah County, 1920, 57 Utah 365, 195
p j 9 4 . Justices Of The Peace <S=> 58(5)
4 Presumptions as to jurisdiction
* No presumption exists in favor of the jurisdiction of the justice's courts. Silver City Mercantile Co. v. District Court of Utah County, 1920,
57 Utah 365, 195 P. 194. Justices Of The Peace
*»59
5. Waiver of objections
Under Comp. Laws 1907, § 3668, providing
where actions shall be commenced in justices'
courts, and section 3669, providing for changing the place of trial where suit is brought in the
wrong district, the privilege of bringing suit m a
particular district is personal to defendant and
may be waived. Beck v Lewis, 1917, 49 Utah
368, 164 P. 480. Justices Of The Peace S=> 60
Under Comp. Laws 1907, § 3668, prescribing
where actions in justices' courts shall be commenced, and section 3669, providing for changing place of trial where suit is brought in wrong
precinct, the defendant waives objection to the
precinct by suffering a default judgment, especially where the complaint stated jurisdictional
facts and no application for changing the place

§ 78-5-104.

6.

Determination of questions of jurisdiction,
generally
Comp. Laws 1888, § 3537, requires actions in
a justice court to be begun and tried in the
precinct or city of defendant's residence, unless
there be no justice court therein; and section
3595 provides for dismissal without prejudice
when it is objected at the trial and appears by
the evidence that the action is brought in the
wrong county, precinct, or city. Held, that defendant need not specially appear to move for
such dismissal, but may object by answer, and
prove the facts on the trial. Kansas City Hardware Co. v. Nielson, 1894, 10 Utah 27, 36 P.
131. Justices Of The Peace <&=> 61
7.

Place of holding court
Under express provisions of Comp. Laws
1907, § 687, where more than one precinct is
embraced in a town, the justices of such precincts may hold court in any part of the touTi
State v Maughan, 1909, 35 Utah 426, 100 P
934. Justices Of The Peace <2> 71
8.

Change of venue
Under Comp. St. 1907, § 3668, prescribing
where actions in justices' courts shall be commenced and section 3669, providing for changing place of trial where suit is brought in wrong
precinct, justice does not lose jurisdiction o\er
suit brought before him in wrong precinct until
affidavit setting forth facts as required by section 3669 is filed. Beck v. Lewis, 1917, 49 Utah
368, 164 P. 480. Justices Of The Peace &=>
73(1)

Jurisdiction

(1) Justice courts have jurisdiction over class B and C misdemeanors, violation of ordinances, and infractions committed within their territorial jurisdiction, except those offenses over which the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction.
(2) Justice courts have jurisdiction of small claims cases under Title 78,
Chapter 6, Small Claims Courts, if the defendant resides in or the debt arose
within the territorial jurisdiction of the justice court.
Laws 1989, c. 157, § 13; Laws 1991, c. 268, § 39; Laws 1993, c. 159, § 11; Laws 1997,
c215, § 16, eff. July 1, 1997.
Cross References
Transfer of small claims cases, see Jud. Admin., Rule 4 - 8 0 1 .
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Justice court judge administrative responsibilities

H

(1) Justice court judges shall comply with and ensure that court person
comply with applicable county or municipal rules and regulations related l£
personnel, budgets, and other administrative functions.
qj
(2) Failure by the judge to comply with applicable administrative county^
municipal rules and regulations may be referred, by the county executive Of
municipal legislative body, to the state Justice Court Administrator.
i 3
(3) Compliance with appropriate administrative requirements shall be coo»
sidered as part of the Judicial Council's judicial performance evaluation pro*
gram for justice court judges.
(4) Repeated or willful noncompliance may be referred, by the county execu*
tive or municipal legislative body, to the Judicial Conduct Commission.
Laws 2003, c. 51, § 2, eff. May 5, 2003.
Library References
Justices of the Peace <$=>21, 20, 10.
We^tlaw Key Number Searches:
231k20, 231kl0

§ 78-5-107.

C J.S. Justices of the Peace §§ 9, 13 to 14.
231k21,

Place of holding court

(l)(a) County justice court judges may hold court in any municipality within
the precinct but may exercise only the jurisdiction provided by law for county
justice courts.
(b) County justice court judges may also, at the direction of the county
legislative body, hold court anywhere in the county as needed but may only
hear cases arising within the precinct.
(2) A municipal justice court judge shall hold court in the municipality where
the court is located and, as directed by the municipal governing body, at the
county jail or municipal prison.
Laws 1989, c. 157, § 16; Laws 1991, c. 92, § 1; Laws 1993, c. 5, § 1; Laws 1993,,c.
227, § 390.
Library References
Criminal Law <3=>254.1.
Justices of the Peace <S=>71
Westlaw Key Number Searches:
110k254.1.

C.J.S. Justices of the Peace § 59.
231k71;

§ 7 8 - 5 - 1 0 8 . Trial facilities—Hours of business
(1) A justice court judge shall conduct all official court business in a courtroom or office located in a public facility which is conducive and appropriate to
the administration of justice.
(2) Each county, city, or town shall provide adequate courtroom and auxiliary space for the justice court. The facility need not be specifically constructed
for or allocated solely for the justice court if existing facilities adequately serve
the purposes of the justice court.
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(3) County and municipal justice courts shall be open and judicial business
shall be transacted.
(a) & v e days per week, tor
(b) no less than four days per week for at least 11 hours per day.
(4) The legislative body of the county, city, or town shall establish operating
hours for the justice courts withm the requirements of Subsection (3) and the
code of judicial administration
(5) The hour s the courts are open shall be posted conspicuously at the courts
and in local public buildings
(6) The clerk of the court and judges of county and municipal courts shall
attend the court at regularly scheduled times
Laws 1989, c 157, § 17, Laws 2004, c 245, § 1, eff May 3, 2004
Library References
Clerks of Courts ®=>64 1
Courts <S=>72, 73
Justices of the Peace <S=>71
Westlaw Key Number Searches
106k73, 231k71 79k64 1

C J S Courts §§ 7, 121, 249 254
c J S Justices of the Peace § 59
106k72,

§ 7 8 - 5 - 1 0 9 . Laws, ordinances, and reference materials provided by counties, cities, and towns
Each county, city, or town shall provide and keep current for each justice
court in its jurisdiction a copy of the motor vehicle laws of Utah, appropriate
copies of the Utah code, the justice court manual published by the state court
administrator, state laws affecting local government, the county, city, or town
ordinances, and other legal reference materials as determined to be necessaiy
by the judge
Laws 1989, c 157, § 18
Counties <3=137
Courts<S=>73
^Municipal Corporations ^ 2 6 2
Westlaw Key Number Searches
> 104kl37, 268k262

Library References
C J S Counties § 175
C J S Courts § 7
CJS
Mun
a l Corporations §§ 955 to 956
106k73
v
v

5 7 8 - 5 - 1 1 0 . Compensation and expenses—Clerical personnel
(1) The county, city, or town creating or maintaining a justice court shall
Provide and compensate clerical personnel to conduct the business of the court
l * W The selection, supervision, and discipline of court clerical personnel shall
^ *° accordance with local government personnel policies
^ ( 3 ) Clerical personnel are governed by Title 52, Chapter 3, regarding employment of relatives
\V The county, city, or town assumes the cost of travel and training expenses
IpSfrical personnel at training sessions conducted by the Judicial Council
HP* 1989, c 157, § 19, Laws 2003, c 51, § 3, eff May 5, 2003
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(X) County and municipal justice courts shall be open and judicial business
•hall be transacted:
(a) five days per week; or
fo) no less than four days per week for at least 11 hours per day.
(A) The legislative body of the county, city, or town shall establish operating
k rs for the justice courts within the requirements of Subsection (3) and the
(pSde of judicial administration.
/e\ fne hours the courts are open shall be posted conspicuously at the courts
d
j|n in local public buildings.
16) The clerk of the court and judges of county and municipal courts shall
attend the court at regularly scheduled times.
]UWS 1989, c. 157, § 17; Laws 2004, c. 245, § 1, eff. May 3, 2004.

Clerks of Courts <s=>64 1
Courts «»72, 73.
Justices of the Peace <s»71
Wcstlaw Key Number Searches
!06k73; 231k71, 79k64 1

Library References
C J S Courts §§ 7, 121, 249, 254
C J S Justices of the Peace § 59
106k72,

§ 7 8 - 5 - 1 0 9 . Laws, ordinances, and reference materials provided by counties, cities, and towns
Each county, city, or town shall provide and keep current for each justice
court in its jurisdiction a copy of the motor vehicle laws of Utah, appropriate
copies of the Utah code, the justice court manual published by the state court
idministrator, state laws affecting local government, the county, city, or town
ordinances, and other legal reference materials as determined to be necessary
by the judge.
Laws 1989, c. 157, § 18.
Library References
Counties <S=137
Courts e-73
^^Cipal^0iPMatl°unS ^ 2 6 2 u
Wcstlaw Key Number Searches
104kl37; 268k262

C J S Counties § 175
C J S Courts § 7
m,i^
106k73,

C J S

Municipal Corporations §§ 955 to 956
v
v

§78-5-110.

Compensation and expenses—Clerical personnel
(l)The county, city, or town creating or maintaining a justice court shall
provide and compensate clerical personnel to conduct the business of the court.
(2) The selection, supervision, and discipline of court clerical personnel shall
w in accordance with local government personnel policies.
, 0 ) Clerical personnel are governed by Title 52, Chapter 3, regarding emplovBtent of relatives.
it I . e c o u n ty> city, or town assumes the cost of travel and training expenses
ppjgpcal personnel at training sessions conducted by the Judicial Council.
|f*M989, c. 157, § 19, Laws 2003, c. 51, § 3, eff. May 5, 2003
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Counties 0=137
Couits c=>55
Municipal Corporations C=>262
WesUaw Key Number Searches
26bk262 106k55

§ 78-5-111.

Library References
C J S Counties § 175
C J S Courts §§ 107 to 109
, n
nC JT Sc » ,
104kl37,
Municipal Corporations §§ 9 „ u , ^

Justice court staff to be provided

(1) Each county, city, or town creating and maintaining a justice court shaS
provide
(a) sufficient staff public prosecutors to attend the court and perform tht
duties of prosecution before the justice court,
(b) adequate funding for the costs of defense for persons charged with ft
public offense who are determined by the court to be indigent under Title77,
Chapter 32, and
(c) sufficient local peace officers to attend the justice court when required
and provide security for the court
(2) The county attorney or district attorney may appoint city prosecutors ai
deputies to prosecute state offenses in municipal justice courts
Laws 1989 c 157 § 20, Laws 1993, c 38, § 115, Laws 1998, c 282, § 81, eff May 4.
1998
Library References
Counties C=> 137
Courts c=>71
District and Prosecuting Attorneys 0=^3(1)

C J S Counties § 175
C J S District and Prosecuting Attorney!
§§ 49 ^0 52 57

W ^ S T u X teaches
268K262 131k3(l) 106k71

C J S

§ 78-5-112.

104,137,

^

^

C

^™

§§

<

Repealed by Laws 1992, c. 219, § 19, eff. July 1, 1992

§ 7 8 - 5 - 1 1 3 . Process to any part of the state—Service
(1) Piocess from a justice court may be issued to any place m the state. ~j
(2) Subpoenas in any action or proceeding of a justice court may be issued to
any place in the state
(3) All warrants issued by a justice court for violation of any state * a v l %
local ordinance within a court's jurisdiction are directed to the sheriff, &n&
constable of the county, or to the marshal or city police of the town or City*
Laws 1989 c 157, § 22

Justices of the Peace 0 7 8
Witnesses <>9
Westlaw Key Number Searches
410k9

Library References
C J S Justices of the Peace § 66
c j s Witnesses §§ 2, 20 to 22 25
231k78

§§ 78-5-114, 78-5-115. Repealed by Laws 1991, c. 268, § 49, eff- J* MI
1992
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H^flr-5-116. Disposition of fines
mfi\i Except as otherwise specified by this section, fines and forfeitures collectitp/ fi justice court shall be remitted, 1/2 to the treasurer of the local
Timent responsible for the court and 1/2 to the treasurer of the local
'^rnment which prosecutes or which would prosecute the violation.
B0Y6J **

t»(s) For violation of Title 23, the court shall allocate 85% to the Division of
tttldlife Resources and 15% to the general fund of the city or county governw n t responsible for the justice court
hl$(b) F° r violation of Title 41, Chapter 22, Off-highway Vehicles, or Title 73,
llfehapter 18, State Boating Act, the court shall allocate 85% to the Division of
fflarks a n d Recreation and 15% to the general fund of the city or county
government responsible for the justice court.
i'll) The surcharge established by Section 63-63a-l shall be paid to the state
fifeasurer.
(4) Fines, fees, court costs, and forfeitures collected by a municipal or county
lustlce court for a violation of Section 72-7-404 or 72-7-406 regarding maximum! weight limitations and overweight permits, minus court costs not to
Jaeced the schedule adopted by the Judicial Council, shall be paid to the state
ftfcasurer and distributed to the class B and C road account.
jfe(5) Revenue deposited in the class B and C road account pursuant to
Subsection (4) is supplemental to the money appropriated under Section
72-2—107 but shall be expended in the same manner as other class B and C
road funds.
#
(6) Until July 1, 2007, fines and forfeitures collected by the court for a
Isolation of Subsection 41-1 a-1303(2) related to registration of vehicles after
establishing residency shall be remitted.
(a) 50% to the state or local governmental entity which issued the citation
%
for a violation to be used for law enforcement purposes, and
(b) 50% in accordance with Subsection (1).
Um 1989, c. 157, § 25, Laws 1991, c 138, § 2, Laws 1991, c 212, § 7, Laws 1991, c
268, § 41; Laws 1998, c 270, § 353, eff March 21, 1998, Laws 2004, c 273, § 2, eff
Jttly 1. 2004; Laws 2004, c 349, § 7, eff July 1, 2004
Historical and Statutory Notes
jgCttnposite section by the Office of Legislative
IjJJfcarth and General Counsel of Laws 2004, c
?73<§ 2 and Laws 2004, c 349, § 7
Cross References
™*jl and forfeitures, distribution and allocation, see § 63-63a-2
pujc mitigation surcharge, distribution of monies, see § 63-63b-102
Library References
»«»20.
tftttlaw Key Number Search 174k20
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mQtL^\29> Compensation—Annual review and adjustment
t \ The governing body of each municipality or county shall annually review

Jd may a d J u s t t h e

com

P e n s a t i o n P aid -

rcl The salary fixed for a justice court judge may not be diminished during
k / rm for which the judge has been appointed or elected.
|jp£ tern
tX\ A copy of the resolution, ordinance, or other document fixing the salary
t the iustice court judge and any adjustments to the document shall be
JT \hed to the state court administrator by the governing body of the municipality or county.
^ 1 9 8 9 , 0 . 157, § 3 8 .
Library References
Ittiticcs of the Peace ®=»14
*W«StlaW Key Number Search: 231kl4
CJ.S. Justices of the Peace § 15

ft 78-5-130. Monthly reports to court administrator and governing body
(1) Every justice court judge shall file monthly with the state court administrator a report of the judicial business of the judge. The report shall be on
forms supplied by the state court administrator.
(2) The report shall state the number of criminal and small claims actions
Wed, the dispositions entered, and other information as specified in the forms.
(3) A copy of the report shall be furnished by the justice court judge to the
governing body in the municipality or county, or to the person or office in the
county, city, or town designated by the governing body.
Laws 1989, c. 157, § 39.
Library References
Justices of the Peace @=>21
Wcstlaw Key Number Search 23 lk21
CJ.S. Justices of the Peace § 14

§ 7 8 - 5 - 1 3 1 . Repealed by Laws 1993, c. 1, § 164, eff. Jan. 28, 1993

§ 78-5-132. Term of office for county court
(lj(a) The term of a county justice court judge is four years beginning the
first Monday in February 1991.
(b) Judges holding office when this act takes effect or appointed to fill any
vacancy hold office until reappointed or a successor is appointed and certified by the Judicial Council.
(2)(a) The term of office of a municipal justice court judge is four years,
beginning the first Monday in February 1992.
(b) Judges holding office when this section takes effect or appointed to fill
*ny vacancy hold office until reappointed or a successor is appointed and
Certified by the Judicial Council.
kws 1989, c. 157, § 41, Laws 1993, c. 1, § 162.
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§ 78-5-132

JUDICIAL COD!
Library References

Justices of the Peace <&=>8
Westlaw Key Number Search 231k8
C J S Justices of the Peace § 8

§ 78-5-133.

Repealed by Laws 1993, c. 1, § 164, efif. Jan. 28, 1993

§ 7 8 - 5 - 1 3 4 . Justice court judges to be appointed—Procedure—Report to
Judicial Council—Retention election—Vacancy
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Appointing authority" means:
(i) the chair of the county commission in counties having the county
commission form of county government;
(ii) the county executive in counties having the county executive-council
form of government;
(iii) the chair of the city commission, city council, or town council1]*!
municipalities having the traditional management arrangement established
by Title 10, Chapter 3, Part 1, Governing Body;
(iv) the city manager, in the council-manager optional form of govern*
ment defined in Section 10-3-1209; and
(v) the mayor, in the council-mayor optional form of government defined
in Section 10-3-1209.
(b) "Local legislative body" means:
(I) the county commission or county council; and
(ii) the city commission, city council, or town council.
(2) Justice court judges shall be appointed by the appointing authority and
confirmed by a majority vote of the local legislative body.
(3)(a) After a newly appointed justice court judge has been confirmed,^
local legislative body shall report the confirmed judge's name to the JudiCiw
Council.
(b) The Judicial Council shall certify the judge as qualified to hold offic|*
upon successful completion of the orientation program and upon the written
opinion of the county or municipal attorney that the judge meets the statutoij,
qualifications for office.
(c) A justice court judge may not perform judicial duties until certified o«
the Judicial Council.
(4) Upon the expiration of a county justice court judge's term of office u» ,
judge shall be subject to an unopposed retention election in accordance wi «
the procedures set forth in Section 20A-12-201.
j
(5) Upon the expiration of a municipal justice court judge's term or °H;;SJN
municipal justice court judge shall be reappointed absent a showing or g «.
cause by the appointing authority.
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§ 78-5-132

JUDICIAL CO^
Library References
< >

Justices of the Peace 3= 8
Westlaw Key Number Search 23 lk8
C J S Justices of the Peace § 8

§ 78-5-133.

Repealed by Laws 1993, c. 1, § 164, eff. Jan. 28, 1993

§ 7 8 - 5 - 1 3 4 . Justice court judges to be appointed—Procedure—Report to
Judicial Council—Retention election—Vacancy
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Appointing authority" means:
(I) the chair of the county commission in counties having the county
commission form of county government;
(n) the county executive in counties having the county executive-council
form of government;
(ui) the chair of the city commission, city council, or town council fa|
municipalities having the traditional management arrangement established
by Title 10, Chapter 3, Part 1, Governing Body;
(IV) the city manager, in the council-manager optional form of government defined in Section 10-3-1209; and
(v) the mayor, in the council-mayor optional form of government defined
in Section 10-3-1209.
(b) "Local legislative body" means:
(l) the county commission or county council; and
(ii) the city commission, city council, or town council.
(2) Justice court judges shall be appointed by the appointing authority and
confirmed by a majority vote of the local legislative body.
(3)(a) After a newly appointed justice court judge has been confirmed,,tlie
local legislative body shall report the confirmed judge's name to the Judicial
Council
(b) The Judicial Council shall certify the judge as qualified to hold o^rf
upon successful completion of the orientation program and upon the written
opinion of the county or municipal attorney that the judge meets the statutory
qualifications for office.
(c) A justice court judge may not perform judicial duties until certified Pj
the Judicial Council.
(4) Upon the expiration of a county justice court judge's term of office u*
judge shall be subject to an unopposed retention election in accordance Wl *
the procedures set forth in Section 20A-12-201.
(5) Upon the expiration of a municipal justice court judge's term of o ^ c
municipal justice court judge shall be reappointed absent a showing or g
cause by the appointing authority.
354
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§ 78-5-135

* \ jf a n appointing authority asserts good cause to not reappoint a
nicipal justice court judge, at the request of the judge, the good cause shall
Presented at a formal hearing of the local legislative body.
L\ Tke local legislative body shall determine by majority vote whether
Jawed cause exists not to reappoint the municipal justice court judge.
cc) The decision of the local legislative body is not subject to appeal.
/j\ j n determining whether good cause exists to not reappoint a municipal
justice Court judge, the appointing authority and local legislative body shall
consider:
(i) whether or not the judge has been certified as meeting the evaluation
criteria for judicial performance established by the Judicial Council; and
(ii) any other factors considered relevant by the appointing authority.
(6) Before reappointment or retention election, each justice court judge shall
be evaluated in accordance with the performance evaluation program established in Subsection 78-3-21(4).
(7)(a) At the conclusion of a term of office or when a vacancy occurs in the
position of justice court judge, the appointing authority may contract with a
justice court judge in the county or an adjacent county to serve as justice court
Judge.
if* (b) The contract shall be for the duration of the justice court judge's term
of office.
(8) Vacancies in the office of justice court judge shall be filled as provided in
Section 20A-1-506.
Uws 1989, c. 157, § 43; Laws 1991, c. 244, § 4; Laws 1993, c. 1, § 163; Laws 1993, c.
139, § 12; Laws 1996, c. 243, § 192, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1996, c. 254, § 4, eff.
Jan. 1,1997; Laws 1997, c. 10, § 143, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 1998, c. 313, § 3, eff. July
1,1998; Laws 2001, c. 71, § 2, eff. April 30, 2001.
Library References
Justices of the Peace &*2>, 8
Wcstlaw Key Number Searches
231k8.

CJ.S. Justices of the Peace §§ 6, 8
231k3,

9 78-5-135. Funds collected—Deposits and reports—Special account—Accounting
(l)(a) Municipal justice courts shall deposit public funds in accordance with
Section 51-4-2
(b) The treasurer shall report to the city recorder the sums collected and
deposited. The recorder shall then apportion and remit the collected proceeds as provided in Section 78-5-116.
(c) The municipality shall retain all small claims filing fees including the
governmental filing fee for actions filed by the municipality as provided in
Section 78-6-14.
(2)(a) County justice courts shall deposit public funds in accordance with
Section 51-4-2.
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§ 78-5-135

JUSTICE COURTS

(a) If an appointing authority asserts good cause to not reappoint a
municipal justice court judge, at the request of the judge, the good cause shall
be presented at a formal hearing of the local legislative body.
(b) The local legislative body shall determine by majority vote whether
good cause exists not to reappoint the municipal justice court judge.
(c) The decision of the local legislative body is not subject to appeal.
(d) In determining whether good cause exists to not reappoint a municipal
justice court judge, the appointing authority and local legislative body shall
consider:
(i) whether or not the judge has been certified as meeting the evaluation
criteria for judicial performance established by the Judicial Council; and
(ii) any other factors considered relevant by the appointing authority.
(£) Before reappointment or retention election, each justice court judge shall
be evaluated in accordance with the performance evaluation program established in Subsection 78-3-21(4).
(7)(a) At the conclusion of a term of office or when a vacancy occurs in the
position of justice court judge, the appointing authority may contract with a
justice court judge in the county or an adjacent county to serve as justice court
judge.
(b) The contract shall be for the duration of the justice court judge's term
of office.
(8) Vacancies in the office of justice court judge shall be filled as provided in
Section 20A-1-506.
Laws 1989, c. 157, § 43; Laws 1991, c. 244, § 4; Laws 1993, c. 1, § 163; Laws 1993, c.
159, § 12; Laws 1996, c. 243, § 192, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1996, c. 254, § 4, eff.
Jan. 1, 1997; Laws 1997, c. 10, § 143, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 1998, c. 313, § 3, eff. July
1,1998; Laws 2001, c. 71, § 2, eff. April 30, 2001.
Library References
Justices of the Peace <3^3, 8
Wcstlaw Key Number Searches:
231k8

8 78-5-135.
counting

C J . S . Justices of the Peace §§ 6, 8
231k3;

Funds collected—Deposits and reports—Special account—Ac-

(l)(a) Municipal justice courts shall deposit public funds in accordance with
Section 51-4-2.
(b) The treasurer shall report to the city recorder the sums collected and
deposited. The recorder shall then apportion and remit the collected proceeds as provided in Section 78-5-116.
|$\c) The municipality shall retain all small claims filing fees including the
SOVerrimental filing fee for actions filed by the municipality as provided in
Paction 78-6-14.
WW County justice courts shall deposit public funds in accordance with
^tion 51-4-2.
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NUISANCE, WASTE, & OTHER DAMAGE

§78-38-10

Research References
Forms
Land Use Prac. & Forms. Handling Land Use
Case § 16 1, Definition

§ 78-38—9. Nuisance—Right of action to abate nuisances—Drug houses
and drug dealing—Gambling—Group criminal activity—Prostitution—
Weapons
(1) Every building or place is a nuisance where:
(a) the unlawful sale, manufacture, service, storage, distribution, dispensing, or acquisition occurs of any controlled substance, precursor, or analog
specified in Title 58, Chapter 37, Controlled Substances;
(b) gambling is permitted to be played, conducted, or dealt upon as
prohibited in Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 11, Gambling, which creates the
conditions of a nuisance as defined in Subsection 78-38-1(1);
(c) criminal activity is committed in concert with two or more persons as
j provided in Section 76-3-203.1;
(d) parties occur frequently which create the conditions of a nuisance as
defined in Subsection 78-38-1(1);
" '(e) prostitution or promotion of prostitution is regularly carried on by one
or more persons as provided in Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 13, Prostitution,
- and
J
(f) a violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 5, Weapons, occurs on the
i premises.
(2) It is a defense to nuisance under Subsection (l)(a) if the defendant can
prove that the defendant is lawfully entitled to possession of a controlled
substance.
(3) Sections 78-38-10 through 78-38-16 govern only an abatement bv eviction of the nuisance as defined in Subsection (1).
Laws 1992, c. 141, § 7, Laws 1996, c 69, § 2, eff April 29, 1996, Laws 1999, c 136,
§ 1, eff. May 3, 1999.
Cross References
Forcible entry and detainer, judgment for restitution, damages, and rent, see § 78-36-10
Forcible entry and detainer, time for appeal, see § 78-36-11
injunctions, generally, see Rules Civ Proc , Rule 65A
Nuisance^pffenses, criminal code, see § 76-10-801 et seq
Jjjkances, brothels, see § 47-1-1 et seq
wtojvfal detainer by tenant, see § 78-36-3
|Huiiance,<S=>3, 19, 25
««stlaW Key Number
$79kl9; 279k25

Library References
C J S Nuisances §§ 10 to 14, 18, 20 to 23, 25,
Searches 279k3,
28 to 45, 48 to 57, 59 to 60, 62, 92 to 97,
99, 102 to 106

Jp38-10. Nuisance—Abatement by eviction
UHWhenever there is reason to believe that a nuisance under Sections
3<M) through 78-38-16 is kept, maintained, or exists in any county, the
617

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
Rule 26

Rule 26. Written orders, judgments and decrees.
(a) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or parties obtaining the ruling shall within fifteen days, or within a shorter
time as the court may direct, file with the court a proposed order, judgment, or decree in conformity with the ruling.
(b) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and orders shall be served upon opposing
counsel before being presented to the court for signature unless the court otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be
submitted to the court and counsel within five days after service.
(c) All orders, judgments, and decrees shall be prepared in such a manner as to show whether they are entered based on a
ruling after a hearing or argument, the stipulation of counsel, the motion of counsel or upon the court's own initiative, and
shall identify the attorneys of record in the cause or proceeding in which the judgment, order or decree is made. If the
order, judgment, or decree is the result of a hearing, the order shall include the date of the hearing, the nature of the
hearing, and the names of the attorneys and parties present at the hearing.
(d) All judgments and decrees shall be prepared as separate documents and shall not include any matters by reference
unless otherwise directed by the court. Orders not constituting judgments or decrees may be made a part of the documents
containing the stipulation or motion upon which the order is based.
(e) No orders, judgments, or decrees based upon stipulation shall be signed or entered unless the stipulation is in writing,
signed by the attorneys of record for the respective parties and filed with the clerk or the stipulation was made on the
record .

Utah Rules of Judicial Conduct Canon 2

Canon 2. A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.
A. A judge shall respect and comply with the law and should exhibit conduct that promotes public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary.
B. A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence the judge's judicial conduct or judgment. A judge
shall not lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance the private interests of others; nor shall a judge convey or permit
others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge. A judge shall not testify voluntarily
as a character witness but may provide honest references in the regular course of business or social life.
C. A judge shall not belong to any organization, other than a religious organization, which practices invidious discrimination
on the basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin.

Hyde Park City Ordinance 10-332

c
10

PART

-320.

A8ATEMEOTOFWEED8ANDDELETER.0U8

OBJECTS
\
10-321.
REAL

PROPERTY TO BE KEPT CLEAN. It

shall be an infraction for any person owning or occupying real
property to allow weed* to prow higher on such property than ia
permitted by this part or not to remove from mich property any
cuttings of such weeds or any refuse, unsightly or deleterious
objects after having been given notice from the health director as
hereinafter provided.
10-322. WEEDS - D E F I N E D . Weeds shall include any
vegetation commonly referred to as & weed, or which shall have
been designated a noxious weed by the Utah commissioner of
agriculture;

10-323, STANDARDS OF WEED CONTROL
A It is hereby declared that the above stated weeds constitute a
nuisance when they:
1. Create a fire Hazard, a source of contamination, or
pollution of the water, sir or property, a danger to health, a
breeding place or habitation for insects or rodents or other
forms of life deleterious to humans or are unsightly or
deleterious to their surroundings.
B, The cut weeds Bhall be removed from the premises within
. hours after cutting.
PART

10-330. N U I S A N C E S ON P R O F E R T Y .
1G-3SL D E F I N I T I O N OF NUISANCE. For the purpose of
this part the term "nuisance" is defined to mean any condition of
use of premises or of building exteriors which are deleterious or
injurious, noxious or unsightly which includes, but is not limited to
keeping or depositing on f or scattering over the premises any of the
following:
A. Lumber, junk, trash, or debris, *
s. B. Abandoned, discarded or unused objects or equipment such as
furniture, stoves, refrigerators, freezers, cans or containers,
/ O 0 - 3 3 2 . DUTY O F M A I N T E N A N C E O F PRIVATE P R O F t ERTY, No person owning, leasing, occupying ox having charge
J of any premises shall maintain or keep any nuisance thereon, nor
\ shall any such person keep or maintain such premises in a manner
causing substantial diminution in the value of the other property
in the neighborhood in which such premises are located.

* Utah Leaf** oi Clti*# and T<miiA -
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Hyde Park City Ordinance 10-300 through 10-343

PART

10-320. ABATEMENT OF W E E & S / N D DELETERIOUS
OBJECTS.
10-321. REAL PROPERTY TO BE KEPT CLEAN. It
shall be an infraction for any person owning or occupying real
property to allow weeds to grow higher on such property than is
permitted by this part or not to remove from such property any
cuttings of such weeds or any refuse, unsightly or deleterious
objects after having been given notice from the health director as
hereinafter provided.
10-322. WEEDS - DEFINED. - Weeds shall include any
vegetation commonly referred to as a weed, or which shall have
been designated a noxious weed by the TJtah commissioner of
agriculture.
10-323. STANDARDS OF WEED CONTROL
A. It is hereby declared that the above stated weeds constitute a
nuisance when they:
1. Create a fire hazard, a source of contamination, or
pollution of the water, air or property, a danger to health, a
breeding place or habitation for insects or rodents or other
forms of life deleterious to humans or are unsightly or
deleterious to their surroundings

B The cut weeds shall be removed from the premises within
48 hours after cutting.
PART

10-330. NUISANCES ON PROPERTY.
10-331. DEFINITION OF NUISANCE. For the purpose of
this part the term "nuisance" is defined to mean any condition of
use of premises or of building exteriors which are deleterious or
injurious, noxious or unsightly which includes, but is not limited to
keeping or depositing on, or scattering over the premises any of the
following:
A. Lumber, junk, trash, or debris. v
B. Abandoned, discarded or unused objects or equipment such as
furniture, stoves, refrigerators, freezers, cans or containers
10-332. DUTY OF MAINTENANCE OF PRIVATE PROPERTY. No person owning, leasing, occupying or having charge
of any premises shall maintain or keep any nuisance thereon, nor
shall any such person keep or maintain such premises in a manner
causing substantial diminution in the value of the other property
in the neighborhood in which such premises are located.

£ Utah League of Cities and Towns — 12/77

c
10-333. STORAGE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY. U
sheltered storage of old, unused, stripped a n d junked machiner
implements, equipment or personal property of a n y kind which
n o longer safely usable for t h e purposes for which it w<
manufactured, for a period of 30 d a y s or more (except in keens*
junk yards) w i t h m this municipality, is hereby declared to be
n u i s a n c e a n d d a n g e r o u s to the public safety
10-334. A B A T E M E N T OF N U I S A N C E BY OWNERS.
T h e owner, owners, t e n a n t s , lessees or occupants of a n y lot with]
this municipality on which such storage as defined in tl
foregoing section 10-333 is made, a n d also the owner, owners <
lessees of the above described personal property involved in sue
storage shall jointly a n d severally abate such n u i s a n c e by I
prompt removal into completely enclosed and secured buildings i
be used for such purposes, or otherwise to remove such propert
from the municipality
PART

10-340.

DANGEROUS BUILDINGS.

10-341. A D O P T I O N O F A CODE FOR T H E ABATEMEN
O F D A N G E R O U S B U I L D I N G S . The "Uniform Code for tr
A b a t e m e n t of Dangerous Buildings," 1976 edition, printed as
code in book form by the International Conference of Buildir
Officials (providing for a jubt, equitable and practicable methc
whereby buildings or structures which from a n y cause endangi
the life, limb, h e a l t h , morals property, safety or welfare of tl
general public or their occupants, m a y be required to be repaire
vacated, or demolished), three copies of which h a v e been filed f(
use and e x a m i n a t i o n by the public in the office of the clerk of th
municipality, is hereby approved a n d adopted a s t h e Abatement <
Dangerous Buildings Code ot this municipality
10-342. A P P L I C A T I O N
T h e provisions of the Abatemer
of Dangerous Buildings Code shall apply to all dangerou
buildings a s therein defined which now exist or which m a y exr
or hereafter be constructed in this municipality
10-343. ALTERATIONS, ADDITIONS AND R E P A I R S .
All buildings or structures w hich are required to be repaired und(
the provisions of t h e Abatement of Dangerous Buildings Cod
shall be subject to t h e provisions of subsections (a), (b), (c), (d), (e
a n d (I) of Section 104 of the Uniform Building Code

Utah League of Cities and Towns — 12/77

Hyde Park City Penalty Ordinance 10-359

1 0 - 3 5 0 . C O L L E C T I O N BY LAW S U I T . In the event collection of expenses of destruction and removal are pursued through
^the courts, (he municipality shall sue for and receive judgment for
all of said expenses of destruction and removal, together with
r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r n e y s ' fees, interest and court costs, and shall
execute upon such j u d g m e n t in the m a n n e r provided by law.
1 0 - 3 5 7 . C O L L E C T I O N T H R O U G H T A X E S . In the event
t h a t the inspector elects to refer the expenses of destruction or
removal to the county treasurer for inclusion in the tax notice of the
property owner, he shall m a k e in triplicate an itemized s t a t e m e n t
of all expenses incurred in the destruction and removal of the
s a m e , and shall deliver the three copies of the s t a t e m e n t to the
county treasurer within ten d a y s after the completion of the work
of destroying or removing such weeds, refuse, garbage, objects or
structures. Thereupon, the costs of the work shall be pursued by the
county treasurer in accordance with the provisions of section 10M-1, U t a h Code A n n o t a t e d 1953, as amended, a n d the recalcitrant
owner shall h a v e such rights a n d shall be subject to such powers as
a r e thereby granted.
1 0 - 3 5 8 . C R I M I N A L P R O C E E D I N G . T h e commencement
of criminal proceedings for the purpose of imposing penalties for
violations of this chapter shall not be conditioned upon prior
issuance of a notice or the g r a n t i n g to the defendant of a n
opportunity to a b a t e or remove the nuisance. T h e provisions of this
c h a p t e r relating to notice a n d a b a t e m e n t shall be deemed merely
a l t e r n a t i v e and additional methods of securing conformity to the
provisions of this chapter.
l O - 3 5 9 / y P E N A L T Y F O R F A I L U R E TO COMPLY.
A. Any owner, occupant or person h a v i n g an interest in the
property subject to this chapter who shall fail to comply with
the notice or order given pursuant to this chapter shall be
guilty of a class C misdemeanor for each offense and further
sum of
$50.00
for each and every day such
failure to comply continues beyond the date fixed for compliance.
B. Compliance by a n y owner, occupant or person to whom a
notice h a s been given as provided in this chapter shall not be
a d m i s s a b l e in a n y criminal proceeding brought p u r s u a n t to
this section.

© Utah League of Cities and To*ns

Blacks Law Dictionary 7 th Edition, West Group 1999

fine

sur

cognizance

de droit,

wtS*rt A money payment from a tenant to the
iflJaiit's lord
^ P mmon fine. A sum of money due from a
f° ant to a lord to defray the cost of a court
r f t o r to allow the litigants to try the action
l 9PT to home — Also termed head-silver
L A pecuniary criminal punishment or civil
^ j t y payable to the public treasury — fine,
mxcessive fine. 1. Criminal law A fine that
Unreasonably high and disproportionate to
the offense committed • The Eighth Amendment proscribes excessive fines An example
<*f an excessive fine is a civil forfeiture in
which the propeity was not an instrumentalist* of the crime and the worth of the property
WW not proportional to the owner's culpabih
(y, 2. A fine or penalty that seriously impairs
jgtfi earning capacity, esp from a business
hmh fine. Hist A fine levied withm the past

ytar.

ffe *
U n i Wd Recovery Act. Hist A statute, enact
^jM to 1833, that abolished the use of fines as a
-flWibod of conveying title to land See FINE (l) 3
| B l H l U f c h 74
MjXnnullando levato de tenemento
quod
fdt de antiquo dommico (fl-nee a-na landoh Wvay-to dee ten-a-men-toh kwod fyoo it
Ipm-tl-kwoh da-min-a koh) [Latin "a fine to
plJBnulled levied from a tenant which was of
tit demesne"! Hist A writ for disannulling
yance of land m ancient demesne to the
f prejudice

plendo pro terris (fl-nee kap-ee-en-doh
'wMs). (Latin "a fine to be taken foi
I Hist. A writ that an imprisoned felon
i in some circumstances to obtain re
9tn jail and to recover lands and goods
|ttling imprisonment
Uenation. Hist A fee paid by a tenant
« upon the alienation of a feudal
• substitution of a new tenant • It
• by all tenants holding by knight's
fcnants in capite by socage tenure —
fined to fine
iowment. Hist A fee paid by a
Htenant to the tenant's lord • If not
aow could not be endowed of her
lid.

| (ft-nom faysa-ree) [Latin] Hist
• a Composition or compromise, to

comme

ceo que

il ad

de son

done

relinquish a claim in exchange for consideration
"In the thirteenth centur} the king s justice^ \neld a
wide and a common law power of ordering that an
offender be kept in custod\ They have an equillv wide
power of discharging him upon his making fine with the
king We must observe the language of the time In
strictness the> have no power to impobe a fine No
tribunal of this period unless we are mistaken i=> evei
said to impose a fine To oidei the offendei to pay so
much money to the king — this the judge ma\ not do If
he did it he would be breaking 01 evading the Great
Charter for an amercement should be affeered not by
royal justices but by neighbour^ of the wioni?doei
What the judges can do 1*, this — they can pronounce a
sentence of imprisonment ind then allow the ci lpnt to
make fine that is to make an end (fineni factn of the
matter by paying or finding secuntv foi a certain -um of
money In theory the fine is a bilateral tran-ution a
bargain it is not imposed it is made
2 Frederick
Pollock & Fredenc W Maitland The Histon < r r QII^II
Law Before the Tune of Eduaid I 517 2d td 1899)

2. To make a settlement of a penalty • Magna
Carta (ch 55) specificallv limited "[a111 fines
which were made with us unjustly and contrary to the law of the land
" (\o\mnes
fines qui injuste et contia legem ten at facti
sunt nobiscum)
fine non capiendo pro pulchre
placitando
(fl-nee non kap-ee-en doh proh pal-kiee plas a
tan-doh) [Latin "a fine not to be taken foi
pleading fairly"] Hist A writ piohibitin^ eouit
officers from taking fines foi fair pleading d e ,
beaupleadei)
fine p r i n t . The part of an agieement oi docu
ment — usu in small, light print that is not
easily noticeable — refemng to disclaimeis,
restrictions, or limitation^
fine pro redisseisma
capiendo (fl nee pi oh re
dis-see-zin-a kap ee e n doh) |Law Latin "a
fine to be taken for again disseising ') Hist A
writ that entitled a person imprisoned foi twice
dispossessing someone {ledisseisin) to ielease
upon payment of a leasonable fine
fines le roy (flnz la roy) [Law Fienchl Hibt
The king's fines • A fine oi fee that \NJN paid
to the monarch for an offense oi contempt
fine sur cognizance de droit, comme ceo que
il ad de son done (fin sai k o n a zants da
droyt, kom say oh kweel a d da s a w n dawn)
[Law French "a fine upon acknowledgment of
the right, as that which he has of hi^> gift" I
Hist The most common fine of conveyance, by
which the defendant (also called the defoitiant)
acknowledged in court that he had alreadv con-

Transcript No. 1, Page 3

premature since the ordinance does not allow for a sentence
greater than allowed by state law.
In ruling on this, let me read from my notes.

The

defendant's motion to dismiss and quash the conviction does
not allege any wrongdoing on the part of the Hyde Park
justice court.

The defendant's motion only alleges that

injustice happens in Utah justice courts.

The defendant does

not allege any wrongdoing on the part of Hyde Park's justice
court and therefore defendant's argument is not relevant and
moot.
Further, the defendant has appealed the justice court
decision to this court and therefore the justice court
decision is moot at this point.

Therefore, defendant's

motion is denied.
In regards to defendant's motion to dismiss, the court
finds that the defendant has not overcome the long-standing
presumptions regarding constitutionality.

The court finds

that plaintiff's ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague
and therefore defendant's motion is denied.
Counsel, will you prepare an order to that effect?
MR. JENKINS:
THE COURT:

I will, Your Honor.
Very well.

Thank you.

With that, counsel, it would

appear that we need to set this matter for trial; is that
correct?
MR. LAURITZEN:

Yes, please.
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